

Influence Operations Weekly Digest

4-11 Oct 2026 · labeled with DISARM Red v1.6.1 · author: [Lukáš Czerner](#)

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$ digest --week 2026-W41 --framework disarm-red-1.6.1
┌ influence operations · weekly digest · DISARM-labeled
│ records  62 digest items · 38 manipulation records labeled
│ labels   292 technique labels · 110 distinct techniques
│ actors   RU 23 · IR 1 · CN 0 · unattributed 13 · domestic 1
└ status   ok
```

Russian, Chinese, Iranian and other state-linked information operations, with a focus on Central Europe and Ukraine.

[-] Disclaimer: This digest is created with the help of AI-enabled tools and may contain inaccuracies. If you find one, [let me know](#).

This week in brief

Russia drove most of the activity this week, but the concrete exposures came from OpenAI, investigative outlets and Ukrainian agencies. No Central European government attributed a specific new campaign to a foreign state.

- [+] [OpenAI exposed](#) the Russia-origin "Dark Clark", whose operators claimed a forged email got Peruvian schools to hold events honoring Stepan Bandera, and the Iran-origin "Bogus Bylines" fake-journalist operation on 8 October.
- [+] [investigace.cz showed](#) on 7 October that the Russia-linked "International Burke Institute" listed a Masaryk University vice-rector as an expert without his knowledge.
- [+] Slovakia is [restoring military attachés with Russia](#), reported on 8 October, and a pro-Kremlin portal [used Slovakia's new Konev statue to insult Czechia](#).
- [+] Poland's special-services coordinator [said](#) a possible Russian amplification of school-attack rumors is being examined but is unproven. Ukraine's Center for Countering Disinformation (CCD) [flagged a Pravda-network push](#) in Poland before 11 November.
- [+] In Germany, Chancellor Merz [accused Russia](#) of disinformation run through bots, and the BND chief [warned of a Russian "shadow war"](#). A Matryoshka fake with a [spoofed Bellingcat logo](#) then accused Merz of skimming Ukraine aid.
- [+] Ukraine's SBU exposed Russian Telegram recruitment of minors, including a [14-year-old recruited by the FSB](#) who strangled an army instructor. Her treason case has gone to court.
- [+] Montenegro [detained Rybar head Mikhail Zvinchuk](#) on 9 October, and the EU [renewed its Russia hybrid-threats sanctions](#) to October 2027 without adding names.

[-] Reading the DISARM lines: under every incident, a `disarm` line lists the DISARM Red v1.6.1 techniques evidenced in the sources, grouped by tactic in kill-chain order (plan → prepare → execute → assess). Every ID (e.g. [T0085.001](#)) links to its DISARM definition. `~` marks a label inferred rather than stated in a source. Technique names are in the appendix. Responses, context items and overt state actions are not labeled. Each incident has an ID (e.g. W41-007) used in the pattern summary.

Czechia

No Czech authority attributed a foreign campaign this week, and police logged no serious incidents during the 9-10 October municipal and Senate elections. The main exposure was investigace.cz's report on a Russia-linked fake think tank with a Brno link.

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
10 Oct W41-001	Police handled several suspected election or public-order offenses during the vote, none of them serious, and said nothing disrupted the course of the elections. Their statement did not mention hoaxes or foreign interference.	No foreign actor named [official]	Newstream
disarm not labeled · context			
9 Oct W41-002	Deník N reported that the NGO Šance na návrat had pupils hand out ANO flyers in Prague during class hours. The NGO is closely tied to the pro-Kremlin association Svatopluk.	A domestic pro-Kremlin network, no state actor [media]	Deník N
disarm not labeled · context			
9 Oct W41-003	Manipulátoři.cz debunked a meme attributing to Dominik Hašek and Col. Otakar Foltýn, both critics of Russia, an unsupported claim that Czech tennis players "took Moscow's side" by beating Ukraine.	Unknown [unattributed]	Manipulátoři.cz
disarm TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA06 T0086.001 T0086.003 · TA07 T0151.001 (actor unknown)			
9 Oct W41-004	StopFake rebutted a claim that Prague left Kyiv "empty-handed" by delaying L-39NG trainer jets. No contract was ever signed, and funding is unresolved.	Russian media and Telegram channels, such as theotherukraine.info [researcher]	StopFake
disarm TA02 ~T0139.001 · TA06 T0023 T0085.003 · TA07 T0151.007 T0152.004			
8 Oct W41-005	Manipulátoři.cz found no evidence for a Facebook claim that Coca-Cola trucks near Kyiv carried drone launchers. Russian sources, including the site Voennoje Delo, had spread it earlier, and Ukraine's CCD called the photo AI-generated.	Russian sources, including Voennoje Delo citing Boris Rozhin [researcher]	Manipulátoři.cz
disarm TA02 T0136.002 · TA14 ~T0004 T0068 · TA06 T0085.003 T0086.002 · TA05 ~T0101 · TA07 T0151.001 T0152.004			
7 Oct W41-006	investigace.cz examined the "International Burke Institute", which poses as a Tel Aviv think tank. It listed Masaryk University vice-rector Radim Polčák as an expert without his knowledge.	Russia (IBI), per OpenAI and Meta. A link to the Social Design Agency is unproven [platform]	investigace.cz
disarm TA02 ~T0136.004 · TA06 T0084.002 T0085.001 T0085.006 T0085.007 · TA15 T0092.001 T0149.003 T0149.007 · TA16 T0097.108 T0097.202 T0097.204 T0100 T0143.002 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.007 T0152.004 T0154.001 · TA09 T0114.001 T0116.001 · TA11 T0130.001			
7 Oct W41-007	Manipulátoři.cz traced a "\$140M in fridge boxes" smear to nvukraine.com, a spoof of Ukraine's NV registered on 21 September. Two Czech commentators spread the claim, and AFP found the audio of the fake NV video very likely AI-generated.	Unknown [unattributed]	Manipulátoři.cz
disarm TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA06 T0084.002 T0085.003 T0087.001 T0088.001 · TA15 T0149.003 T0150.001 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.001 T0152.004 · TA08 T0042 · TA17 ~T0039 (actor unknown)			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
5 Oct W41-008	Manipulátoři.cz debunked a story that a Ukrainian co-pilot attacked a Russian captain on a Flydubai flight. The captain was Indian, and the framing had also appeared in an original Expres.cz headline.	Originator unknown. Russian outlets (Krasnodar TV, citing the SHOT channel) amplified it [researcher]	Manipulátoři.cz
disarm TA14 ~T0068 · TA07 T0111 (actor unknown)			

[–] Background: a 4 October [iRozhlas commentary](#) listed earlier government cuts to state strategic-communication and hybrid-resilience units. Their exact dates are unconfirmed.

