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Lukáš Czerner
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OpenAI exposes the Russia-origin Dark Clark and Iran-origin Bogus Bylines operations

OpenAI disclosed the Russia-origin Dark Clark and the Iran-origin Bogus Bylines operations, and investigace.cz exposed a Russia-linked fake think tank that listed a Czech academic without his knowledge. No Central European government attributed a specific new campaign to a foreign state. 62 items from 4 to 11 October.

2026-10-11.pdf →

The PDF edition also labels the 38 items that describe manipulation with the techniques of the DISARM framework, and closes with the week’s patterns in tactics and techniques.

This week in brief

Russia drove most of the activity this week, but the concrete exposures came from OpenAI, investigative outlets and Ukrainian agencies. No Central European government attributed a specific new campaign to a foreign state.

Czechia

No Czech authority attributed a foreign campaign this week, and police logged no serious incidents during the 9-10 October municipal and Senate elections. The main exposure was investigace.cz’s report on a Russia-linked fake think tank with a Brno link.

  • 10 Oct - Police handled several suspected election or public-order offenses during the vote, none of them serious, and said nothing disrupted the course of the elections. Their statement did not mention hoaxes or foreign interference. Actor: no foreign actor named [official].
  • 9 Oct - Deník N reported that the NGO Šance na návrat had pupils hand out ANO flyers in Prague during class hours. The NGO is closely tied to the pro-Kremlin association Svatopluk. Actor: a domestic pro-Kremlin network, no state actor [media].
  • 9 Oct - Manipulátoři.cz debunked a meme attributing to Dominik Hašek and Col. Otakar Foltýn, both critics of Russia, an unsupported claim that Czech tennis players “took Moscow’s side” by beating Ukraine. Actor: unknown [unattributed].
  • 9 Oct - StopFake rebutted a claim that Prague left Kyiv “empty-handed” by delaying L-39NG trainer jets. No contract was ever signed, and funding is unresolved. Actor: Russian media and Telegram channels, such as theotherukraine.info [researcher].
  • 8 Oct - Manipulátoři.cz found no evidence for a Facebook claim that Coca-Cola trucks near Kyiv carried drone launchers. Russian sources, including the site Voennoje Delo, had spread it earlier, and Ukraine’s CCD called the photo AI-generated. Actor: Russian sources, including Voennoje Delo citing Boris Rozhin [researcher].
  • 7 Oct - investigace.cz examined the “International Burke Institute”, which poses as a Tel Aviv think tank. It listed Masaryk University vice-rector Radim Polčák as an expert without his knowledge. Actor: Russia (IBI), per OpenAI and Meta. A link to the Social Design Agency is unproven [platform].
  • 7 Oct - Manipulátoři.cz traced a “$140M in fridge boxes” smear to nvukraine.com, a spoof of Ukraine’s NV registered on 21 September. Two Czech commentators spread the claim, and AFP found the audio of the fake NV video very likely AI-generated. Actor: unknown [unattributed].
  • 5 Oct - Manipulátoři.cz debunked a story that a Ukrainian co-pilot attacked a Russian captain on a Flydubai flight. The captain was Indian, and the framing had also appeared in an original Expres.cz headline. Actor: originator unknown. Russian outlets (Krasnodar TV, citing the SHOT channel) amplified it [researcher].

Background: a 4 October iRozhlas commentary listed earlier government cuts to state strategic-communication and hybrid-resilience units. Their exact dates are unconfirmed.

Slovakia

Slovakia’s week brought an overt government move toward Moscow rather than exposed covert campaigns. No Slovak authority attributed a foreign information operation.

