Influence Operations Weekly Digest

18-26 Oct 2026 · labeled with DISARM Red v1.6.1 · author: Lukáš Czerner

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$ digest --week 2026-W44 --framework disarm-red-1.6.1
┌─ influence operations · weekly digest · DISARM-labeled
│  records  97 digest items · 69 manipulation records labeled
│  labels   454 technique labels · 97 distinct techniques
│  actors   RU 39 · IR 1 · CN 0 · unattributed 24 · domestic 5
└─ status    ok
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Russian, Chinese, Iranian and other state-linked information operations, with a focus on Central Europe and Ukraine.

[-] Disclaimer: This digest is created with the help of AI-enabled tools and may contain inaccuracies. If you find one, let me know.

This week in brief

Leaked Kremlin files and a bot network working the mood before France's protests put Doppelganger at the centre of the week, alongside a Storm-1516 deepfake in the US midterm race and Russian intelligence cases in Germany and Austria. No Central European government attributed a specific new disinformation campaign to a foreign state.

[+] The Insider published hacked correspondence between Russia's Presidential Administration and the Social Design Agency that it says names Sergei Kiriyenko as Doppelganger's initiator, shows Germany as its main early target and describes a campaign aimed at Ukrainians since 2023.

[+] Alliance4Europe attributed "with high confidence" to Doppelganger a bot network that posted 639 messages on X in French, German, English and Polish before France's 17 October protests, seen about 7.4 million times.

[+] Graphika tied to Storm-1516 deepfake videos accusing Texas Senate candidate James Talarico of sexual assault, which AI chatbots then repeated.

[+] Austria expelled four Russian diplomats, whom profil reports are suspected of espionage, and Germany arrested a Ukrainian suspected of spying on the arms industry for a Russian intelligence service.

[+] Ukraine's HUR said Russia was staging a Zoom "telebridge" with fake witnesses to divert attention from occupied Oleshky, and warned of false-flag sabotage in the EU to be blamed on Ukraine.

[+] An AI-made video of car queues at the Ukrainian border, shared by Konfederacja politicians, became a Channel One story, and NASK reported that platforms removed 6.7% of the more than 65,000 items it flagged.

[+] Čeští elfové found Vietnamese "AI slop" pages on Facebook carrying a fake Babiš speech demanding Russian gas, to 950,000 views across three pages.

[-] Reading the DISARM lines: under every incident, a **disarm** line lists the DISARM Red v1.6.1 techniques evidenced in the sources, grouped by tactic in kill-chain order (plan → prepare → execute → assess). Every ID (e.g. T0085.001) links to its DISARM definition. ~ marks a label inferred rather than stated in a source. Technique names are in the appendix. Responses, context items and overt state actions are not labeled. Each incident has an ID (e.g. W44-007) used in the pattern summary.

Czechia

No Czech authority attributed a campaign to a foreign state this week, though the prime minister and the interior minister called a story about a new wave of Ukrainian refugees false. The main exposures were investigace.cz showing that successors of sanctioned Russian propaganda sites still publish in Czech, and Čeští elfové finding Facebook "AI slop" pages it ties to Vietnam pushing a fake Babiš speech that demanded Russian gas. Russia's new ambassador openly courted Czech admirers of Putin.

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
25 Oct W44-001	Čeští elfové reported that in the second half of September Facebook "AI slop" pages were the main carriers of the call for Czechia to go back to Russian oil and gas. A reel on the page Bohemia Times, which it says is run by admins in Vietnam, claimed Babiš demands the return of Russian gas and drew 497,000 views, the same content reached 950,000 views across three pages, and most commenters took it as genuine.	Page admins in Vietnam, per Čeští elfové. No state named **[researcher]**	Čeští elfové
disarm TA06 T0085 T0087.001 · TA05 T0016 · TA07 T0151.003 · TA17 ~T0119.001 ~T0122 · TA11 ~T0130.001 (actor unknown)			
25 Oct W44-002	In its monitoring of disinformation websites for the first half of October, Čeští elfové found them turning on ANO and Babiš for not being "peaceful" enough, over the plan to send two mechanized brigades to the Baltics and support for a French nuclear umbrella, most sharply on 42TCen, which it calls Sputnik's successor site. The sites hold up Slovakia's Prime Minister Fico as the model of a "peace" premier.	Czech disinformation websites, 42TCen among them, per Čeští elfové **[researcher]**	Čeští elfové
disarm TA02 ~T0135.002 · TA16 T0098.002 · TA07 T0152.004 (domestic · excluded from FIMI analysis)			
23 Oct W44-003	The Insider showed that an April fake of Sweden's king refusing Zelensky's handshake was relaunched with a new claim that Zelensky spat at the king's feet, starting from the X account "Československé mírové fórum", with about 900 followers. The Insider ties the account to Vladimíra Vítová, former head of the small party Aliance národních sil, which it calls pro-Russian, and says the Czech post was "apparently" used as a foreign source. The Telegram channel Voenkor Kotenok, RT's English X account, Regnum and Bloknot, which drew a spit onto a photo, then spread it.	A Czech X account, then RT and other Russian media, per The Insider **[media]**	theins.ru
disarm TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA06 T0023 T0086.003 T0087.002 · TA07 T0111 T0151.007 T0151.008 · TA11 T0060			
23 Oct W44-004	MEP Tomáš Zdechovský told Hlídací pes that Sputnik, which the outlet calls Russian state media, asked him that week to comment on why most EU states opposed a full ban for Russians, after two Russian journalists called him the week before and a woman posing as a Lithuanian independent journalist the week before that. He refused, and says he has faced discrediting campaigns since September and cyberattacks in recent weeks.	Sputnik, and an unidentified impersonator, per Zdechovský **[media]**	hlidacipes.org
disarm not labeled · context			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
22 Oct W44-005	The broadcasting council registered TV Jedna, an online TV of the Svatopluk association, which Deník N has described as spreading views close to the Russian regime. The project had raised CZK 671,516 from 559 donors, lists MEPs Kateřina Konečná (KSČM) and Ivan David (SPD) among its hosts, and plans to broadcast from November. disarm not labeled · context	A domestic association. No state actor named **[media]**	lupa.cz; Deník N
20-22 Oct W44-006	Prime Minister Babiš and Interior Minister Lubomír Metnar said on 20 October that social media claims of a new wave of Ukrainian refugees were false, and the interior ministry said occasional queues at the Ukrainian-Polish border were mainly caused by air-raid alerts during Russian strikes on western Ukraine. Novinky checked one post claiming a million refugees were heading for Czechia: it recast Zelensky's 16 October warning that 20 million people could come if Ukraine lost, and partly used photos of the 2023 Polish truckers' blockade of the border. **disarm** TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0023 T0084.003 T0085 · TA07 T0151.001 · TA08 T0042 (domestic · excluded from FIMI analysis)	None named by the government. Novinky named the post's author, a Czech man it says repeatedly shares false information **[media]**	novinky.cz; novinky.cz
19-22 Oct W44-007	Russia's new ambassador Anna Ponomaryova told an event at the Communist Party's Prague headquarters, which Hlídací pes describes as a meeting with Czech admirers of Putin, that she should perhaps invite "our military experts" to explain the war. In videos on the YouTube channel of Petr Bureš she said Russia went to war only "to stop the killing of Russian people", Aktuálně reported, and President Pavel replied that Russian experts would not change the facts. **disarm** TA02 ~T0136.002 · TA14 T0004 · TA16 T0097.111 T0100.001 T0143.001 · TA05 T0102.001 · TA07 ~T0151.007	The Russian embassy in Prague, openly **[media]**	hlidacipes.org; zpravy.aktualne.cz ; seznamzpravy.cz
20-21 Oct W44-008	investigace.cz showed that Govorit and Euroview, which Romania's Public Record linked through shared infrastructure, redirects and ad identifiers to the sanctioned Russian propaganda sites Euromore and Golos, publish in some 40 languages. The Czech edition of Govorit calls itself "Evropa mluví", Govorit runs pieces under Viktor Medvedchuk's name, and Hlídací pes found that it lists a Prague "branch" with an untraceable landline number. Britain sanctioned Govorit Evropa and Euroview in May, and the EU listed Euroview in the spring. **disarm** TA06 T0023 · TA15 T0149.004 · TA16 T0097.102 T0098.002 T0100.001 ~T0143.002 T0143.003 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0152.004 · TA11 T0128.005 T0130.001	Successors of sanctioned Russian outlets, per the UK government and Public Record **[official]**	investigace.cz; hlidacipes.org
20 Oct W44-009	In its monitoring of disinformation websites for the second half of September, Čeští elfové found attacks on President Pavel and the previous government over corruption cases, and a narrative that Europe is preparing a war of conquest against Russia, reinforced by Putin's remarks as quoted by Aeronet. It says the narrative "may serve" as an information foreground for stepping up hostile Russian operations against European countries. **disarm** TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA14 T0004 T0022.001 · TA16 T0098.002 · TA07 T0152.004 (domestic · excluded from FIMI analysis)	Czech disinformation websites, Aeronet among them, per Čeští elfové **[researcher]**	Čeští elfové

Slovakia

No Slovak authority attributed a foreign information operation this week, and police and election officials did not mention foreign interference in the 24 October municipal and regional elections, where police complaints concerned vote buying, breaches of the campaign moratorium and defamation of candidates. The main exposure was Aktuality.sk's count of more than 506,000 euros in state contracts for three sites it calls pro-government and pro-Russian. The Slovak-Russian intergovernmental commission met in Moscow, and the Russian embassy disputed that the 1932-33 famine targeted Ukrainians.