Slovakia

Slovakia's week brought an overt government move toward Moscow rather than exposed covert campaigns. No Slovak authority attributed a foreign information operation.

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
9 Oct W41-009	Police stepped up patrols near schools, citing the Staškov attack and the knife attacks in Poland, where "Bloody Friday" rumors spread on TikTok and Discord, according to Reuters. Police did not answer whether threats reached Slovakia.	None named [unattributed]	Pravda.sk
disarm not labeled · response			
8 Oct W41-010	Slovakia and Russia are restoring military attachés after four years. Tomáš Valášek, an opposition MP for PS, warned that the Russian attaché could take part in influence operations.	The Slovak and Russian governments, an overt act. The risk claim is the opposition's [media]	Noviny.sk ; Startitup.sk
disarm not labeled · overt state action			
8 Oct W41-011	Demagog.sk debunked an AI-generated video claiming Lay's chips contain insects. It had over 500,000 views on Facebook.	Unknown [unattributed]	Demagog.sk
disarm TA06 T0087.001 · TA07 T0151.001 (actor unknown)			
7 Oct W41-012	Footage from "20 Days in Mariupol" was recast as Ukraine burying soldiers in mass graves. Ukraine's CCD noted it spread in Slovak, among other languages.	Kremlin-linked accounts, per Detector Media [researcher]	Detector Media
disarm TA02 T0066 · TA06 T0084.003 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.008 · TA17 ~T0049.003 ~T0119.002			
6 Oct W41-013	The pro-Kremlin portal EA Daily praised Slovakia's new Konev statue and, recalling Prague's removal of its own, called Czechia a "lice-infested hole" that still is one.	The pro-Kremlin outlet EA Daily, no state direction shown [media]	TA3
disarm TA02 ~T0079 · TA14 T0083 · TA06 T0085 · TA07 T0152.004			
5 Oct W41-014	False claims that the 14-year-old killed in Staškov had bullied her attacker spread through anonymous accounts and news-lookalike sites. Education Minister Tomáš Drucker warned against sharing unverified information.	No foreign actor named [unattributed]	TA3
disarm TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0085 · TA16 T0098 · TA07 T0151.001 T0152.004 · TA17 T0122 · TA11 T0128.001 (actor unknown)			

[–] Background: on 3 October a [Konev statue was unveiled at Dukla](#) with Russia's ambassador and the Smer minister Richard Takáč present.

Poland

Poland's week centered on two school knife attacks and the rumor wave that followed. The special-services coordinator said a Russian role is being examined but is unproven. OpenAI's Dark Clark case was the only newly exposed Russian operation touching Poland, and Ukraine's CCD separately warned of a Pravda-network push without citing examples.

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
10 Oct W41-015	Ukraine's CCD warned of a push on the "collapse of Polish-Ukrainian friendship", xenophobia and Ukraine-fatigue narratives before 11 November. It cited no specific posts or accounts.	Russia (Pravda/Portal Kombat), per Ukraine's CCD [official]	Ukrinform
disarm not labeled · response			
10 Oct W41-016	Tomasz Siemoniak, the special-services coordinator, said that police, the services and NASK are checking every hypothesis, including Russian amplification of the school-attack panic, but that evidence must come first.	Russia under examination, no evidence yet [unattributed]	OKO.press ; WP
disarm not labeled · response			
9 Oct W41-017	After knife attacks on 7 and 8 October, rumors of a coordinated "Bloody Friday" spread on X, often as screenshots of text and messenger chats. Demagog found them contradictory, and digital affairs minister Gawkowski ordered round-the-clock internet monitoring, with NASK passing worrying signals to the police.	None identified [unattributed]	Demagog ; Rynek Zdrowia
disarm TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0085 · TA07 T0151.004 T0151.005 T0151.008 · TA08 ~ T0044 (actor unknown)			
8 Oct W41-018	OpenAI disclosed "Dark Clark", whose operators claimed that a fake email from Lima's education office got Peruvian schools to hold events honoring Stepan Bandera. In July, Myśl Polska and MEP Grzegorz Braun had used the story against Ukraine.	Russia-origin (Dark Clark) [platform]	OpenAI ; Detector Media
disarm TA02 T0066 ~ T0079 T0135.001 T0139.001 · TA06 T0085.001 T0085.004 T0087 T0088 · TA15 T0010 T0092.001 T0146.005 T0149.007 · TA16 T0097.202 T0097.204 T0097.206 T0143.002 T0143.003 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.008 T0152.004 T0153.001 T0154.001 · TA09 T0117 · TA10 T0057.002 · TA11 T0130.001 · TA12 T0133			
8 Oct W41-019	A Lublin appeals court raised Paweł K.'s espionage sentence to 5.5 years. Prosecutors said he was tasked with gathering Rzeszów airport security data that Russian intelligence could have used in a possible plot against Zelensky.	Russia, per prosecutors and the court. He denies it [official]	Notes from Poland
disarm not labeled · context			
8 Oct W41-020	The government sought powers to block illegal online content faster after the school attacks. The President had vetoed an earlier law implementing the DSA.	No foreign actor, a policy response [official]	gov.pl
disarm not labeled · response			
7 Oct W41-021	StopFake rebutted claims that Poland and Romania refused Ukrainian grain transit. They declined only to raise volumes, and transit continues.	Russian media and Telegram, such as anna-news.info [researcher]	StopFake
disarm TA02 ~ T0079 · TA06 T0023 T0085.003 · TA07 T0151.007 T0152.004			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
7 Oct W41-022	Polish Facebook users recast a GUS estimate of Poland's GDP losses from Russia's war, 490 billion złoty over 2022-2025, as money lost "because of Ukraine".	Polish users, not linked to Russia [unattributed]	Detector Media
disarm TA06 T0023.001 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.002 T0151.003 · TA17 ~T0119.001 (actor unknown)			
7 Oct W41-023	OKO.press reported that Pathway Global Alliance, an Indian partner of Braun's party, has worked with Russia since 2019. Former PiS MEP Ryszard Czarnecki is one of its international directors.	A Russia-linked network [media]	OKO.press
disarm not labeled · context			
6 Oct W41-024	A Kyiv tree-protest clip, recast as "forced mobilization of women", spread on Polish Facebook reels and the X account @WolnaRadio.	The Russian Telegram channel Shepot Fronta as the origin [researcher]	Detector Media
disarm TA06 T0023.001 T0085 · TA05 ~T0101 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.007 T0151.008 · TA17 ~T0119.002			
5 Oct W41-025	Demagog mapped Russian efforts to set Poland against Czechia, Lithuania, Germany and Ukraine. It cited NASK experts saying the modus operandi of a Zaolzie provocation before the Czech Senate vote pointed to Russia.	Russia, including Matryoshka, per Demagog citing NASK [researcher]	Demagog
disarm TA02 T0079 · TA14 T0083 · TA16 T0097.111 T0143.003 · TA18 T0123 · TA10 T0057			

[-] Background: by an [order of 29 September](#), the Prime Minister [created the Centrum Walki z Dezinformacją](#), an advisory body within the digital ministry that works with the security services.