  • 9 Oct - Police stepped up patrols near schools, citing the Staškov attack and the knife attacks in Poland, where “Bloody Friday” rumors spread on TikTok and Discord, according to Reuters. Police did not answer whether threats reached Slovakia. Actor: none named [unattributed].
  • 8 Oct - Slovakia and Russia are restoring military attachés after four years. Tomáš Valášek, an opposition MP for PS, warned that the Russian attaché could take part in influence operations. Actor: the Slovak and Russian governments, an overt act. The risk claim is the opposition’s [media].
  • 8 Oct - Demagog.sk debunked an AI-generated video claiming Lay’s chips contain insects. It had over 500,000 views on Facebook. Actor: unknown [unattributed].
  • 7 Oct - Footage from “20 Days in Mariupol” was recast as Ukraine burying soldiers in mass graves. Ukraine’s CCD noted it spread in Slovak, among other languages. Actor: Kremlin-linked accounts, per Detector Media [researcher].
  • 6 Oct - The pro-Kremlin portal EA Daily praised Slovakia’s new Konev statue and, recalling Prague’s removal of its own, called Czechia a “lice-infested hole” that still is one. Actor: the pro-Kremlin outlet EA Daily, no state direction shown [media].
  • 5 Oct - False claims that the 14-year-old killed in Staškov had bullied her attacker spread through anonymous accounts and news-lookalike sites. Education Minister Tomáš Drucker warned against sharing unverified information. Actor: no foreign actor named [unattributed].

Background: on 3 October a Konev statue was unveiled at Dukla with Russia’s ambassador and the Smer minister Richard Takáč present.

Poland

Poland’s week centered on two school knife attacks and the rumor wave that followed. The special-services coordinator said a Russian role is being examined but is unproven. OpenAI’s Dark Clark case was the only newly exposed Russian operation touching Poland, and Ukraine’s CCD separately warned of a Pravda-network push without citing examples.

  • 10 Oct - Ukraine’s CCD warned of a push on the “collapse of Polish-Ukrainian friendship”, xenophobia and Ukraine-fatigue narratives before 11 November. It cited no specific posts or accounts. Actor: Russia (Pravda/Portal Kombat), per Ukraine’s CCD [official].
  • 10 Oct - Tomasz Siemoniak, the special-services coordinator, said that police, the services and NASK are checking every hypothesis, including Russian amplification of the school-attack panic, but that evidence must come first. Actor: Russia under examination, no evidence yet [unattributed].
  • 9 Oct - After knife attacks on 7 and 8 October, rumors of a coordinated “Bloody Friday” spread on X, often as screenshots of text and messenger chats. Demagog found them contradictory, and digital affairs minister Gawkowski ordered round-the-clock internet monitoring, with NASK passing worrying signals to the police. Actor: none identified [unattributed].
  • 8 Oct - OpenAI disclosed “Dark Clark”, whose operators claimed that a fake email from Lima’s education office got Peruvian schools to hold events honoring Stepan Bandera. In July, Myśl Polska and MEP Grzegorz Braun had used the story against Ukraine. Actor: Russia-origin (Dark Clark) [platform].
  • 8 Oct - A Lublin appeals court raised Paweł K.’s espionage sentence to 5.5 years. Prosecutors said he was tasked with gathering Rzeszów airport security data that Russian intelligence could have used in a possible plot against Zelensky. Actor: Russia, per prosecutors and the court. He denies it [official].
  • 8 Oct - The government sought powers to block illegal online content faster after the school attacks. The President had vetoed an earlier law implementing the DSA. Actor: no foreign actor, a policy response [official].
  • 7 Oct - StopFake rebutted claims that Poland and Romania refused Ukrainian grain transit. They declined only to raise volumes, and transit continues. Actor: Russian media and Telegram, such as anna-news.info [researcher].
  • 7 Oct - Polish Facebook users recast a GUS estimate of Poland’s GDP losses from Russia’s war, 490 billion złoty over 2022-2025, as money lost “because of Ukraine”. Actor: Polish users, not linked to Russia [unattributed].
  • 7 Oct - OKO.press reported that Pathway Global Alliance, an Indian partner of Braun’s party, has worked with Russia since 2019. Former PiS MEP Ryszard Czarnecki is one of its international directors. Actor: a Russia-linked network [media].
  • 6 Oct - A Kyiv tree-protest clip, recast as “forced mobilization of women”, spread on Polish Facebook reels and the X account @WolnaRadio. Actor: the Russian Telegram channel Shepot Fronta as the origin [researcher].
  • 5 Oct - Demagog mapped Russian efforts to set Poland against Czechia, Lithuania, Germany and Ukraine. It cited NASK experts saying the modus operandi of a Zaolzie provocation before the Czech Senate vote pointed to Russia. Actor: Russia, including Matryoshka, per Demagog citing NASK [researcher].

Background: by an order of 29 September, the Prime Minister created the Centrum Walki z Dezinformacją, an advisory body within the digital ministry that works with the security services.