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
26 Oct W44-010	The Slovak-Russian intergovernmental commission opened its session in Moscow, and its Russian co-chair, science minister Valery Falkov, said Russia wants to keep and expand energy ties. The Russian foreign ministry's readout of Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár's meeting with Sergei Lavrov, as TASR relayed it, lists trade, cultural and "military-memorial" cooperation, and Aktuality reported that pro-Kremlin media present the visit as proof that EU sanctions do not work. **disarm** not labeled · overt state action	The Slovak and Russian governments, an overt act **[media]**	teraz.sk; teraz.sk; aktuality.sk
25 Oct W44-011	Denník N reported that figures of the disinformation scene were disappointed with the election results, having expected more from Republika's Milan Mazurek, and that the Prešov region results embittered several of them. **disarm** not labeled · context	Domestic disinformation channels. No foreign actor named **[media]**	Denník N
22-24 Oct W44-012	The Russian embassy in Bratislava answered on Facebook a Denník N article on the 1932-33 famine in Ukraine, rejecting that the famine targeted Ukrainians, blaming crop failure and Western countries that demanded payment in grain, and saying the West today takes Ukraine's food and pays in weapons. Denník N's Newsfilter called the reply a textbook of propaganda, and InfoVojna and Slovanské noviny republished it. **disarm** TA02 ~T0075.001 · TA14 T0004 T0022.001 · TA16 T0097.206 T0143.001 · TA07 T0151.003 T0152.004	The Russian embassy in Slovakia, an overt statement **[media]**	slovanskenoviny.sk; dennikn.podbean.com
21 Oct W44-013	AFP's Slovak fact-checkers found that a 24-second video of lasers and microwave weapons downing drone swarms, presented in a 4 October Facebook post as a Chinese anti-drone system, is AI-generated, according to UncovAI, one of the detection tools AFP used. The original was posted on Douyin in March with an AI label that the copy circulating in Slovakia lacked, and Slovak-language Facebook posts with it were shared more than 300 times. **disarm** TA06 T0084.001 T0084.003 T0087.001 · TA07 T0151.001 · TA11 ~T0129.009 (actor unknown)	Unknown **[unattributed]**	uncovai.com

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
20 Oct W44-014	Aktuality.sk found 23 state contracts and orders worth over 506,000 euros, signed since Fico's fourth government took office, for the publishers of Hlavné správy, Hlavný denník and eReport, sites it calls pro-government and pro-Russian. The National Security Authority shut down the first two after Russia's 2022 invasion, and most of the money came from ministries run by Richard Takáč (agriculture) and Robert Kaliňák (defence).	No foreign actor. The money is the Slovak state's, per Aktuality **[media]**	aktuality.sk
disarm not labeled · context			
20 Oct W44-015	Denník N reported that AI fakes and years-old videos were spreading about the unrest in France, and that Republika politicians Milan Uhrík and Milan Mazurek linked the unrest to hiring foreign workers without giving any data on who the attackers were.	Unknown for the fakes **[unattributed]**	Denník N
disarm TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0084.003 T0086.002 (actor unknown)			

[-] Background: The Insider reported on 14 October that Smer MEP Lubos Blaha officially reported a trip to Russia as organised by the Russian Historical Society, which is chaired by the SVR director Sergei Naryshkin, and Aktuality relayed it on 24 October.

Poland

No Polish authority attributed a specific new disinformation campaign to a foreign state. The interior ministry rebutted posts telling parents that children would be bussed away during air-raid alarms without naming anyone behind them, and the president's spokesman, a deputy foreign minister and the special-services minister likened Lviv's decision to honour the UPA to a Russian provocation, offering no evidence. The main exposure was an AI-made video of endless car queues at the Ukrainian border, shared by Konfederacja politicians and turned into a Channel One story, and NASK reported that platforms removed under 7% of the more than 65,000 items it flagged in the first half of the year.

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
26 Oct W44-016	Konkret24 traced a clip of Sweden's King Carl XVI Gustaf supposedly refusing Zelensky's hand, which spread during Zelensky's 20-21 October visit to Oslo and which Polish-language X accounts shared on 22 October, to the king's April visit to Lviv, cut before the two men shook hands. RT, RIA Novosti, Gazeta.ru and Pravda.ru pushed the same cut in April, and Konkret24 says the new wave "looks like a coordinated action", with near-identical captions in English, Arabic, Japanese, Turkish and Serbian.	Russian media in April, per Konkret24. Nobody is named behind the new wave **[researcher]**	konkret24.tvn24.pl
disarm TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0023 T0087.002 · TA05 ~T0101 · TA07 T0111 T0151.008 · TA11 T0060			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
21-26 Oct W44-017	A collage of one man carrying a small dog at strike sites in Rivne, Dnipro and Kyiv, a fake debunked last week, was posted on 17 October by the Polish X account "Ministerstwo Prawdy", casting the man as a crisis actor who turns up wherever Russian strikes hit, and holds one real police photo and two AI images, Demagog found. Konkret24 counted over 100,000 views on that post and found the same collage on the X account of Russia's embassy in Kenya.	Probably the Russian propaganda apparatus, per Ukraine's CCD as cited by Konkret24 **[official]**	Demagog; konkret24.tvn24.pl
disarm TA02 T0136.001 · TA14 T0004 T0068 · TA06 T0086.002 T0086.004 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.007 T0151.008			
23 Oct W44-018	Konkret24 showed that Konfederacja MP Andrzej Zapałowski's 17 October posts saying that, "according to the Russians", about 2,000 Ukrainian soldiers had surrendered in northern Kharkiv region carried an April 2022 video of marines surrendering in Mariupol, which pro-Russian accounts had already recast as Kursk in March 2025. Konkret24 says only pro-Russian sources spread the 2,000 figure, and ISW found no evidence for it.	Pro-Russian sources as the origin, per Konkret24. No state actor named **[researcher]**	konkret24.tvn24.pl
disarm TA06 T0084.003 T0085 · TA16 T0097.110 T0143.001 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.008 (actor unknown)			
22-23 Oct W44-019	The interior ministry rebutted posts urging parents to forbid schools to put their children on buses during air-raid alarms, after Facebook reels tied new alarm procedures to forced evacuations and separated families. One template letter was shared 3,000 times, and CyberDefence24 cites the local portal Moja Kruszwica as saying AI-generated images of frightened children and buses accompanied the posts on Facebook and TikTok.	None named **[unattributed]**	Demagog; cyberdefence24.pl
disarm TA14 T0022.001 · TA06 T0023 T0085.004 T0086.002 · TA07 T0151.001 · TA08 T0042 (actor unknown)			
22-23 Oct W44-020	The Sejm accepted nine of ten Senate amendments to the bill letting authorities order illegal online content blocked, and it went to President Nawrocki on 23 October. Digital minister Krzysztof Gawkowski, who on 21 October had told the president to sign it and "not support Russian disinformation in Poland", said he was counting on his signature, and Nawrocki vetoed an earlier law implementing the DSA in January.	No foreign actor, a policy step **[official]**	cyberdefence24.pl ; Monitor Polski; cyberdefence24.pl ; gov.pl
disarm not labeled · response			
22 Oct W44-021	The Insider showed that Russia's Channel One reported on 22 October that Poland had "cancelled" a large military aid package to Ukraine over the Lviv regional council's UPA decision, after Poland's defence ministry had denied even a suspension, which a Ukrainian outlet had reported citing an anonymous source.	Channel One, Russian state TV, per The Insider **[media]**	theins.ru
disarm TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0023 · TA07 T0111.001			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
22 Oct W44-022	Konkret24 found that a video of a "pregnant Ukrainian soldier" surrendering to Russians, posted on Polish X to over 24,000 views, carries the watermark of "The Aussie Cossack", Simeon Boikov, who posted it on his Telegram on 10 November 2023. StopFake said the video, which shows "numerous signs of staging", was relaunched on X for English and French audiences without a date. **disarm** TA02 ~T0066 · TA06 T0087 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0151.007 T0151.008 · TA08 ~T0042 · TA11 T0060	Simeon Boikov as the source, per Konkret24 **[researcher]**	konkret24.tvn24.pl; StopFake
22 Oct W44-023	The ABW detained a second Georgian man on 19 October, a day after he flew in from Georgia, and prosecutors charged him with aiding the 15 June murder in Biała Podlaska of Robert Kuzovkov, a Russian artist and Kremlin critic known as Semyon Skrepetsky. He allegedly supplied a gun, transport and an app to track the victim's car, according to a court spokeswoman, and denies it. **disarm** not labeled · context	Not named. Authorities have not said who ordered the killing **[official]**	abw.gov.pl; Notes from Poland
22 Oct W44-024	Fakenews.pl found that an 18 October X post, viewed tens of thousands of times, claiming Rzeszów had 37 air-raid alarms in September against Lviv's 11, conflated government SMS alerts with sirens: the region got 15 alerts, and sirens sounded once. **disarm** TA06 T0023 · TA07 T0151.008 (actor unknown)	None named **[unattributed]**	fakenews.pl
20-22 Oct W44-025	After the Lviv regional council declared 2027 a year of the UPA and Roman Shukhevych, President Nawrocki's spokesman Rafał Leśkiewicz said it "smacks of Russian provocation", according to The Insider, deputy foreign minister Marcin Bosacki said it looked "as if made by Russian agents", and special-services minister Tomasz Siemoniak said it was "as if Russia ordered such actions". None offered evidence, and The Insider calls the provocation theory "rather doubtful". **disarm** not labeled · context	None established. Officials likened the decision to a Russian provocation **[official]**	theins.ru; OKO.press; gov.pl
19-22 Oct W44-026	PiS MP Michał Woś posted an AI image of an elderly Paris couple stripped to their underwear by "immigrants", Konkret24 and Demagog found, and Demagog traced a viral photo of a French bookseller drinking coffee amid the riots, shared by Polish Facebook users, to an AI video by a Hong Kong meme account that had labelled it as AI. **disarm** TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0084.003 T0086.002 · TA16 T0097.110 T0143.001 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.008 · TA11 ~T0129.009 (actor unknown)	None named **[unattributed]**	konkret24.tvn24.pl; Demagog; Demagog