Germany and Austria

Germany's chancellor and intelligence chiefs publicly accused Russia of disinformation and a "shadow war", while Russian-linked fakes targeted Merz. Austria announced a counter-FIMI center. Its spy arrests this week involved Ukrainians, not Russians.

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
10 Oct W41-026	Germany: Mimikama rated as false Russian-language Telegram posts claiming Merz blamed Russia for his poll ratings. He was answering a question about criticism of Ukraine aid.	Russian-language Telegram as the origin, no network named [researcher]	Mimikama
disarm TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA06 T0023.001 · TA07 ~T0151.007 (actor unknown)			
7-9 Oct W41-027	Germany: a video with a spoofed Bellingcat logo claimed Merz pockets 25% of each Ukraine aid tranche. Bellingcat said it did not make the video.	Russia (Matryoshka), per AntiBot4Navalny via The Insider [researcher]	The Insider ; Mimikama
disarm TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA06 T0087 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.008 · TA08 T0042 · TA17 T0039 ~T0119.002			
5-9 Oct W41-028	Austria: two Ukrainians, reported to be military-intelligence staff, were arrested in Vienna on suspicion of spying against Austria and remanded, initially until 21 October. Both deny it. A Ukrainska Pravda journalist and cameraman were briefly detained, then freed.	Suspected Ukrainian intelligence, per media reports. Officials confirmed only an espionage suspicion [media]	profil ; ÖÖN
disarm not labeled · context			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
8 Oct W41-029	Austria: Foreign Minister Beate Meinl-Reisinger announced a competence center against foreign information manipulation, modeled on Finland. The FPÖ called it a "ministry of truth".	Russia cited as context ("shadow war") [official]	<u>Heute; MeinBezirk</u>
disarm not labeled · response			
7 Oct W41-030	Austria: a settlement obliges the FPÖ parliamentary club to pay 3,000 euros and correct a false claim on FPÖ-TV that Meinl-Reisinger carried cash suitcases to Ukraine, according to NEOS. NEOS called the story deliberate pro-Russian propaganda.	FPÖ-TV (domestic). The pro-Russian label is NEOS's claim [unattributed]	<u>NEOS</u>
disarm TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA06 T0085 · TA15 T0095 · TA16 T0097.110 T0143.001 · TA07 T0151.001 (domestic · excluded from FIMI analysis)			
6 Oct W41-031	Germany: former BND president August Hanning was arrested on suspicion of attempted treason and intelligence agent activity. His former office head was also arrested, accused of aiding him. Prosecutors did not name the foreign power involved.	A foreign power, unnamed and not attributed to Russia [official]	<u>CORRECTIV; dpa via inFranken</u>
disarm not labeled · context			
6 Oct W41-032	Germany: SPRAVDI described #RussiaIsNotMyEnemy, near-identical X posts posing as EU citizens, linked offline to the German group "Russland ist nicht unser Feind".	Kremlin-aligned networks, per Ukraine's StratCom Centre [official]	<u>SPRAVDI</u>
disarm TA02 T0135.002 · TA06 T0015 T0086.002 T0087.001 · TA16 T0097.101 T0143.002 T0144.002 · TA07 T0151.008 · TA17 T0049.003 T0119			
6 Oct W41-033	Germany: Detector Media debunked a Russian-language AI voice-over of a January speech by AfD leader Alice Weidel that makes her attack Zelensky. It has been on the TikTok page Global.Politic since 8 March, and a Georgian account re-shared it on 30 September.	None named [unattributed]	<u>Detector Media</u>
disarm TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA06 T0023.001 T0087.002 T0088.001 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0151.003 T0151.008 · TA17 T0119.002 (actor unknown)			
5 Oct W41-034	Germany: BND chief Martin Jäger told a public Bundestag oversight hearing that Russia is waging a "shadow war" against Germany. BfV chief Sinan Selen described sabotage plans and disinformation meant to sow discord.	Russia [official]	<u>dpa via cash.ch</u>
disarm not labeled · context			
4 Oct W41-035	Germany: in Kyiv, Chancellor Merz said Russia runs systematic disinformation campaigns in Germany through bots and collaborators.	Russia [official]	<u>Boston Globe/AP</u>
disarm not labeled · context			

[–] Background: the BfV flagged rising manipulation against Merz on 16 September, and APA-Faktencheck debunked a cloned-site Ukrainian cash-raid video on 2 October.

Ukraine

Ukrainian agencies tracked Russian efforts to blame Kyiv for the early winter strike campaign and to push "peace now" lines, while SBU cases showed Telegram recruitment of minors extending to murder. Trump's 9 October Russian diesel deal and his 10 October call for a "new president" in Ukraine formed the backdrop.