Germany and Austria

Germany’s chancellor and intelligence chiefs publicly accused Russia of disinformation and a “shadow war”, while Russian-linked fakes targeted Merz. Austria announced a counter-FIMI center. Its spy arrests this week involved Ukrainians, not Russians.

  • 10 Oct - Germany: Mimikama rated as false Russian-language Telegram posts claiming Merz blamed Russia for his poll ratings. He was answering a question about criticism of Ukraine aid. Actor: Russian-language Telegram as the origin, no network named [researcher].
  • 7-9 Oct - Germany: a video with a spoofed Bellingcat logo claimed Merz pockets 25% of each Ukraine aid tranche. Bellingcat said it did not make the video. Actor: Russia (Matryoshka), per AntiBot4Navalny via The Insider [researcher].
  • 5-9 Oct - Austria: two Ukrainians, reported to be military-intelligence staff, were arrested in Vienna on suspicion of spying against Austria and remanded, initially until 21 October. Both deny it. A Ukrainska Pravda journalist and cameraman were briefly detained, then freed. Actor: suspected Ukrainian intelligence, per media reports. Officials confirmed only an espionage suspicion [media].
  • 8 Oct - Austria: Foreign Minister Beate Meinl-Reisinger announced a competence center against foreign information manipulation, modeled on Finland. The FPÖ called it a “ministry of truth”. Actor: Russia cited as context (“shadow war”) [official].
  • 7 Oct - Austria: a settlement obliges the FPÖ parliamentary club to pay 3,000 euros and correct a false claim on FPÖ-TV that Meinl-Reisinger carried cash suitcases to Ukraine, according to NEOS. NEOS called the story deliberate pro-Russian propaganda. Actor: FPÖ-TV (domestic). The pro-Russian label is NEOS’s claim [unattributed].
  • 6 Oct - Germany: former BND president August Hanning was arrested on suspicion of attempted treason and intelligence agent activity. His former office head was also arrested, accused of aiding him. Prosecutors did not name the foreign power involved. Actor: a foreign power, unnamed and not attributed to Russia [official].
  • 6 Oct - Germany: SPRAVDI described #RussiaIsNotMyEnemy, near-identical X posts posing as EU citizens, linked offline to the German group “Russland ist nicht unser Feind”. Actor: Kremlin-aligned networks, per Ukraine’s StratCom Centre [official].
  • 6 Oct - Germany: Detector Media debunked a Russian-language AI voice-over of a January speech by AfD leader Alice Weidel that makes her attack Zelensky. It has been on the TikTok page Global.Politic since 8 March, and a Georgian account re-shared it on 30 September. Actor: none named [unattributed].
  • 5 Oct - Germany: BND chief Martin Jäger told a public Bundestag oversight hearing that Russia is waging a “shadow war” against Germany. BfV chief Sinan Selen described sabotage plans and disinformation meant to sow discord. Actor: Russia [official].
  • 4 Oct - Germany: in Kyiv, Chancellor Merz said Russia runs systematic disinformation campaigns in Germany through bots and collaborators. Actor: Russia [official].

Background: the BfV flagged rising manipulation against Merz on 16 September, and APA-Faktencheck debunked a cloned-site Ukrainian cash-raid video on 2 October.

Ukraine

Ukrainian agencies tracked Russian efforts to blame Kyiv for the early winter strike campaign and to push “peace now” lines, while SBU cases showed Telegram recruitment of minors extending to murder. Trump’s 9 October Russian diesel deal and his 10 October call for a “new president” in Ukraine formed the backdrop.