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
21 Oct W44-027	NASK reported that platforms removed 6.7% of the more than 65,000 items its disinformation analysis centre flagged in the first half of 2026, and X 2.5%, among them a pro-Iranian campaign of inauthentic accounts and recordings of supposed Polish soldiers. Gawkowski threatened fines and demanded Polish-language moderation teams, and the same day the government's new Centre for Combating Disinformation held its first meeting. **disarm** not labeled · response	None named for the whole set **[official]**	nask.pl; cyberdefence24.pl; gov.pl
21 Oct W44-028	INFO OPS Polska found that TASS played up the gap between Lithuania, whose presidential adviser said a Ukrainian drone that entered Lithuania on 18 October came from Poland, and Poland's defence ministry, which said its radar did not confirm this, casting it as a rift among allies and a hint that NATO airspace is used for strikes on Russia. **disarm** TA02 ~T0079 · TA14 T0004 T0068 · TA06 T0023 · TA07 T0111	TASS and other Russian media, per INFO OPS Polska **[researcher]**	disinfodigest.pl
20-21 Oct W44-029	Demagog found that a video of an endless queue of cars at the Ukrainian border, which Konfederacja politicians Łukasz Kolada and Jakub Perkowski shared on 17 October as Ukrainians coming to "winter in Poland" and whose frames WP and Kresy.pl ran, was made with AI. SPRAVDI said it was posted on Telegram, Facebook, TikTok and Instagram on 17 October, on Facebook and TikTok through pages styled with a logo resembling that of Ukraine's UNN agency, drew over 54,000 views on one Telegram channel and became a Channel One report tying the queues to Kyiv's policies. **disarm** TA06 T0023.001 T0087.001 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.003 T0151.007 T0151.008 · TA09 T0117 · TA17 T0119.002 (actor unknown)	Creators unknown. Polish politicians and media and Russian state TV amplified it, per Demagog and SPRAVDI **[unattributed]**	Demagog; SPRAVDI
20 Oct W44-030	Demagog rebutted Facebook posts, including in a group named after MEP Grzegorz Braun, claiming that those killed in Bucha were soldiers, not civilians, on the word of RT correspondent Chay Bowes and "verifications" by the Global Fact-Checking Network. Demagog, citing RSF, says Russia created and controls the network to lend its propaganda credibility. **disarm** TA02 ~T0136.001 · TA14 T0004 · TA16 T0097.203 T0143.002 · TA05 T0102.001 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.002	RT's correspondent and the Russia-run GFCN as the cited sources, per Demagog **[researcher]**	Demagog
20 Oct W44-031	Military police detained a reservist with Polish and Ukrainian citizenship on 16 October on suspicion of offering to work for a foreign intelligence service, and deputy defence minister Cezary Tomczyk said he had been reconnoitring military installations. Authorities have not named the service. **disarm** not labeled · context	An unnamed foreign intelligence service, per prosecutors **[official]**	Notes from Poland

[-] Background: an undercover Vot Tak reporter answering a Telegram job ad was offered $20,000-30,000 and "an order in Belarus" by a recruiter to set fire to the Flytronic drone plant in Gliwice, OKO.press reported on 19 October from Vot Tak's investigation of 15 October.

Germany and Austria

No German or Austrian authority attributed a specific new disinformation campaign, but both acted in suspected Russian espionage cases: Austria expelled four Russian diplomats whom profil reports are suspected of espionage, and Germany's Federal Prosecutor had a Ukrainian arrested on suspicion of spying on the arms industry for a Russian intelligence service. An internal Bundeswehr assessment rates the threat of Russian sabotage as "considerable" for the first time. The main exposure was The Insider's account, from hacked Kremlin correspondence, that Germany was Doppelganger's main early target.

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
22-26 Oct W44-032	Germany: dpa and Mimikama debunked a montage of eight funeral photos captioned "This boy has already buried his eighth Ukrainian father", offered as proof that the war is staged. The 14-year-old volunteers to carry fallen soldiers' portraits at funerals in Otyniia in western Ukraine, and Ukraine's CCD had debunked the same claim in February. **disarm** TA14 T0004 · TA06 T0023.001 T0086.004 · TA07 T0151.008 · TA11 T0060 (actor unknown)	None named **[unattributed]**	dpa-factchecking.com; Mimikama
25 Oct W44-033	Austria: Mimikama rated false an image on Facebook and X of a supposed Ukrainian soldier back from Russian captivity with "Jew" carved in Russian into his back, which two detectors rated 99.5% and 98% likely AI-made, and one Facebook post with it had 4,386 shares. Mimikama found no evidence of an organised campaign. **disarm** TA06 T0086.002 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.008 (actor unknown)	Unknown **[unattributed]**	Mimikama
23 Oct W44-034	Austria: the foreign ministry declared four Russian diplomats personae non gratae, three at the embassy in Vienna and one at Russia's OSCE delegation, for "activities incompatible with their diplomatic status". profil, which broke the story, says they are suspected of espionage and that three were on a list of 21 names the defence ministry sent to soldiers in August, and Russia's deputy foreign minister Dmitry Lyubinsky told TASS a response is "inevitable". **disarm** not labeled · response	Russian diplomats suspected of espionage, per profil. The ministry cited "incompatible activities" and findings of the security authorities **[official]**	orf.at; profil
22-23 Oct W44-035	Germany: the Federal Prosecutor had a Ukrainian, Vadym Y., arrested in Oder-Spree, suspected of having been in contact with a Russian intelligence service through an intermediary since July 2025 at the latest and of collecting information on the production of armoured vehicles, ammunition and explosives and on sites securing NATO's eastern flank. A Federal Court of Justice judge ordered him held on 23 October, and tagesschau reports he is 53 and from the Luhansk region. **disarm** not labeled · context	A Russian intelligence service, per the Federal Prosecutor **[official]**	generalbundesanwalt.de; generalbundesanwalt.de; tagesschau.de

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
22 Oct W44-036	Germany: CORRECTIV debunked TikTok videos claiming Zelensky is buying Santa Cristina, a private island in the Venice lagoon once owned by the Swarovski family, one of them shown more than 160,000 times with aerial footage from a three-year-old YouTube video. The seller, a private foundation in Wattens in Tyrol, and Zelensky's press office both denied it. **disarm** TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA06 T0084.002 T0087 · TA07 T0151.008 · TA08 T0042 (actor unknown)	None named **[unattributed]**	CORRECTIV
22 Oct W44-037	Germany: after hackers calling themselves Hexane published about 420,000 AfD emails on 19 October, screenshots of supposed emails that are not in the leak spread online. Volksverpetzer found them absent from the dataset and Mimikama rated two such graphics false, and a CDU member of the Baden-Wuerttemberg state parliament quoted one forged mail in a debate on 21 October. **disarm** TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0085.004 T0089.003 · TA07 ~T0151.001 · TA08 T0042 (actor unknown)	Unknown. Nobody has tied the hack or the forgeries to a state **[unattributed]**	volksverpetzer.de ; Mimikama
21-22 Oct W44-038	Germany: dpa and Mimikama found that a clip accusing the Tagesschau of playing down France's riots as "student protests" splices an earlier intro, from 10 October per dpa, of its edition in simple language over footage of violence filmed on 17 October, and that the original segment did mention violence and injuries. **disarm** TA02 ~T0075.001 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0087.002 · TA07 T0151.008 (actor unknown)	None named **[unattributed]**	dpa-factchecking.com; Mimikama
21 Oct W44-039	Germany: CORRECTIV's first review of the AfD leak found plans for an AfD delegation, including MPs Frank Pasemann and Steffen Kotré, to meet the Russian oligarch Konstantin Malofeyev in Moscow in February 2019, though the emails do not show whether the trip took place. It also found a 2018 request by an aide of MP Markus Frohnmaier for an "inaugural visit" to the Russian ambassador. **disarm** not labeled · context	None. The leak shows contacts between AfD figures and Russian actors, per CORRECTIV **[media]**	CORRECTIV
21 Oct W44-040	Germany: WDR and SZ reported an internal Bundeswehr assessment that for the first time rates the threat of Russian sabotage against its forces in Germany as "considerable", the second-highest level, after an explosives-laden drone was found near Wunstorf air base. It says Russia "very likely" aims to weaken German political and public support for Ukraine, and the Defence Ministry confirmed the rating. **disarm** not labeled · response	Russia, per the Bundeswehr assessment **[official]**	tagesschau.de; Tagesspiegel