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
6-10 Oct W41-036	The CCD relayed Ukrenergogo: the outages stem from Russian strikes on substations, not a capacity shortage. It warned that out-of-context fuel-stockpiling posts feed panic.	Russian propaganda, per the CCD [official]	<u>CCD Telegram</u> ; <u>CCD Telegram</u>
disarm not labeled · response			
9 Oct W41-037	The SBU said the FSB recruited a 14-year-old girl through Telegram and that she strangled an army instructor in January. The treason case is now in court.	Russia (FSB) [official]	<u>SBU</u>
disarm TA15 T0091 · TA07 T0151.006 ~T0153.007 · TA10 T0127.002			
9 Oct W41-038	SPRAVDI, citing SBU data, said Russia drew 327 minors into sabotage in 2024-2026. In 41 publicly detailed cases, Telegram was the recruitment channel in 30.	Russian special services, per SPRAVDI using SBU data [official]	<u>SPRAVDI</u>
disarm TA02 T0138.003 · TA15 T0091.001 · TA07 T0151.006 T0151.015 ~T0153.007 · TA18 T0048.003 · TA10 T0127.002 · TA11 T0128.001 T0130.001			
9 Oct W41-039	The CCD warned that hostile channels urging residents of Kramatorsk, Sloviansk and nearby towns to "relocate" to occupied Donetsk funnel them into chatbots that harvest data and recruit saboteurs.	Russian special services, per the CCD [official]	<u>CCD Telegram</u>
disarm TA02 T0138.001 · TA15 ~T0091 T0146.007			
9 Oct W41-040	The CCD reported AI-generated cartoons in which "Masha and the Bear" characters kill caricatured Ukrainians.	Russia, per the CCD [official]	<u>CCD Telegram</u>
disarm TA02 T0140.003 · TA06 T0087.001 · TA07 T0151.001			
9 Oct W41-041	Texty found 53 "peace at any price" TikTok videos with nearly 1.38 million views, and 13.2% of active YouTube commenters matched a database of known bots and trolls.	Kremlin-aligned narratives, no state direction claimed [researcher]	<u>Texty</u>
disarm TA02 ~T0139.001 · TA14 T0022.001 · TA06 T0084.001 · TA07 T0151.008 T0151.014 · TA09 T0116.001 · TA17 T0049.005 (actor unknown)			
9 Oct W41-042	StopFake and Detector Media debunked claims that the Rada will split Ukrainians into three legal classes by language. No such bill exists.	Russian Telegram channels [researcher]	<u>StopFake</u> ; <u>Detector Media</u>
disarm TA02 ~T0135.004 · TA14 T0083 · TA06 T0023 T0085 · TA07 T0151.007			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
4-6 Oct W41-043	ISW judged the Russian MoD's claims of encircling Ukrainian troops northeast of Kharkiv false (4 October) and said milbloggers backed a Dobropillia encirclement claim with invented Ukrainian counterattacks (6 October). It flagged likely AI-altered footage of Russian troops at the Kupiansk-Vuzlovyyi station and of a flag-raising in Holubkove.	The Russian MoD and milbloggers, per ISW [researcher]	<u>ISW</u> ; <u>ISW</u>
disarm TA02 T0136.004 · TA06 T0085 T0087.001 · TA16 T0097.206 T0143.001 · TA07 T0151.007 T0151.008			
8-9 Oct W41-044	SPRAVDI logged about 8,000 Ukraine items from 220 FIMI-linked outlets on 8 October alone. The lines included "Ukraine is doomed" and Rubio's remarks on escalation risks, twisted into claims that Europe is courting nuclear war. The CCD separately flagged a distorted Rubio quote on peace prospects, without naming who spread it.	Russia (FIMI-linked outlets), per SPRAVDI [official]	<u>SPRAVDI</u> ; <u>Detector Media</u>
disarm TA02 T0079 T0139.001 · TA06 T0023 T0085			
8 Oct W41-045	The SBU said Russian handlers posing as SBU officers recruited two Kyiv-region teenagers through Telegram dating chats. They blackmailed a 17-year-old into torching a logistics firm's trucks and set a 16-year-old to scatter screws on a road to stop lorries.	Russian special services [official]	<u>SBU</u>
disarm TA02 T0138.003 · TA15 T0091 · TA16 T0097.109 T0097.112 T0143.002 · TA07 T0151.006 ~T0153.007 · TA10 T0127.002 · TA11 T0129.007			
7 Oct W41-046	The SBU warned that occupation troops were ordered to film staged interviews in occupied Oleshky blaming Ukraine, from October to early November.	A Russian occupation unit [official]	<u>SBU</u>
disarm not labeled · response			
6 Oct W41-047	The CCD said a campaign amplified Peskov's "retaliation" line blaming Kyiv for strike damage. ISW separately found the Russian MoD's retaliation claims false.	The Kremlin and Russia-loyal media, per the CCD [official], and the Russian MoD, per ISW [researcher]	<u>Ukrinform</u> ; <u>ISW</u>
disarm TA02 T0136.002 · TA14 T0004 T0068 · TA06 T0085 · TA16 T0097.111 T0097.206 T0143.001 · TA07 T0111 T0151.007			
5-6 Oct W41-048	After CCD reports, TikTok removed over 1,000 Alabuga-linked posts and over 90 AI deepfake videos of Ukrainian women journalists, the CCD said.	Unnamed accounts posting content linked to Alabuga, a Russian drone-production zone. The deepfake makers are unnamed [official]	<u>Ukrinform</u> ; <u>CCD</u> <u>Telegram</u>
disarm not labeled · response			
5 Oct W41-049	StopFake debunked a story that MPs would leave Kyiv by 17 October. It began in a Romanian outlet citing an anonymous source, and pro-Russian channels amplified it.	Pro-Russian channels amplified a Romanian outlet's report. StopFake ties neither to a state [researcher]	<u>StopFake</u>
disarm TA06 T0085 T0085.003 · TA07 T0151.001 T0152.004 · TA17 ~T0119.002 (actor unknown)			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
4 Oct W41-050	The CCD said Russian outlets claimed Kyiv planned a staged strike on facilities linked to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, and warned this could be an alibi for Russian provocations or strikes.	Russian propaganda outlets, per the CCD [official]	<u>CCD Telegram</u>
disarm TA02 T0136.002 · TA14 T0004 · TA06 T0085			

[-] Attribution note: The CCD, SPRAVDI and the SBU are Ukrainian state bodies and a party to the war. Their attributions are official, but not neutral.

Wider Europe and beyond

The Baltics and Montenegro produced the week's main exposures and enforcement outside the core region. OpenAI's Bogus Bylines was the only new Iran-origin exposure, and this issue found no new Chinese operation.