  • 6-10 Oct - The CCD relayed Ukrenergo: the outages stem from Russian strikes on substations, not a capacity shortage. It warned that out-of-context fuel-stockpiling posts feed panic. Actor: Russian propaganda, per the CCD [official].
  • 9 Oct - The SBU said the FSB recruited a 14-year-old girl through Telegram and that she strangled an army instructor in January. The treason case is now in court. Actor: Russia (FSB) [official].
  • 9 Oct - SPRAVDI, citing SBU data, said Russia drew 327 minors into sabotage in 2024-2026. In 41 publicly detailed cases, Telegram was the recruitment channel in 30. Actor: Russian special services, per SPRAVDI using SBU data [official].
  • 9 Oct - The CCD warned that hostile channels urging residents of Kramatorsk, Sloviansk and nearby towns to “relocate” to occupied Donetsk funnel them into chatbots that harvest data and recruit saboteurs. Actor: Russian special services, per the CCD [official].
  • 9 Oct - The CCD reported AI-generated cartoons in which “Masha and the Bear” characters kill caricatured Ukrainians. Actor: Russia, per the CCD [official].
  • 9 Oct - Texty found 53 “peace at any price” TikTok videos with nearly 1.38 million views, and 13.2% of active YouTube commenters matched a database of known bots and trolls. Actor: Kremlin-aligned narratives, no state direction claimed [researcher].
  • 9 Oct - StopFake and Detector Media debunked claims that the Rada will split Ukrainians into three legal classes by language. No such bill exists. Actor: Russian Telegram channels [researcher].
  • 4-6 Oct - ISW judged the Russian MoD’s claims of encircling Ukrainian troops northeast of Kharkiv false (4 October) and said milbloggers backed a Dobropillia encirclement claim with invented Ukrainian counterattacks (6 October). It flagged likely AI-altered footage of Russian troops at the Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi station and of a flag-raising in Holubkove. Actor: the Russian MoD and milbloggers, per ISW [researcher].
  • 8-9 Oct - SPRAVDI logged about 8,000 Ukraine items from 220 FIMI-linked outlets on 8 October alone. The lines included “Ukraine is doomed” and Rubio’s remarks on escalation risks, twisted into claims that Europe is courting nuclear war. The CCD separately flagged a distorted Rubio quote on peace prospects, without naming who spread it. Actor: Russia (FIMI-linked outlets), per SPRAVDI [official].
  • 8 Oct - The SBU said Russian handlers posing as SBU officers recruited two Kyiv-region teenagers through Telegram dating chats. They blackmailed a 17-year-old into torching a logistics firm’s trucks and set a 16-year-old to scatter screws on a road to stop lorries. Actor: Russian special services [official].
  • 7 Oct - The SBU warned that occupation troops were ordered to film staged interviews in occupied Oleshky blaming Ukraine, from October to early November. Actor: a Russian occupation unit [official].
  • 6 Oct - The CCD said a campaign amplified Peskov’s “retaliation” line blaming Kyiv for strike damage. ISW separately found the Russian MoD’s retaliation claims false. Actor: the Kremlin and Russia-loyal media, per the CCD [official], and the Russian MoD, per ISW [researcher].
  • 5-6 Oct - After CCD reports, TikTok removed over 1,000 Alabuga-linked posts and over 90 AI deepfake videos of Ukrainian women journalists, the CCD said. Actor: unnamed accounts posting content linked to Alabuga, a Russian drone-production zone. The deepfake makers are unnamed [official].
  • 5 Oct - StopFake debunked a story that MPs would leave Kyiv by 17 October. It began in a Romanian outlet citing an anonymous source, and pro-Russian channels amplified it. Actor: pro-Russian channels amplified a Romanian outlet’s report. StopFake ties neither to a state [researcher].
  • 4 Oct - The CCD said Russian outlets claimed Kyiv planned a staged strike on facilities linked to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, and warned this could be an alibi for Russian provocations or strikes. Actor: Russian propaganda outlets, per the CCD [official].
  • The CCD, SPRAVDI and the SBU are Ukrainian state bodies and a party to the war. Their attributions are official, but not neutral.

Wider Europe and beyond

The Baltics and Montenegro produced the week’s main exposures and enforcement outside the core region. OpenAI’s Bogus Bylines was the only new Iran-origin exposure, and this issue found no new Chinese operation.