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
21 Oct W44-041	Germany: The Insider, citing hacked correspondence between Russia's Presidential Administration and the Social Design Agency, reported that Germany was the main focus of Doppelganger's early stages in 2022, with one aim being to turn Germans against an "ineffective" sanctions policy. Operatives fed German audiences invented stories about Ukrainian refugees, posed as Ukrainians in comments under such stories, and proposed a fake Die Zeit-style video about a girl in Rostock raped by Ukrainian teenagers.	The Presidential Administration and Ilya Gambashidze's Social Design Agency, per The Insider **[media]**	The Insider
disarm TA01 T0073 · TA02 T0066 T0135.002 · TA06 T0085.003 T0087 · TA15 T0149.001 · TA16 T0097.101 T0097.202 T0143.002 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.006 T0152.004 · TA09 T0114.001 T0116.001 · TA17 T0122 · TA12 T0133			
21 Oct W44-042	Austria: the Vienna Regional Court extended the remand of the two Ukrainians arrested in early October on suspicion of secret intelligence activity against Austria to 20 November, and OÖN reports that both are said to belong to Ukraine's military intelligence. Both have denied the accusations, OÖN reported on 9 October.	Suspected Ukrainian military intelligence, per media reports **[media]**	wien.orf.at; OÖN; OÖN
disarm not labeled · context			
20 Oct W44-043	Germany: CORRECTIV, citing internal papers of the Joint Hybrid Defence Centre, reported 163 suspected sabotage cases in Germany in 2026 up to 19 August and 1,034 drone overflights of critical infrastructure, military sites and arms firms. Of 20 cases of transnational repression from 17 June, nine were traced to Iran, three to Russia and one to China.	None named for the sabotage and drone counts, per the centre's papers seen by CORRECTIV **[official]**	CORRECTIV
disarm not labeled · context			
19 Oct W44-044	Germany: after the Hamburg verdict covered last week, the Foreign Office summoned Iran's ambassador, and Iran summoned Germany's ambassador the same day and rejected the accusations as baseless, according to Tasnim.	Iran, per the Foreign Office **[official]**	berliner-zeitung.de
disarm not labeled · response			
19 Oct W44-045	Germany: CORRECTIV followed up on two Berlin-based employees of the EU-sanctioned Izvestia whom Seznam Zprávy caught filming for the Telegram channel Rybar in Prague in September, and the BfV told it that Rybar is "a Russian media company and a known influence actor". Berlin prosecutors had no case against the two as of early October.	Rybar, a known Russian influence actor, per the BfV **[official]**	CORRECTIV
disarm not labeled · context			

[-] Background: a Putin decree published on 15 October granted Russian citizenship to 19 people whom Ukraine's IMI calls propagandists, six of them RT DE staff, IMI reported on 16 October.

Ukraine

Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR) said Russia was staging a Zoom "telebridge" with fake witnesses to divert attention from occupied Oleshky, and warned that Moscow is weighing false-flag sabotage in the EU to blame on Ukraine, while SPRAVDI counted over 1,100 posts recasting the Oleshky truce as a trap. The CCD said official pages of Russian diplomatic missions joined a "staged war" fake, and the SBU detailed more recruitment over Telegram. The main exposure came from The Insider, whose leaked Kremlin files describe a Doppelganger campaign aimed at Ukrainians since 2023.

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
26 Oct W44-046	SPRAVDI counted 1,173 posts on 23-25 October recasting the local truce in occupied Oleshky, reached through the mediation of Melania Trump, as a trap, with the Pravda network claiming Ukraine wanted it to bring in boats and prepare a Dnipro crossing. It also warned that Russia may let civilians evacuate only into Russia to produce a propaganda "picture".	Russia, including the Pravda network, per SPRAVDI **[official]**	SPRAVDI; Telegram
disarm TA02 T0135.002 T0136.002 T0136.004 · TA14 T0004 T0068 · TA16 T0098.002 · TA07 T0152.004			
26 Oct W44-047	SPRAVDI counted 3,305 posts on 23-25 October, by RT, RT DE, RT France and the Pravda network among others, presenting Elon Musk's remarks on restricting Starlink for strike drones, and on a collapse of Ukraine's front without it, as military fact. Another 824, Sputnik and RT among them, cast Ukraine and Europe as the obstacles to peace.	Russia (RT, Sputnik and the Pravda network), per SPRAVDI **[official]**	SPRAVDI; Telegram
disarm TA02 T0066 T0139.001 · TA14 T0004 T0068 · TA06 T0023 · TA16 T0098.002 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0111 T0152.004			
26 Oct W44-048	SPRAVDI rebutted a column by Viktor Medvedchuk, whom it calls a traitor, claiming Zelensky agreed to give up 25% of Ukraine's territory, and a claim by Scott Ritter, who it says has worked with RT since 2019, that Ukraine's defeat would break up NATO and the EU.	Viktor Medvedchuk and Scott Ritter, per SPRAVDI **[official]**	Telegram; Telegram
disarm TA02 T0079 T0135.002 T0139.001 · TA14 T0022.001 · TA06 T0023 T0085.006 · TA16 T0097.110 T0143.001 · TA07 T0111			
26 Oct W44-049	CAT-UA, in a weekly report published by Detector Media, found that pro-Russian messages in Ukrainian social media on 17-23 October shifted from strikes and Russian advances to "selling" Ukrainians a peace with Donbas as a demilitarized zone, no NATO and sanctions lifted. Artem Zakharchenko, head of CAT-UA's media analytics centre, said propaganda now works "through more familiar pro-Russian figures", and the report cites Vadym Novynskyi's calls to accept the terms now.	Russian propaganda, per CAT-UA **[researcher]**	detector.media
disarm TA02 ~T0135.001 ~T0139.001 · TA05 T0016 · TA07 T0151.001 T0152.004 (actor unknown)			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
19-26 Oct W44-050	The SBU detailed more Russian recruitment over Telegram: an Odesa sales representative found by the FSB while seeking extra earnings marked troop positions on Google Maps, and a man spotted through his anti-Ukrainian comments in Telegram chats got 15 years for preparing to bomb a railway. On 26 October it said a 20-year-old who sought "easy" earnings on Telegram filmed strike aftermath in Odesa, then fitted GPS trackers to fuel tankers so Russia could locate fuel depots.	Russian special services, the FSB in two cases, per the SBU **[official]**	Telegram; Telegram; Telegram
	disarm TA15 T0091.001 · TA07 T0151.006 T0151.007 T0153.007 · TA10 T0127.002		
24 Oct W44-051	StopFake debunked a forged front page of Der Nordschleswiger, the German-language daily in Denmark, quoting Lykke Friis of Think Tank Europa as saying the EU may close its border with Ukraine over cholera, hepatitis A and polluted water. The real front page carried other news, and her think tank called the quote invented.	"propagandists" in the pro-Russian segment of the internet, per StopFake **[researcher]**	StopFake
	disarm TA06 T0085.003 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA07 T0152.004		
19-24 Oct W44-052	SPRAVDI logged 21,219 posts with FIMI markers on 16-18 October, almost nine in ten from the Pravda network, mainly in English, German, Spanish and French, casting Europe as "Zelensky's ATM". Its weekly review counted over 2,300 Russian channel posts using Trump's criticism to show the West had "abandoned Kyiv", and on 22 October it logged 183 foreign-language posts selling a "peace-loving" Russia after Putin's interview.	Russia (FIMI-linked outlets and the Pravda network), per SPRAVDI **[official]**	SPRAVDI; SPRAVDI; SPRAVDI
	disarm TA02 T0079 T0135.002 T0139.001 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0023 T0087 · TA16 T0097.207 T0098.002 T0143.002 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0152.004		
23 Oct W44-053	Texty found that its tracked TikTok "talking heads" posted 39 videos discrediting Zelensky on 12-18 October, with almost 3.03 million views, and that nearly one in three of over 3,800 destructive YouTube comments about him came from bots. The bots moved from calls for "peace" to demanding Ukraine's capitulation, and bloggers promoted a "Maidan" for impeachment and peace planned for 24 October.	Russian-inspired narratives pushed by bots and TikTok bloggers, per Texty **[researcher]**	Texty
	disarm TA02 T0135.001 ~T0139.001 · TA06 T0084.001 T0085.008 · TA07 T0151.008 T0151.014 · TA09 T0116.001 · TA10 T0057 · TA11 T0129.007 (actor unknown)		
23 Oct W44-054	HUR said Moscow is weighing false-flag operations in the EU, possibly sabotage in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics in particular, to be blamed on Ukraine through Russian propaganda channels. The CCD relayed the warning, and HUR published no evidence.	Russia, per HUR **[official]**	Telegram; CCD Telegram
	disarm not labeled · response		