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
11 Oct W41-051	Five European intelligence services told the FT that Russia is stepping up plots against defense-industry executives, largely to deter business with Ukraine.	Russia, largely the GRU, per the FT [media]	<u>Ukrinform</u>
disarm not labeled · context			
10 Oct W41-052	Bulgaria's election commission said voting machines have no internet link, so outside interference with results is impossible. The presidential vote is on 25 October.	None named [official]	<u>BTA</u> ; <u>BTA</u>
disarm not labeled · response			
9 Oct W41-053	Montenegro detained Rybar head Mikhail Zvinchuk and four other Russians in Risan, and police seized a drone, cameras and phones. Police said all five will be expelled.	Russia (Rybar). Zvinchuk is under EU and UK sanctions [official]	<u>RFE/RL</u>
disarm not labeled · context			
9 Oct W41-054	Propastop, summarizing the Government Office's September bulletin, reported that Russian propaganda about Estonia rose about a third from August. It included spliced quotes from defense minister Martin Herem.	Russian state media and officials [researcher]	<u>Propastop</u>
disarm TA02 ~T0136.001 · TA06 T0023 · TA16 T0097.111 T0143.001 · TA07 T0111.002 · TA08 T0042 · TA11 T0129.006			
8 Oct W41-055	The EU Council extended its Russia hybrid-threats sanctions regime to 9 October 2027. It covers 80 individuals and 20 entities, and the release announced no new listings.	Russia [official]	<u>Council of the EU</u>
disarm not labeled · response			
8 Oct W41-056	OpenAI exposed "Bogus Bylines": seven fake journalist personas, mostly posing as Americans, published or syndicated almost 100 articles. The operation also aimed batches of hostile Persian-language replies at London-based Iran International.	Iran-origin. OpenAI says it looks like a commercial for-hire actor and could not identify the organization [platform]	<u>OpenAI</u> ; <u>Iran International</u>
disarm TA02 ~T0075.001 · TA06 T0085.001 T0085.006 · TA15 ~T0145.002 T0149.007 · TA16 T0097.102 T0100 T0143.002 T0144.001 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.008 T0153.001 T0154.001 · TA09 T0116.001 · TA17 T0049.005 · TA11 T0130.001 · TA12 T0134.001			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
8 Oct W41-057	Factcheck.bg debunked three fabricated statements spread on Facebook and TikTok: Putin threatening to strike four "American bases" in Bulgaria, Belousov saying everyone who armed Ukraine "will be tried in Russia", and a made-up dialogue between Medvedev and the Vazrazhdane leader Kostadinov.	Not named [unattributed]	<u>Detector Media</u>
disarm TA06 T0023 T0085 T0085.003 · TA16 T0098.002 · TA05 T0102.001 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.002 T0151.008 T0152.004 · TA08 T0042 · TA17 ~T0119.002 (actor unknown)			
7 Oct W41-058	The EEAS, Canada and Lithuania withdrew support from EU DisinfoLab's Vilnius conference after, according to the Guardian, the Trump administration urged sponsors to pull out. The State Department said the conference had labeled the US a "FIMI threat".	A US objection, not an influence operation [media]	<u>Tech Policy Press</u>
disarm not labeled · context			
6 Oct W41-059	The London firm Refute reported Kremlin-linked fakes around Latvia's and Estonia's elections, including a spoofed Euronews video and a evobserver.news spoof site.	Russia, no operation named [researcher]	<u>Euronews</u>
disarm TA02 T0135.003 · TA06 T0084.002 T0085.003 T0087.001 T0087.002 T0088.001 · TA15 T0149.003 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 ~T0151.007 T0151.008 T0152.004 · TA08 T0042 · TA17 ~T0039 · TA11 T0131.001			
5 Oct W41-060	ODIHR's statement on Bosnia's 4 October election found anonymous networks working along ethnic lines, along with clickbait and coordinated inauthentic networks posting political content. It named no foreign state.	None named [unattributed]	<u>ODIHR</u>
disarm TA02 ~T0135.004 · TA14 T0068 T0083 · TA06 T0085 T0086.002 · TA16 T0098 · TA05 T0016 · TA07 T0151.003 T0152.004 (actor unknown)			
5 Oct W41-061	Propastop reviewed Yle reports that a significant number of Finnish MPs suspect their homes were entered with nothing stolen. Yle counts fewer than 20 such incidents in about a year. Supo said it has nothing tying Russia to the method.	Suspected Russia, unconfirmed [unattributed]	<u>Propastop</u>
disarm not labeled · context			
4 Oct W41-062	LSM found no large propaganda wave or hacking around Latvia's 3 October election. Two pro-Russian-leaning parties took about 24% combined.	Russia, messaging seen but no wave [media]	<u>LSM</u>
disarm not labeled · context			

[-] Background: on 1 October the UK sanctioned four Georgians for spreading Kremlin disinformation, along with three people linked to Georgia's occupied regions, among them the Russian political strategist Sergei Tolmachev.

Actors and techniques

Russian operations dominated, using spoofed media brands, fake think tanks, AI audio and Telegram recruitment. The only Iran-origin exposure used fake bylines, and no Chinese operation surfaced.

OPERATION OR ACTOR	ORIGIN	WHAT IT DID THIS WEEK	WHERE SEEN
Matryoshka (Operation Overload)	Russia	Spread the spoofed-Bellingcat video claiming Merz pockets 25% of Ukraine aid. <u>Demagog's 5 October analysis</u> cited its fake about Ukraine buying Polish granite to rebury UPA fighters.	Germany (X) and Poland
Pravda / Portal Kombat	Russia	Ukraine's CCD warned of an anti-Ukrainian push in Poland before 11 November. No fresh report placed it in Czechia or Slovakia this week.	Poland
Social Design Agency / International Burke Institute	Russia per OpenAI and Meta, with the SDA link unproven	<u>investigace.cz showed</u> that IBI listed real experts without their knowledge and ran promotional text on at least 25 India-focused news sites. A leaked SDA plan had proposed an Israeli think tank.	Czechia, India and internationally
Dark Clark / Politology ("La Compania")	Russia per OpenAI	Open-source researchers link some fakes to Politology, a reported Wagner successor. <u>Exposed by OpenAI</u> on 8 October as its first Category 5 case. It ran the "Social Research Center", which claimed to study the Indian diaspora in Latin America, along with forged school directives and fake audio.	Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Panama, with spillover into Polish media
Bogus Bylines	Iran-origin	OpenAI says it is consistent with a commercial for-hire actor and names no state agency. <u>Exposed by OpenAI</u> on 8 October. Seven fake bylines placed almost 100 articles in about a dozen outlets since July 2025. Its "Michael Harrison" persona also appeared in a Meta takedown in March.	Global outlets and the UK
Spoofed news domains	Russia-linked in Refute's case, actor unknown in the NV case	nvukraine.com spoofed Ukraine's NV with very likely AI-generated audio, and Refute found a euobserver.news spoof around the Baltic elections. Both fit the pattern of Russia's Storm-1516, though no source names it.	Czechia and Estonia
Rybar	Russia, an MoD-linked Telegram network	Its head was detained in Montenegro while, according to Montenegrin media <u>cited by RFE/RL</u> , filming a documentary critical of the country's EU push.	Montenegro
Telegram recruitment of minors	Russia (the FSB and other services)	The SBU exposed teen recruits for arson and a killing. Handlers posed as SBU officers, promised quick money and used blackmail. <u>SPRAVDI</u> also counts at least 16 cases elsewhere in Europe of teenagers and young people drawn into sabotage in 2024-2026, 11 of them officially tied to Russian services.	Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe

OPERATION OR ACTOR	ORIGIN	WHAT IT DID THIS WEEK	WHERE SEEN
#RussiaIsNotMyEnemy	Kremlin-aligned networks	Bot-like X accounts posted AI images of "ordinary" Europeans opposing war with Russia.	EU-wide on X, with offline activity in Germany, Italy, France and Romania
Russian MoD and milbloggers	Russia	Claimed false encirclements and posted likely AI-altered footage, per ISW.	Ukraine
Technique: AI audio and voice-overs	Mostly Russia-aligned and often unattributed	Likely AI audio on the NV spoof video, a Russian-language voice-over on a Weidel speech, and Dark Clark's fake Bolivian water-cut clip.	Czechia, in Russian- and Georgian-language spaces, and in Bolivia
Technique: deepfakes and AI video	Russia-aligned, with the makers often unnamed	TikTok removed over 90 deepfakes of Ukrainian women journalists after CCD reports, the CCD flagged AI cartoon killings, and ISW flagged likely AI-altered footage.	Ukraine
Technique: spoofed media brands	Russia-linked	Fakes imitated Bellingcat, NV, Euronews and EUobserver, and sponsored links to IBI appeared on fake Forbes and Rolling Stone sites.	Germany, Czechia and the Baltics
Technique: fake think tanks	Russia	IBI listed real experts without their knowledge, and the Social Research Center was run through an invented persona and unwitting local staff.	Czechia and Latin America

New research and reports

OpenAI's 8 October report and investigace.cz's IBI investigation are the two to read. Most other output this week came from Ukrainian monitors. Meta, Google, Microsoft, Graphika, DFRLab and ISD published nothing on state influence operations in the window.