  • 11 Oct - Five European intelligence services told the FT that Russia is stepping up plots against defense-industry executives, largely to deter business with Ukraine. Actor: Russia, largely the GRU, per the FT [media].
  • 10 Oct - Bulgaria’s election commission said voting machines have no internet link, so outside interference with results is impossible. The presidential vote is on 25 October. Actor: none named [official].
  • 9 Oct - Montenegro detained Rybar head Mikhail Zvinchuk and four other Russians in Risan, and police seized a drone, cameras and phones. Police said all five will be expelled. Actor: Russia (Rybar). Zvinchuk is under EU and UK sanctions [official].
  • 9 Oct - Propastop, summarizing the Government Office’s September bulletin, reported that Russian propaganda about Estonia rose about a third from August. It included spliced quotes from defense minister Martin Herem. Actor: Russian state media and officials [researcher].
  • 8 Oct - The EU Council extended its Russia hybrid-threats sanctions regime to 9 October 2027. It covers 80 individuals and 20 entities, and the release announced no new listings. Actor: Russia [official].
  • 8 Oct - OpenAI exposed “Bogus Bylines”: seven fake journalist personas, mostly posing as Americans, published or syndicated almost 100 articles. The operation also aimed batches of hostile Persian-language replies at London-based Iran International. Actor: Iran-origin. OpenAI says it looks like a commercial for-hire actor and could not identify the organization [platform].
  • 8 Oct - Factcheck.bg debunked three fabricated statements spread on Facebook and TikTok: Putin threatening to strike four “American bases” in Bulgaria, Belousov saying everyone who armed Ukraine “will be tried in Russia”, and a made-up dialogue between Medvedev and the Vazrazhdane leader Kostadinov. Actor: not named [unattributed].
  • 7 Oct - The EEAS, Canada and Lithuania withdrew support from EU DisinfoLab’s Vilnius conference after, according to the Guardian, the Trump administration urged sponsors to pull out. The State Department said the conference had labeled the US a “FIMI threat”. Actor: a US objection, not an influence operation [media].
  • 6 Oct - The London firm Refute reported Kremlin-linked fakes around Latvia’s and Estonia’s elections, including a spoofed Euronews video and a euobserver.news spoof site. Actor: Russia, no operation named [researcher].
  • 5 Oct - ODIHR’s statement on Bosnia’s 4 October election found anonymous networks working along ethnic lines, along with clickbait and coordinated inauthentic networks posting political content. It named no foreign state. Actor: none named [unattributed].
  • 5 Oct - Propastop reviewed Yle reports that a significant number of Finnish MPs suspect their homes were entered with nothing stolen. Yle counts fewer than 20 such incidents in about a year. Supo said it has nothing tying Russia to the method. Actor: suspected Russia, unconfirmed [unattributed].
  • 4 Oct - LSM found no large propaganda wave or hacking around Latvia’s 3 October election. Two pro-Russian-leaning parties took about 24% combined. Actor: Russia, messaging seen but no wave [media].

Background: on 1 October the UK sanctioned four Georgians for spreading Kremlin disinformation, along with three people linked to Georgia’s occupied regions, among them the Russian political strategist Sergei Tolmachev.

Actors and techniques

Russian operations dominated, using spoofed media brands, fake think tanks, AI audio and Telegram recruitment. The only Iran-origin exposure used fake bylines, and no Chinese operation surfaced.