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
23 Oct W44-055	SPRAVDI, citing human rights activist Oleksandra Dvoretska, said Russian forces made a 10-year-old girl from Kostiantynivka record videos thanking them for her "rescue" and blaming the Ukrainian army, a story Zvezda and TASS ran in July. It says Russia's children's commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova has now announced that the girl was placed with a guardian she did not know, while her relatives in Ukraine searched for her. **disarm** TA02 ~T0136.004 · TA14 T0004 · TA06 T0087 · TA07 T0111	Russian forces, officials and state media, per SPRAVDI **[official]**	SPRAVDI
23 Oct W44-056	StopFake found that a TikTok video of a "soldier" telling Ukrainians who demand the 1991 borders to go and fight for them themselves was AI-generated, which Hive rated 87.2% likely. StopFake says it fits narratives Russia pushes through AI-made "soldiers". **disarm** TA02 ~T0139.001 · TA06 T0087.001 · TA16 T0097.105 T0143.002 · TA07 T0151.008	None named. The link to Russian narratives is StopFake's comparison **[researcher]**	StopFake
21-23 Oct W44-057	ISW said the Russian MoD's 21 October claims to have taken Chervonyi Yar and Yulivka, about 17 km beyond the furthest assessed Russian advance, fit the Kremlin's "systematic cognitive warfare effort", and that one Russian milblogger called the Yulivka claim likely a deliberate exaggeration aimed at US negotiators. It has reason to believe that a flag-raising video from Vesele Pole, about 12 km beyond Russian lines, may be AI-generated or AI-altered. **disarm** TA02 T0139.001 · TA06 T0023 ~T0087.001 · TA16 T0097.206 T0143.001	The Russian MoD and Russian sources, per ISW **[researcher]**	ISW; ISW; ISW
20-23 Oct W44-058	The CCD said Russia had scaled up its fake about an "actor with a little dog" at strike sites, with official pages of Russian diplomatic missions joining in, alongside a similar fake about a "boy who buried several parents", both feeding a "staged war" narrative. VoxCheck traced the second to funerals in Otyniia, where a local boy has carried portraits of the fallen since 2024. **disarm** TA02 T0066 · TA14 T0004 · TA06 T0023.001 T0086.004 · TA07 T0151.001 · TA11 T0060	Russia, including its diplomatic missions' pages for the first fake, per the CCD **[official]**	CCD Telegram; voxukraine.org
20-23 Oct W44-059	SPRAVDI rebutted Russian foreign ministry official Rodion Miroshnik's claim that Ukraine lures foreigners with fake job offers, Irish journalist Chay Bowes, who it says worked with RT, on the West being outraged at Zelensky "mocking" Trump, British commentator Alexander Mercouris, who it says recast Zelensky's warning that 20 million people could flee as faked statistics, and the Russian foreign ministry's biolab claims. **disarm** TA14 T0004 T0022.001 · TA06 T0023 · TA16 T0097.111 T0097.206 T0100.001 T0143.001 · TA07 T0111	Rodion Miroshnik, Chay Bowes, Alexander Mercouris and the Russian foreign ministry, per SPRAVDI **[official]**	SPRAVDI; SPRAVDI; Telegram; SPRAVDI

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
19-23 Oct W44-060	StopFake caught AI-generated images of Ukrainian streets: a billboard quoting Zelensky with a line from the 1938 film "Alexander Nevsky", a paint-splattered stele at the US embassy in Kyiv reading "Trump and Musk are killers of Ukraine", and Lviv graffiti supporting the man sentenced for killing Iryna Farion. It traced the stele image to the Russian Telegram channel "Srochno, Seychas" on 16 October.	Russian and pro-Russian Telegram channels, per StopFake **[researcher]**	StopFake; StopFake; StopFake
	disarm TA02 ~T0079 · TA06 T0086.002 · TA07 T0111 T0151.007 T0152.004 · TA08 T0042 · TA17 ~T0119.002		
22 Oct W44-061	HUR said Russia was staging "Operation Telemost", a Zoom "international telebridge" for diplomats on alleged Ukrainian crimes against civilians in Zaporizhzhia region, with the sanctioned Rodion Miroshnik as its main speaker, staged appearances by fake "witnesses and victims", and RT staff, Russian embassies and Russian Houses, Bulgaria's among them, taking part. HUR said it was meant to divert attention from the crisis in occupied Oleshky.	Russia, per HUR **[official]**	Telegram
	disarm TA02 T0077 T0135.002 · TA14 T0004 · TA16 T0097.101 T0097.111 T0143.001 T0143.002 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0110 T0151.004 · TA10 T0057		
20-22 Oct W44-062	Russia's foreign intelligence service, the SVR, claimed that people around Zelensky took drug-cartel money to train cartel fighters as drone operators. SPRAVDI said the SVR gave no documents, payments or names, and Detector Media relayed its rebuttal.	The SVR, in its own statement, per SPRAVDI **[official]**	tass.com; SPRAVDI; Detector Media
	disarm TA02 T0066 T0135.002 · TA14 T0083 · TA06 T0085 · TA16 T0097.206 T0143.001 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0111		
21 Oct W44-063	The Insider's investigation of Doppelganger, built on hacked correspondence between Russia's presidential administration and the Social Design Agency, says a "Ukrainian counter-campaign", first code-named "Uganda", ran from early 2023 to discredit Ukraine's leadership, split its elites and demoralize the army, through Telegram channels disguised as Ukrainian ones. It names Sergei Kiriyenko as the operation's initiator and Alexander Kharichev as the curator of fakes about Ukraine.	Russia's presidential administration and the Social Design Agency, per The Insider **[media]**	theins.ru
	disarm TA02 T0135.001 T0135.003 T0135.004 T0139.001 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0085.004 T0086 · TA16 T0097.111 T0097.202 T0097.206 T0143.002 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.007 · TA11 T0130.001 · TA12 T0133		
21 Oct W44-064	The SBU exposed six "agitators", among them a Kyiv woman who it says posted almost 100,000 Telegram messages, some calling for killing Ukrainians, and a Mykolaiv man acting "on the order of a representative of Russia" whose accomplice ran a local Telegram channel of over 13,000 subscribers on a Russian curator's instructions.	A Russian curator in one case, per the SBU **[official]**	Telegram
	disarm not labeled · context		

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
21 Oct W44-065	Detector Media, citing Georgia's Myth Detector, debunked a recycled card claiming the UN recognised Ukrainian as a "branch" of Russian, posted by Russian-speaking Facebook accounts on 9-14 October. The earliest version of the image found appeared on a Russian literary site in 2008.	Russian-speaking Facebook accounts, per Detector Media **[researcher]**	Detector Media
disarm TA06 T0084.003 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.002 · TA11 T0060 (actor unknown)			
20-21 Oct W44-066	VoxCheck debunked eight more fakes built on local news reports, each recasting a crime by an unnamed man as the act of a soldier of a named unit, from the 158th brigade to the 120th territorial defense brigade, two by editing the original headline. All eight circulated through the Telegram channel dillfrash, like the four debunked last week.	None named. VoxCheck links each fake to a post on the Telegram channel dillfrash **[unattributed]**	voxukraine.org; voxukraine.org
disarm TA06 T0023 T0086.003 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.007 (actor unknown)			
18-21 Oct W44-067	Ukrainian units described the flag-planting behind Russian capture claims: the 3rd Heavy Mechanized Brigade said a drone flew a Russian flag into Kolodyazne, and 7th Corps spokesman Volodymyr Polevyi cited flags dropped from drones and "outright falsification using AI". Presidential Office head Kyrylo Budanov said Dobropillia remains Ukrainian.	Russian forces and, in Budanov's account, the commander of Russia's Center group of forces, Colonel General Andrei Ivanayev, per Ukraine's military and the Presidential Office **[official]**	armyinform.com.ua ; armyinform.com.ua; Telegram
disarm TA06 T0023 T0087.001 · TA10 T0057.002			
20 Oct W44-068	The CCD said reports that the government had declared a "state of emergency" in energy or heating were untrue: the Cabinet only named officials responsible for repairing strike damage.	None named **[unattributed]**	CCD Telegram
disarm TA06 T0023 (actor unknown)			
19 Oct W44-069	The CCD said Russia is expanding its network of Telegram bots offering civilians money for photos and videos of drone-strike aftermath, which it calls direct cooperation with Russian special services, and the SBU said 75 people have been sentenced this year for posting such footage or air-defense positions.	Russian special services, per the CCD **[official]**	CCD Telegram; Telegram
disarm TA15 T0091.001 T0146.007			
19 Oct W44-070	StopFake traced a "quote" in which Zelensky called constitutional monarchy ideal for Ukraine, set on a still from his Financial Times interview, to a satirical Telegram channel that labels its posts "verified fakes", and found Russian Telegram channels captioning a TikTok video, in which a man describes a stop at a long-standing border-zone checkpoint near Khotyn, as Ukraine "closing roads between regions".	A satirical Telegram channel, and Russian Telegram channels, per StopFake **[researcher]**	StopFake; StopFake
disarm TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA06 T0084.003 T0085 · TA16 T0143.004 · TA07 T0151.007			

[-] Attribution note: The CCD, SPRAVDI, HUR, the SBU, Ukraine's armed forces and the Presidential Office are Ukrainian state bodies and a party to the war. Their attributions are official, but not neutral.