DATE	PUBLISHER	TITLE OR TOPIC	WHY IT MATTERS
10 Oct	SPRAVDI	<u>Weekly monitor of pro-Kremlin channels</u>	Strikes on Kyiv's bridges and infrastructure made up over 41% of the pro-Kremlin channel posts it sampled.
9 Oct	Texty	<u>"peace at any price" on TikTok and YouTube, 28 September to 4 October</u>	Puts known bots and trolls at 13.2% of active YouTube commenters.
9 Oct	SPRAVDI	<u>How Russian services recruit minors</u>	Cites SBU data on 327 recruited minors and counts at least 16 cases in Europe.
9 Oct	SPRAVDI	<u>One-day FIMI monitoring of 8 October</u>	Logs about 8,000 items from 220 outlets, putting a number on the "Ukraine is doomed" push.
9 Oct	EUvsDisinfo	<u>"How to justify crimes against humanity: the Kremlin method"</u>	Covers Kaliningrad blockade claims. Lithuanian data show GPS-spoofing antennas there rose from 3 to 36.
9 Oct	Propastop	<u>September media review on Estonia</u>	Volume rose about a third from August.
9 Oct	NATO StratCom COE	<u>"Coping Amid Disruption: Lessons on Resilience from Crisis and War"</u>	A 48-page review of civilian resilience. It does not address influence operations directly.

DATE	PUBLISHER	TITLE OR TOPIC	WHY IT MATTERS
9 Oct	Čeští elfové	<u>Chain-email monitoring for August 2026</u>	Monthly data on Czech chain emails.
8 Oct	OpenAI	<u>"Disrupting AI-enabled false front operations"</u>	OpenAI's first Category 5 disruption. Dark Clark used AI mostly to write internal reports for a superior.
8 Oct	Texty	<u>How Ukrainian politicians speculate on peace</u>	Traces a Russian "Maidan for peace" call through an opaque poll to MPs' statements.
7 Oct	investigace.cz	<u>The International Burke Institute as an academic front</u>	Adds a Czech victim, a leaked SDA plan and Indian placements to earlier OpenAI and Meta findings.
6 Oct	Refute via Euronews	<u>Kremlin-linked fakes in the Baltic elections</u>	Concludes the aim was eroding trust, not backing candidates.
6 Oct	SPRAVDI	<u>#RussiaIsNotMyEnemy</u>	Links online fake pacifism to German street groups.
5 Oct	ODIHR	<u>Preliminary statement on Bosnia's general election</u>	Monitored 400 clickbait pages, and notes that Bosnia has no state body for hybrid threats.
5 Oct	Demagog.org.pl	<u>"Od Wilna po Zaolzie"</u>	Maps Russian wedges between Poland and Czechia, Lithuania, Germany and Ukraine.
5 Oct	EUvsDisinfo	<u>"Bucha denial at UNGA and Nazi narratives justifying strikes on Ukraine"</u>	Tracks Lavrov's Bucha denial at the UN and the "Nazi" framing of strikes.

What to watch next week

The EU's 12 October foreign ministers' meeting on Russia's hybrid campaign, the Czech Senate run-offs and Bulgaria's 25 October election are the dates to watch.















- [+] 12 Oct: The EU Foreign Affairs Council discusses Russia's "escalating hybrid campaign".
- [+] 15-16 Oct: A European Council summit on competitiveness, Ukraine, the EU budget, the Middle East, defense, migration and enlargement. The draft agenda has no FIMI item.
- [+] 16-17 Oct: Czech Senate run-offs, a week after the first round. Watch for late hoaxes like the Zaolzie provocation NASK flagged before round one.
- [+] 21 Oct: The initial remand of the two Ukrainians arrested in Vienna ends, unless a court extends it.
- [+] 25 Oct: Bulgaria's presidential election, with a possible run-off on 1 November. The Commission pressed Bulgaria on 1 October to designate and empower the remaining authorities that enforce the DSA.
- [+] October to early November: The SBU expects staged "resident interviews" from occupied Oleshky.
- [+] 11 Nov: Poland's Independence Day, which Ukraine's CCD flagged for a Pravda-network anti-Ukrainian push.

[-] Coverage gap: This issue does not draw on SIS, SME, GLOBSEC, the Czech CHH, Konkret24, PAP Fake Hunter, BfV, tagesschau, derStandard, Ukrainska Pravda, Sweden's MPF or Balkan Insight, and does not specifically cover Pravda-network and Storm-1516 activity in Czechia and Slovakia. Finding nothing there is not proof that nothing happened.

TTP patterns this week

Russia accounts for 23 of the 24 attributed manipulation records. What sets those apart is disguise and infrastructure (impersonation, fake fronts, Telegram seeding), not the content itself, which attributed and unattributed actors now produce the same way, AI included. One week is a baseline, not a trend: read every number below as n/N records.

[x] Tactic presence by actor: records using each DISARM tactic at least once

TACTIC (KILL-CHAIN ORDER)	RUSSIA (N=23)	UNATTRIBUTED (N=13)	IRAN (N=1)
TA02 Plan Objectives	 21/23	 6/13	[x]
TA14 Develop Narratives	 6/23	 5/13	[]
TA06 Develop Content	 18/23	 12/13	[x]
TA15 Establish Assets	 7/23	 1/13	[x]
TA16 Establish Legitimacy	 10/23	 4/13	[x]
TA05 Microtarget	 5/23	 3/13	[]
TA07 Select Channels and Affordances	 19/23	 13/13	[x]
TA08 Conduct Pump Priming	 3/23	 3/13	[]
TA09 Deliver Content	 2/23	 1/13	[x]
TA17 Maximise Exposure	 5/23	 7/13	[x]
TA18 Drive Online Harms	 2/23	 0/13	[]
TA10 Drive Offline Activity	 5/23	 0/13	[]
TA11 Persist in the Information Environment	 6/23	 1/13	[x]
TA12 Assess Effectiveness	 1/23	 0/13	[x]

Not seen this week: TA01 Plan Strategy, TA13 Target Audience Analysis. Planning-phase tactics are rarely visible in open sources, so their absence says more about evidence than behaviour. TA02 includes inferred aims. Counting only aims a source states, Russia is 14/23 and unattributed 0/13.