  • Matryoshka (Operation Overload), Russia. Spread the spoofed-Bellingcat video claiming Merz pockets 25% of Ukraine aid. Demagog’s 5 October analysis cited its fake about Ukraine buying Polish granite to rebury UPA fighters. Seen in Germany (X) and Poland.
  • Pravda / Portal Kombat, Russia. Ukraine’s CCD warned of an anti-Ukrainian push in Poland before 11 November. No fresh report placed it in Czechia or Slovakia this week. Seen in Poland.
  • Social Design Agency / International Burke Institute, Russia per OpenAI and Meta, with the SDA link unproven. investigace.cz showed that IBI listed real experts without their knowledge and ran promotional text on at least 25 India-focused news sites. A leaked SDA plan had proposed an Israeli think tank. Seen in Czechia, India and internationally.
  • Dark Clark / Politology (“La Compania”), Russia per OpenAI. Open-source researchers link some fakes to Politology, a reported Wagner successor. Exposed by OpenAI on 8 October as its first Category 5 case. It ran the “Social Research Center”, which claimed to study the Indian diaspora in Latin America, along with forged school directives and fake audio. Seen in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Panama, with spillover into Polish media.
  • Bogus Bylines, Iran-origin. OpenAI says it is consistent with a commercial for-hire actor and names no state agency. Exposed by OpenAI on 8 October. Seven fake bylines placed almost 100 articles in about a dozen outlets since July 2025. Its “Michael Harrison” persona also appeared in a Meta takedown in March. Seen in global outlets and the UK.
  • Spoofed news domains, Russia-linked in Refute’s case, actor unknown in the NV case. nvukraine.com spoofed Ukraine’s NV with very likely AI-generated audio, and Refute found a euobserver.news spoof around the Baltic elections. Both fit the pattern of Russia’s Storm-1516, though no source names it. Seen in Czechia and Estonia.
  • Rybar, Russia, an MoD-linked Telegram network. Its head was detained in Montenegro while, according to Montenegrin media cited by RFE/RL, filming a documentary critical of the country’s EU push. Seen in Montenegro.
  • Telegram recruitment of minors, Russia (the FSB and other services). The SBU exposed teen recruits for arson and a killing. Handlers posed as SBU officers, promised quick money and used blackmail. SPRAVDI also counts at least 16 cases elsewhere in Europe of teenagers and young people drawn into sabotage in 2024-2026, 11 of them officially tied to Russian services. Seen in Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe.
  • #RussiaIsNotMyEnemy, Kremlin-aligned networks. Bot-like X accounts posted AI images of “ordinary” Europeans opposing war with Russia. Seen EU-wide on X, with offline activity in Germany, Italy, France and Romania.
  • Russian MoD and milbloggers, Russia. Claimed false encirclements and posted likely AI-altered footage, per ISW. Seen in Ukraine.
  • Technique: AI audio and voice-overs, mostly Russia-aligned and often unattributed. Likely AI audio on the NV spoof video, a Russian-language voice-over on a Weidel speech, and Dark Clark’s fake Bolivian water-cut clip. Seen in Czechia, in Russian- and Georgian-language spaces, and in Bolivia.
  • Technique: deepfakes and AI video, Russia-aligned, with the makers often unnamed. TikTok removed over 90 deepfakes of Ukrainian women journalists after CCD reports, the CCD flagged AI cartoon killings, and ISW flagged likely AI-altered footage. Seen in Ukraine.
  • Technique: spoofed media brands, Russia-linked. Fakes imitated Bellingcat, NV, Euronews and EUobserver, and sponsored links to IBI appeared on fake Forbes and Rolling Stone sites. Seen in Germany, Czechia and the Baltics.
  • Technique: fake think tanks, Russia. IBI listed real experts without their knowledge, and the Social Research Center was run through an invented persona and unwitting local staff. Seen in Czechia and Latin America.

New research and reports

OpenAI’s 8 October report and investigace.cz’s IBI investigation are the two to read. Most other output this week came from Ukrainian monitors. Meta, Google, Microsoft, Graphika, DFRLab and ISD published nothing on state influence operations in the window.

What to watch next week

The EU’s 12 October foreign ministers’ meeting on Russia’s hybrid campaign, the Czech Senate run-offs and Bulgaria’s 25 October election are the dates to watch.

  • 12 Oct - The EU Foreign Affairs Council discusses Russia’s “escalating hybrid campaign”.
  • 15-16 Oct - A European Council summit on competitiveness, Ukraine, the EU budget, the Middle East, defense, migration and enlargement. The draft agenda has no FIMI item.
  • 16-17 Oct - Czech Senate run-offs, a week after the first round. Watch for late hoaxes like the Zaolzie provocation NASK flagged before round one.
  • 21 Oct - The initial remand of the two Ukrainians arrested in Vienna ends, unless a court extends it.
  • 25 Oct - Bulgaria’s presidential election, with a possible run-off on 1 November. The Commission pressed Bulgaria on 1 October to designate and empower the remaining authorities that enforce the DSA.
  • October to early November - The SBU expects staged “resident interviews” from occupied Oleshky.
  • 11 Nov - Poland’s Independence Day, which Ukraine’s CCD flagged for a Pravda-network anti-Ukrainian push.
  • This issue does not draw on SIS, SME, GLOBSEC, the Czech CHH, Konkret24, PAP Fake Hunter, BfV, tagesschau, derStandard, Ukrainska Pravda, Sweden’s MPF or Balkan Insight, and does not specifically cover Pravda-network and Storm-1516 activity in Czechia and Slovakia. Finding nothing there is not proof that nothing happened.

This digest is created with the help of AI-enabled tools and may contain inaccuracies. If you find one, let me know.

CEE influence operations 2026-10-11 15:47
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