Wider Europe and beyond

UK counter-terrorism police said Iranian state involvement in the RAF Fairford case is "highly likely", Lithuania's presidential adviser put a "high probability" on Russia behind the Starlink arson attempt in Vilnius, and Moldova's StratCom centre found Sputnik Moldova accounts among those amplifying a drone-factory rumour. Two senior US lawmakers cited a classified report that Russia is covertly targeting candidates who support Ukraine. The main exposures were Alliance4Europe's attribution of a bot network active before France's protests to Doppelganger, and the Storm-1516 deepfake against Texas Senate candidate James Talarico.

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
25 Oct W44-071	Conceding defeat in Serbia's 25 October parliamentary election, Aleksandar Vucic, who resigned as president last month to lead the campaign, blamed independent media and alleged interference by unnamed European countries and an "American deep state", AP reported.	Unnamed European countries and an "American deep state", per Aleksandar Vucic **[media]**	cnn.com
disarm not labeled · context			
25 Oct W44-072	On the day of Bulgaria's presidential election, Factcheck.bg debunked a supposed address by Putin to "Bulgarian brothers" after the 6 October drone attack on ships in Bulgaria's Black Sea economic zone, whose only source was DailyStandart.com, a site it has repeatedly flagged. It traced a network of Facebook groups and profiles around the site, one profile posting 324 times in seven groups and pages in 30 days, and the most-shared post drew over 13,000 interactions.	The DailyStandart.com network. No state named **[researcher]**	factcheck.bg
disarm TA02 ~T0137.001 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0085.003 · TA16 T0098.002 · TA05 T0102.001 · TA07 T0151.002 T0152.004 · TA17 T0119.001 T0122 (actor unknown)			
24 Oct W44-073	StopFake debunked two false claims about Ukrainians in Lithuania: that Vilnius will stop protecting conscription-age Ukrainians, when a 7 October rule only requires some new applicants to prove military service or an exemption from it, and a legal border crossing, and that President Nauseda wants a Vilnius metro to shelter from Ukrainian drones, a twist added to an LRT report on a dual-use metro.	Social media accounts and Russian websites and Telegram channels, per StopFake **[researcher]**	StopFake; StopFake
disarm TA02 T0079 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0023 · TA07 T0151.001 ~T0151.007 T0152.004			
20-24 Oct W44-074	Moldova's government StratCom centre said that a baseless claim that the authorities were secretly building a drone factory was pushed by 13 Telegram accounts, four of them Sputnik Moldova's, in 21 posts on 16-17 October, about three hours before Russian foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova called Moldova a Western anti-Russian testing ground, and saw signs of coordinated amplification rather than a spontaneous reaction. On 24 October StopFals found the Socialist candidate for governor of Gagauzia repeating the claim.	Not named. StratCom says the claim fits the propaganda narrative of Moldova's "militarization" and serves the agenda of "foreign actors" **[official]**	cotidianul.md; stopfals.md
disarm TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0084.001 ~T0085.004 · TA07 T0111 ~T0151.007 · TA17 T0119.001			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
23 Oct W44-075	StopFals found that Moldovan MP Vasile Costiuc revived in a 21 October video a July 2024 claim that Ukrainian border guards shot a Ukrainian man on Moldovan soil, although police said the body found then bore no gunshot wounds. The claim first ran on a Telegram channel StopFals calls affiliated with the fugitive Ilan Shor, and this time several Russian outlets, RIA Novosti and Lenta.ru among them, picked it up.	Vasile Costiuc, then Russian outlets, per StopFals **[researcher]**	stopfals.md
disarm TA14 T0022.001 · TA06 T0087 · TA16 T0097.110 T0143.001 · TA07 T0151.001 · TA09 T0117 · TA11 T0060 (domestic · excluded from FIMI analysis)			
23 Oct W44-076	Veridica traced a claim that Ukrainian refugees joined France's riots and wrecked a Paris restaurant over "Russian" borscht to a 17 October RT France story that reported only negative online reviews the owner suspected Ukrainians had written, which Ukraina.ru recast three days later as Ukrainian migrants devastating the restaurant.	Ukraina.ru, recasting an RT France story, per Veridica **[researcher]**	veridica.ro
disarm TA02 T0066 T0140.003 · TA14 T0022.001 T0068 · TA06 T0023 · TA07 T0111 · TA17 ~T0119.002			
23 Oct W44-077	SPRAVDI counted about 190 posts on 22 October claiming Paris "robs the French" for Kyiv, which used a statement by Russia's OSCE envoy Dmitry Polyansky on France's unrest to tie underfunded schools, migration and police action to aid for Ukraine.	The Kremlin, per SPRAVDI **[official]**	SPRAVDI
disarm TA02 T0135.002 T0135.004 · TA14 T0068 T0083 · TA06 T0023			
21-23 Oct W44-078	In the US, Graphika assessed "with high confidence" that Storm-1516 made two very likely deepfake videos in which a supposed former student accuses Democratic Texas Senate candidate James Talarico of sexual assault, seeded on X on 20 October by an account created in September. NewsGuard found Google's AI Overview, Gemini and Copilot repeating the claim, and NPR reported that one video reached about 857,000 views in 24 hours, according to Alethea.	Storm-1516, "Russia-aligned" per Graphika and a Russian campaign per NewsGuard **[researcher]**	graphika.com; newsguardrealitycheck.com; npr.org
disarm TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA06 T0087.001 · TA15 T0149.007 T0150.001 · TA16 T0097.100 T0100.003 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.008 · TA17 ~T0039 T0049.003 · TA11 T0129.007 T0130.001			
22 Oct W44-079	NewsGuard found that Iran's Revolutionary Guards posted a video on Telegram on 5 October claiming France had cut the internet during its protests, when it showed queues at a Carrefour near Paris during a card-payment glitch, in a video first posted on 6 September. NewsGuard calls it an apparent attempt to downplay Iran's own internet blackout in January 2026.	The IRGC and pro-Iran accounts, per NewsGuard **[researcher]**	newsguardriskbriefing.substack.com
disarm TA02 T0136.001 · TA06 T0084.003 · TA16 T0097.206 T0143.001 · TA07 ~T0151.007			
22 Oct W44-080	Veridica debunked a PolitNavigator report that Moldova plans to raise gas prices drastically for Transnistria, which turned a deputy prime minister's remark that the Tiraspol authorities would have to raise tariffs into the government's own intent.	PolitNavigator, which Veridica calls pro-Kremlin **[researcher]**	veridica.ro
disarm TA02 ~T0135.001 T0135.002 T0136.004 · TA06 T0023 · TA05 T0016 · TA07 T0152.004			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
22 Oct W44-081	Myth Detector found that a video of the German AfD politician Enxhi Seli-Zacharias circulated with fabricated Russian audio in which she calls Ukraine a Western "tool" and Zelensky a "puppet", although her May 2026 speech did not mention the war, and three detection tools put the chance that the audio is AI at 90-95%. A Russian-language Facebook page posted it on 17 September and 14 October. **disarm** TA06 T0087.002 T0088.001 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0151.003 (actor unknown)	A Russian-language Facebook page. No state named **[researcher]**	mythdetector.com
22 Oct W44-082	Armenia's Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said that "certain circles in Russia" and in Armenia are trying to provoke instability with the ultimate aim of eliminating Armenia's de facto independence, the third attempt in three years, now built around Russian restrictions on Armenian goods. **disarm** not labeled · context	"certain circles in Russia", per Armenia's prime minister **[official]**	oc-media.org
21 Oct W44-083	Alliance4Europe attributed "with high confidence" to Russia's Doppelganger a bot network that posted 639 coordinated messages on X in French, German, English and Polish from 2 September to 14 October, seen about 7.4 million times, blaming high bills in France on aid to Ukraine before the 17 October protests. It found no evidence that a foreign actor started the protests, and counted 1,018 Pravda-network articles about the unrest across 28 sites. **disarm** TA02 ~T0135.001 T0135.002 · TA14 T0068 T0083 · TA06 T0085.003 · TA15 T0149.004 T0150.008 · TA16 T0097.101 T0097.202 T0098.002 T0143.002 T0143.003 T0144.002 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0151.007 T0151.008 T0152.004 · TA17 T0049.003 T0122	Russia (Doppelganger and the Pravda network), per Alliance4Europe **[researcher]**	alliance4europe.eu; alliance4europe.eu
21 Oct W44-084	US Senate Intelligence vice-chair Mark Warner and House Intelligence ranking member Jim Himes said a classified intelligence report details a covert Russian online influence campaign against candidates of both parties who support Ukraine before the 3 November midterms, and also Chinese and Iranian attempts, and Warner said it suggested Moscow is using AI tools. A spokesperson for the Republican chair of the House Intelligence Committee said the two had "cherry-picked" details. **disarm** not labeled · context	Russia, per two US lawmakers citing an intelligence report **[official]**	yahoo.com
21 Oct W44-085	The FT reported that EU regulators are examining possible online interference from outside the EU that may have fuelled the riots in France and elsewhere, with security officials pointing to pro-Russian and far-right accounts and also suspecting Iran and Algeria, according to Il Sole 24 Ore. A European intelligence source told the FT there is no concrete evidence of Russian provocation on the ground. **disarm** not labeled · response	Suspected Russia, Iran and Algeria, per security officials cited by the FT **[media]**	en.ilsole24ore.com; editorialedomani.it