- [1] **Russia's signature is disguise and infrastructure.** Content development appears almost everywhere (Russia 18/23, unattributed 12/13). What distinguishes the Russian records: impersonating real outlets, institutions or people (7/23 vs 1/13: [T0143.003](#), [T0097.202](#), [T0097.206](#), [T0149.003](#)), seeding via Telegram channels (8/23 vs 1/13: [T0151.007](#)) and concealment (6/23 vs 1/13: [TA11](#)). Caveat: traceable infrastructure is often what makes attribution possible, so part of this gap is a selection effect.
- [2] **Fake institutions with real people inside, across states.** Two Russian operations (International Burke Institute, W41-006; Dark Clark's Social Research Center, W41-018) and Iran-origin Bogus Bylines (W41-056) all built fabricated institutional or journalist identities ([T0097.204](#), [T0097.102](#)) and then borrowed credibility from real people: experts listed without consent ([T0143.003](#)), unwitting local writers ([T0010](#)), real outlets that published the op-eds ([T0100](#)). Both OpenAI-documented operations also used AI for internal reporting to their sponsors ([TA12](#)).
- [3] **AI-generated media is now baseline, not a signature.** AI text, images, video or voice appear in 7/23 Russian records, 4/13 unattributed and the single Iranian one, the same share (~30%) either way. Uses were AI-written articles and personas, voice-overs, video and images ([T0085.001](#), [T0088.001](#), [T0087.001](#), [T0086.002](#)). Apart from an AI voice-over on a speech by AfD leader Alice Weidel (W41-033), no deepfake of a Central European politician

surfaced.

- [4] **Wedge narratives aim at Central European neighbors.** Polish audiences are targeted in as many Russian records as Ukrainian ones (7 each). Four Russian records push neighbor-against-neighbor lines: the Konev statue (SK vs CZ, W41-013), the fake Bandera school email (PL vs UA, W41-018), grain transit (PL/RO vs UA, W41-021), and Zaolzie and other wedges (W41-025). Divide (T0079) is the stated or inferred aim.
- [5] **Crisis exploitation mostly runs without a known actor.** Exploiting breaking news (T0068) appears in 4/13 unattributed records (school attacks in Poland, the Staškov killing in Slovakia, the Flydubai story, Bosnia's election), against 2/23 Russian ones. Polish ministers explicitly declined to attribute the school-attack rumors.
- [6] **Offline harm through messaging apps rests on Ukrainian sources.** Recruitment of teenagers for arson and killing via Telegram and direct messages (T0127.002, T0153.007) appears in three Russian records, all sourced to Ukrainian state bodies (W41-037, -038, -045). SPRAVDI also counts at least 16 similar cases elsewhere in Europe, 11 of them officially tied to Russian services, but this week's records rest on Ukrainian sources alone.
- [7] **Reporting depth, not actor skill, drives label counts.** Records from platform takedown reports carry 22 labels on average, fact-checks 7 and Ukrainian state bodies 5.6. The full Russian chain (disguise, manipulated content, seeding, spread) is documented end-to-end in only 3 of 23 records (below). Compare actors by tactic presence, never by raw label counts.

ruddian spoof-to-spread chain · records documenting each stage (n = 23)

disguise	content	seed	spread
persona, spoofed brand, fake front TA16 10 / 23	AI-made or manipulated real media TA06 14 / 23	Telegram, X, Facebook, own or spoofed sites TA07 15 / 23	localization, cross-posting, flooding TA05 · TA17 7 / 23

all four stages documented in 3 records: Dark Clark (W41-018), #RussiaIsNotMyEnemy (W41-032), Baltic election spoofs of Euronews, EUobserver and The Defense Post (W41-059)

Stages count techniques, not whole tactics. Disguise is any TA16 label. Content is AI-made or edited media (T0023, T0023.001, T0084.003, T0085.001, T0086.002, T0086.003, T0087.001, T0087.002, T0088.001, T0088.002). Seed is T0151.001, T0151.007, T0151.008 or T0152.004. Spread is any TA17 label or T0101. That is why content and seed count fewer records than TA06 and TA07.

- [-] **Read with care:** one week and 37 FIMI records. Iran rests on a single record and China on none, 8 of 23 Russian records rest on Ukrainian state bodies, a party to the war, and labels come from secondary reporting, so they show what was documented, not everything the operators did.
- [x] **What to track as weeks accumulate**
- [+] Share of Russian records with impersonation (now 7/23) and Telegram seeding (8/23): rising means more traceable infrastructure.
- [+] AI-media share by actor (now ~30% for both): watch for the first high-quality deepfake of a Central European government official.
- [+] New fake fronts (think tanks, journalist personas) and whether IBI and Social Research Center tradecraft converge.
- [+] Targets: Poland vs Czechia vs Slovakia in wedge narratives, especially before Poland's 11 November.
- [+] First Chinese record in the region, and Iran beyond fake bylines.

Appendix: DISARM techniques used this week

110 techniques, ordered by tactic along the kill chain. Counts are records, not labels. RU = Russia, UNK = unattributed, IR = Iran, DOM = domestic (excluded from the analysis). Each ID links to its definition in the DISARM framework.