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
21 Oct W44-086	Detector Media found a new wave of TikTok videos under the brands of France 24, Bloomberg, Le Parisien, 20 Minutes, RFI and BFM, posted overnight by six accounts with template names, claiming Macron fled to the Emirates during the riots and protesters burned Brad Pitt's Chateau Miraval. The videos drew no likes, and Detector Media suggests TikTok limited their reach.	None named **[unattributed]**	Detector Media
	disarm TA02 T0075.001 T0135.001 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0084.001 T0087 · TA15 T0150.008 · TA16 T0097.102 T0097.202 T0143.002 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.008 (actor unknown)		
21 Oct W44-087	StopFals debunked claims that Moldova will pay to treat Ukrainian soldiers at the expense of Moldovan patients, pushed from 7 October through an online petition whose author's claimed employer denied he works there, and spread by RIA Novosti and other Russian outlets and by Telegram channels including Sputnik Moldova's.	Sources StopFals calls known for promoting pro-Kremlin disinformation **[researcher]**	stopfals.md
	disarm TA06 T0023 · TA16 T0097.101 T0143.002 · TA05 T0016 · TA07 T0111 T0151.001 T0151.007 T0152.004		
21 Oct W44-088	Factcheck.bg debunked an image styled like presidential candidate Andrey Gyurov's campaign material, quoting him as saying he would send Bulgaria's army to Ukraine, which his campaign denied. It spread in Facebook groups such as one calling for the Soviet Army monument in Sofia to be restored.	Unknown **[unattributed]**	factcheck.bg
	disarm TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA06 T0086 · TA16 T0097.110 T0143.003 · TA05 T0102.001 · TA07 T0151.002 (actor unknown)		
21 Oct W44-089	Veridica debunked a Ukraina.ru article claiming NATO and the EU are arming to attack Russia and seize its resources, which recast the EU's 2030 defence-readiness roadmap as preparation for war.	Ukraina.ru, per Veridica **[researcher]**	veridica.ro
	disarm TA02 T0135.002 T0136.002 · TA14 T0004 · TA06 T0023 · TA07 T0111 · TA17 ~T0119.002		
20-21 Oct W44-090	UK counter-terrorism police re-arrested two men in the RAF Fairford case on suspicion of assisting a foreign intelligence service under the National Security Act, saying the country concerned is Iran and that Iranian state involvement is "highly likely", and a court let them be held without charge until 27 October.	Iran, "highly likely", per UK counter-terrorism police **[official]**	counterterrorism.police.uk
	disarm not labeled · context		
19-21 Oct W44-091	Promo-LEX reported that Transnistria's schools are being folded into Russia's education system and that propaganda against reintegration with Moldova is becoming more systematic, and found that nine children and young people from a local Cossack paramilitary group attended a September project in Moscow run by Rossotrudnichestvo, which the EU sanctioned in 2022.	Russia (Rossotrudnichestvo) and the Tiraspol authorities, per Promo-LEX **[researcher]**	promolex.md; promolex.md
	disarm not labeled · overt state action		

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
20 Oct W44-092	FIP.am found that an Armenian site's claim, attributed to the official channel of Iran's Revolutionary Guards, that Azerbaijan is preparing a provocation against Armenia came from a Russian-language Telegram channel that uses the IRGC's name and symbols, is not among its official accounts and lists Russia as its location. **disarm** TA06 T0085 · TA16 T0097.206 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.007 · TA09 T0117 (actor unknown)	An IRGC-branded Telegram channel that lists Russia as its location. No state named **[researcher]**	fip.am
20 Oct W44-093	Italy's Defence Minister Guido Crosetto called violent cost-of-living protests in Milan and other cities the end point of a "hybrid war" that "someone" is waging through TikTok and YouTube, in remarks AGI framed as pointing towards Russia and Iran, and investigators are examining whether the calls to protest had an organizing hand behind them. **disarm** not labeled · context	"someone", per Italy's defence minister, who named no country **[official]**	agi.it
20 Oct W44-094	Factcheck.bg found no record of Kaja Kallas saying that elections in Romania and Moldova should be cancelled because "the wrong party" might win, as the Vazrazhdane leader and presidential candidate Kostadin Kostadinov claimed in a radio interview viewed 67,000 times on YouTube. **disarm** TA06 T0023 · TA16 T0097.110 T0143.001 · TA08 T0042 (domestic · excluded from FIMI analysis)	Kostadin Kostadinov. No state named **[researcher]**	factcheck.bg
19 Oct W44-095	Deividas Matulionis, national security adviser to Lithuania's president, said there is "a high probability that Russia is behind" the attempted arson at SpaceX's Vilnius premises, "but we do not yet have 100% confirmation and attribution", after the prime minister blamed Russia last week. **disarm** not labeled · context	Russia, probable but not confirmed, per Lithuania's presidential adviser **[official]**	lrt.lt
19 Oct W44-096	Propastop reported a new wave of Russian media claims from 18 October that drones hitting St Petersburg came from the Baltic states, with Estonia said to guide them alongside Britain's SAS, and the commentator Oleg Ivannikov proposing that all of Estonia's civil and military air traffic be halted. **disarm** TA02 ~T0136.002 · TA14 T0004 · TA07 T0111 · TA11 T0060	Russian media and commentators, per Propastop **[researcher]**	Propastop
19 Oct W44-097	Factual.ro debunked an audio recording of a supposed call in which Romania's President Nicusor Dan tells Moldova's Maia Sandu he can mobilize 20,000 soldiers against Russia, which some detection tools flag as likely AI while others were inconclusive, and which a Moldovan Socialist Party branch shared on Facebook. It had already circulated on Telegram before Moldova's September 2025 election, per Moldovan media. **disarm** TA06 T0088.001 · TA07 T0151.001 ~T0151.007 · TA11 T0060 (actor unknown)	Unnamed. Factual calls it "another example of pro-Russian disinformation" **[researcher]**	factual.ro

Actors and techniques

Russian operations again dominated, led by two exposures of Doppelganger, and Russian state media and diplomats pushed their lines in the open as well as in disguise. Iran appeared through the IRGC's fake French internet shutdown and the RAF Fairford case, and no China-linked information operation was exposed in the region.

OPERATION OR ACTOR	ORIGIN	WHAT IT DID THIS WEEK	WHERE SEEN
Doppelganger (Social Design Agency)	Russia per The Insider and Alliance4Europe	Leaked correspondence published by The Insider names Sergei Kiriyenko as its initiator, Alexander Kharichev and Sofia Zakharova as its Kremlin overseers and Germany as its early main target, and Alliance4Europe tied a four-language bot network on X to it before France's protests, with German-language posts as late as 14 October.	France, Germany, Poland and Ukraine
Storm-1516	Russia per NewsGuard, "Russia-aligned" per Graphika	A deepfake accusing a US Senate candidate of sexual assault, which AI chatbots then repeated.	The US (X)
Pravda network (Portal Kombat)	Russia per SPRAVDI and Alliance4Europe	Carried almost nine in ten of the 21,219 FIMI-marked posts SPRAVDI logged on 16-18 October, 1,018 articles on France's unrest, and the claim that the Oleshky truce is a trap.	Ukraine, France and internationally
RT, Sputnik and Channel One	Russia (state media)	RT France reported a Paris restaurant's bad reviews, which Ukraina.ru recast as a "borscht" riot, RT's English X account spread the Swedish king fake, Channel One reported a Polish aid "cancellation" and aired the AI border-queue video, and Sputnik approached a Czech MEP and helped spread a Moldovan rumour.	Czechia, Poland, France, Moldova and Ukraine
Russian diplomats	Russia (overt)	The ambassador in Prague courted Czech admirers of Putin, the embassy in Bratislava disputed the targeting of Ukrainians in the 1932-33 famine, the OSCE envoy's remarks on France fed a narrative SPRAVDI tracked, and diplomatic pages spread "staged war" fakes, per the CCD.	Czechia, Slovakia, France and on X
Russian intelligence	A Russian intelligence service per Germany's Federal Prosecutor	A suspected spy on the arms industry was arrested in Germany, and Austria expelled four diplomats profil reports are suspected of espionage. Separately, Lithuania's presidential adviser sees "a high probability that Russia is behind" the Vilnius Starlink arson attempt, without naming a service.	Germany, Austria and Lithuania
Telegram recruitment	Russia (its special services, the FSB in two cases) per the SBU and the CCD	Handlers found recruits seeking "extra" or "easy" earnings on Telegram channels and through anti-Ukrainian comments in Telegram chats, and chatbots pay for strike footage.	Ukraine
Russian MoD and military leadership	Russia per ISW and Ukraine's military	False capture claims, backed by flag-planting and by footage ISW believes may be AI-generated or AI-altered.	Ukraine