TACTIC	ID	TECHNIQUE	RU	UNK	IR	DOM
TA02	T0066	Degrade Adversary	2	-	-	-
TA02	T0075.001	Discredit Credible Sources	-	-	1	-
TA02	T0079	Divide	5	-	-	-
TA02	T0135.001	Smear	2	4	-	1
TA02	T0135.002	Thwart	1	-	-	-
TA02	T0135.003	Subvert	1	-	-	-
TA02	T0135.004	Polarise	1	1	-	-
TA02	T0136.001	Defend Reputaton	1	-	-	-
TA02	T0136.002	Justify Action	3	-	-	-
TA02	T0136.004	Boost Reputation	2	-	-	-
TA02	T0138.001	Encourage	1	-	-	-
TA02	T0138.003	Compel	2	-	-	-
TA02	T0139.001	Discourage	3	1	-	-
TA02	T0140.003	Spread Hate	1	-	-	-
TA14	T0004	Develop Competing Narratives	3	-	-	-
TA14	T0022.001	Amplify Existing Conspiracy Theory Narratives	-	1	-	-
TA14	T0068	Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis	2	4	-	-
TA14	T0083	Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative	3	1	-	-
TA06	T0015	Create Hashtags and Search Artefacts	1	-	-	-
TA06	T0023	Distort Facts	5	1	-	-
TA06	T0023.001	Reframe Context	1	3	-	-
TA06	T0084.001	Use Copy pasta	-	1	-	-
TA06	T0084.002	Plagiarise Content	2	1	-	-
TA06	T0084.003	Deceptively Labelled or Translated	1	-	-	-
TA06	T0085	Develop Text-Based Content	7	5	-	1
TA06	T0085.001	Develop AI-Generated Text	2	-	1	-
TA06	T0085.003	Develop Inauthentic News Articles	4	3	-	-
TA06	T0085.004	Develop Document	1	-	-	-
TA06	T0085.006	Develop Opinion Article	1	-	1	-
TA06	T0085.007	Create Fake Research	1	-	-	-
TA06	T0086.001	Develop Memes	-	1	-	-
TA06	T0086.002	Develop AI-Generated Images (Deepfakes)	2	1	-	-
TA06	T0086.003	Deceptively Edit Images (Cheap Fakes)	-	1	-	-
TA06	T0087	Develop Video-Based Content	2	-	-	-
TA06	T0087.001	Develop AI-Generated Videos (Deepfakes)	4	2	-	-
TA06	T0087.002	Deceptively Edit Video (Cheap Fakes)	1	1	-	-
TA06	T0088	Develop Audio-Based Content	1	-	-	-
TA06	T0088.001	Develop AI-Generated Audio (Deepfakes)	1	2	-	-
TA15	T0010	Cultivate Ignorant Agents	1	-	-	-

TACTIC	ID	TECHNIQUE	RU	UNK	IR	DOM
TA15	T0091	Recruit Malign Actors	3	-	-	-
TA15	T0091.001	Recruit Contractors	1	-	-	-
TA15	T0092.001	Create Organisations	2	-	-	-
TA15	T0095	Develop Owned Media Assets	-	-	-	1
TA15	T0145.002	AI-Generated Account Imagery	-	-	1	-
TA15	T0146.005	Lookalike Account ID	1	-	-	-
TA15	T0146.007	Automated Account Asset	1	-	-	-
TA15	T0149.003	Lookalike Domain	2	1	-	-
TA15	T0149.007	VPN Asset	2	-	1	-
TA15	T0150.001	Newly Created Asset	-	1	-	-
TA16	T0097.101	Local Persona	1	-	-	-
TA16	T0097.102	Journalist Persona	-	-	1	-
TA16	T0097.108	Expert Persona	1	-	-	-
TA16	T0097.109	Romantic Suitor Persona	1	-	-	-
TA16	T0097.110	Party Official Persona	-	-	-	1
TA16	T0097.111	Government Official Persona	3	-	-	-
TA16	T0097.112	Government Employee Persona	1	-	-	-
TA16	T0097.202	News Outlet Persona	4	1	-	-
TA16	T0097.204	Think Tank Persona	2	-	-	-
TA16	T0097.206	Government Institution Persona	3	-	-	-
TA16	T0098	Establish Inauthentic News Sites	-	2	-	-
TA16	T0098.002	Leverage Existing Inauthentic News Sites	-	1	-	-
TA16	T0100	Co-Opt Trusted Sources	1	-	1	-
TA16	T0143.001	Authentic Persona	3	-	-	1
TA16	T0143.002	Fabricated Persona	4	-	1	-
TA16	T0143.003	Impersonated Persona	5	1	-	-
TA16	T0144.001	Present Persona across Platforms	-	-	1	-
TA16	T0144.002	Persona Template	1	-	-	-
TA05	T0016	Create Clickbait	-	1	-	-
TA05	T0101	Create Localised Content	5	1	-	-
TA05	T0102.001	Use Existing Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles	-	1	-	-
TA07	T0111	Traditional Media	1	1	-	-
TA07	T0111.002	Newspaper	1	-	-	-
TA07	T0151.001	Social Media Platform	6	7	1	1
TA07	T0151.002	Online Community Group	-	2	-	-
TA07	T0151.003	Online Community Page	-	3	-	-
TA07	T0151.004	Chat Platform	-	1	-	-
TA07	T0151.005	Chat Community Server	-	1	-	-
TA07	T0151.006	Chat Room	3	-	-	-
TA07	T0151.007	Chat Broadcast Group	8	1	-	-
TA07	T0151.008	Microblogging Platform	7	4	1	-
TA07	T0151.014	Comments Section	-	1	-	-
TA07	T0151.015	Online Game Platform	1	-	-	-
TA07	T0152.004	Website Asset	7	5	-	-

TACTIC	ID	TECHNIQUE	RU	UNK	IR	DOM
TA07	T0153.001	Email Platform	1	-	1	-
TA07	T0153.007	Direct Messaging	3	-	-	-
TA07	T0154.001	AI LLM Platform	2	-	1	-
TA08	T0042	Seed Kernel of Truth	3	2	-	-
TA08	T0044	Seed Distortions	-	1	-	-
TA09	T0114.001	Social Media	1	-	-	-
TA09	T0116.001	Post Inauthentic Social Media Comment	1	1	1	-
TA09	T0117	Attract Traditional Media	1	-	-	-
TA17	T0039	Bait Influencer	2	1	-	-
TA17	T0049.003	Bots Amplify via Automated Forwarding and Reposting	2	-	-	-
TA17	T0049.005	Conduct Swarming	-	1	1	-
TA17	T0119	Cross-Posting	1	-	-	-
TA17	T0119.001	Post across Groups	-	1	-	-
TA17	T0119.002	Post across Platform	3	3	-	-
TA17	T0122	Direct Users to Alternative Platforms	-	1	-	-
TA18	T0048.003	Threaten to Dox	1	-	-	-
TA18	T0123	Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations	1	-	-	-
TA10	T0057	Organise Events	1	-	-	-
TA10	T0057.002	Conduct Symbolic Action	1	-	-	-
TA10	T0127.002	Encourage Physical Violence	3	-	-	-
TA11	T0128.001	Use Pseudonyms	1	1	-	-
TA11	T0129.006	Deny Involvement	1	-	-	-
TA11	T0129.007	Delete Accounts/Account Activity	1	-	-	-
TA11	T0130.001	Conceal Sponsorship	3	-	1	-
TA11	T0131.001	Legacy Web Content	1	-	-	-
TA12	T0133	Measure Effectiveness	1	-	-	-
TA12	T0134.001	Message Reach	-	-	1	-