OPERATION OR ACTOR	ORIGIN	WHAT IT DID THIS WEEK	WHERE SEEN
Rybar	Russia per the BfV	The BfV called it "a known influence actor" after two Berlin-based staff of the sanctioned Izvestia were caught filming for it in Prague, and INFO OPS Polska profiled its funding and fronts.	Germany and Czechia
Govorit and Euroview	Successors of sanctioned Russian outlets per the UK government and Public Record	Publish in some 40 languages, Czech included, with pieces under Viktor Medvedchuk's name.	Czechia
Global Fact-Checking Network	Russia per Demagog citing RSF	Its "verifications" were cited in Polish posts denying the Bucha killings.	Poland
IRGC and the Iranian state	Iran per NewsGuard and UK counter-terrorism police	The IRGC posted a miscaptioned video claiming France cut the internet, per NewsGuard, and in the RAF Fairford case police see Iranian state involvement as "highly likely", without naming an agency.	France and the UK
Technique: AI images, video and audio	Mostly unattributed	AI fakes included a Babiš speech, a border queue, a soldier with "Jew" carved into his back, street scenes in Kyiv and Lviv, Paris riot images, a Ukrainian "soldier" on TikTok, a likely AI-faked call between the Romanian and Moldovan presidents, and the Talarico deepfake.	Czechia, Poland, Austria, Ukraine, Romania, Moldova and the US
Technique: spoofed media brands	Russia-linked where attributed	Fakes imitated Der Nordschleswiger, the Tagesschau, Ukraine's UNN agency and, on TikTok, France 24, Bloomberg, Le Parisien, 20 Minutes, RFI and BFM, and Doppelganger's posts linked to articles branded as Der Spiegel.	Denmark, Germany, Poland and France
Technique: old fakes relaunched	Actors mostly unnamed	The Swedish king clip, the "pregnant soldier" video, the "eighth father" montage, a 2024 Moldovan border claim and a 2022 surrender video all returned this week.	Czechia, Poland, Germany, Moldova and Ukraine

New research and reports

Two Doppelganger exposures led the week's research: Alliance4Europe tied a Russian bot campaign to the mood before France's 17 October protests, and The Insider published leaked Social Design Agency files naming the Kremlin officials who ran the operation. No platform published a takedown report in the window; X said on 14 October, before it, that it had suspended over 13,000 accounts in three suspected foreign influence operations linked to Iran, Russia and China.

DATE	PUBLISHER	TITLE OR TOPIC	WHY IT MATTERS
26 Oct	CAT-UA	Weekly report on Ukraine's information space, 17-23 October	Finds pro-Russian messaging turning from Russian "victories" to "selling" Ukrainians peace.
25 Oct	Factcheck.bg	A fake Putin address and the DailyStandart.com network	Maps the Facebook groups and profiles around the site, published on the day of Bulgaria's presidential vote.

DATE	PUBLISHER	TITLE OR TOPIC	WHY IT MATTERS
25 Oct	Čeští elfové	Social media monitoring, 16-30 September	Finds "AI slop" pages it ties to Vietnam carrying the "return to Russian gas" line to Czech audiences.
25 Oct	Čeští elfové	Chain-email monitoring, September	Logs 55 chain emails, most often attacking President Pavel, Ukraine and Germany.
23 Oct	Hybrid CoE and the EU's Joint Research Centre	"Defending Europe against hybrid warfare"	Proposes a strategy of resilience and deterrence, and argues that strong attribution is what makes retaliation legitimate.
23 Oct	ORF	A map of Russia-linked physical hybrid incidents	Part of a Eurovision News Spotlight investigation logging such incidents in 17 countries from April to mid-October, which WP says puts Poland among the most affected.
23 Oct	Texty	TikTok and YouTube monitoring, 12-18 October	Puts bots behind nearly one in three destructive YouTube comments about Zelensky, now calling for capitulation.
23 Oct	INFO OPS Polska	Russian propaganda and Poland's defence policy	Maps how Russian state media cast Poland's military build-up as offensive, 17-23 October.
22 Oct	The Insider	"'Write like a 38-year-old Israeli woman': The Kremlin used fake media and fabricated 'experts' to spread disinformation in Israel"	A follow-up drawing on the same leaked Social Design Agency files, days before Israel's 27 October election.
22 Oct	Yevropeiska Pravda	German-language sites promoting the AfD and Kremlin narratives	An analysis by Oleksandr Lemenov and Volodymyr Cherchyk profiling PI-News, Journalistenwatch, Report24, COMPACT and others, with traffic estimates.
22 Oct	INFO OPS Polska	Dark Clark's Polish leg	Traces how a Russian-origin provocation in Lima schools became a Polish political story through Myśl Polska and i.pl, then fed back into Peruvian media.
22 Oct	NewsGuard	"Fakes of the week: Russians interfere in Texas senate race; French internet blackout"	Documents the Talarico deepfake, the IRGC's fake French blackout and the "crisis actor" images on Pravda-network sites.
21 Oct	Alliance4Europe	"EU Unrest Report | How France's October 2026 protests were manipulated, then retold abroad"	The week's main network exposure: a Doppelganger bot campaign in four languages, seen about 7.4 million times.
21 Oct	The Insider	"Putin's 'Doppelgängers': The Insider gets inside the operations of the Kremlin's foreign disinformation network"	Names the officials behind Doppelganger and quotes its fake-making manuals and AI persona prompts.
21 Oct	Graphika	"Storm-1516 Produces Very Likely Deepfake Videos of Student Accusing Democratic Senate Candidate of Sexual Assault"	A high-confidence Storm-1516 attribution two weeks before the US midterms.
21 Oct	NewsGuard	"Russian Deepfake Accuses Talarico of Sexually Abusing Student"	Shows AI chatbots repeating the fake within a day.
21 Oct	NASK	Report on how platforms handle flagged content	Finds platforms removed 6.7% of the more than 65,000 items flagged in the first half of 2026.
21 Oct	INFO OPS Polska	Seven days of Russian propaganda against Poland	Shows Russian media using the 18 October drone incident to cast NATO's eastern flank as a launch pad for Ukrainian strikes.

DATE	PUBLISHER	TITLE OR TOPIC	WHY IT MATTERS
20 Oct	investigace.cz	Sanctioned propaganda sites still publishing in Czech	Shows rebranded Russian propaganda sites outlasting sanctions.
19 Oct	Promo-LEX	Quarterly report on the Transnistrian region	Documents Russian influence over schools and propaganda against reintegration with Moldova.
19 Oct	INFO OPS Polska	Rybar as a "private" contractor of Russian influence operations	A 37-page report on Rybar's funding, fronts and filming trips, including interview requests in Prague and Bratislava.
19 Oct	Propastop	"A new wave of Russian drone propaganda: from accusations against Estonia to direct threats"	Shows a recycled accusation turning into calls to ground Estonia's air traffic.
18 Oct	Journal of Information Technology & Politics	"Propaganda as infrastructure: reconceptualizing information operations through the Pravda network"	A peer-reviewed study of the network's output from 2023 to 2025, arguing that it works as always-on infrastructure that current regulation struggles to reach.

What to watch next week

Elections in Israel and the US, Bulgaria's presidential run-off and the Oleshky truce are the dates to watch.

[+] 27 Oct: Israel's legislative election, where The Insider says Kremlin-linked operatives "remain active".

[+] 27 Oct: A planned local ceasefire in occupied Oleshky is due to begin, which Zelensky said would need to last several days, after SPRAVDI counted posts framing the truce as a trap.

[+] 27 Oct: The two men re-arrested in the RAF Fairford case can be held without charge until this date.

[+] 31 Oct: "Gen Z" protests called in about 21 German cities, where the BfV is stepping up monitoring of channels calling for violence and AI-made protest calls of unclear origin circulate.

[+] 1 Nov: Bulgaria's presidential run-off between Iliana Yotova and Andrey Gyurov, according to AP.

[+] 2 Nov: The trial of Jang I-ming, the Chinese correspondent accused of spying, resumes in Prague.

[+] 3 Nov: The US midterm elections, where researchers tracking Storm-1516 expect more fake videos around election day.

[+] No date: President Nawrocki's decision on the bill on blocking illegal online content, which reached him on 23 October.

[+] No date: Russia's promised response to Austria's expulsion of four diplomats.

[+] No date: The EU's proposed 100 FIMI sanctions listings await adoption.

[-] Coverage gap: This issue does not draw on Manipulátoři.cz, Demagog.cz, the European Values Center, GLOBSEC, SIS, PAP Fake Hunter, AFP's fact-checks, EUvsDisinfo, the Council of the EU's and the EEAS's own pages, ODIHR's statement on Serbia's election, or the FT and Politico originals. Finding nothing there is not proof that nothing happened.

TTP patterns this week

Russia is the state behind 39 of the 40 records with a state actor this week, attributed or suspected, and Iran behind one; 24 manipulation records have no known actor. The Russian records stand apart less by disguise than by voice and channel: state officials and state media speaking as themselves, and Telegram seeding, while AI media, Facebook and X belong more to the unattributed side. Three weeks of records are a baseline, not a trend: read every number below as n/N records.

[x] Tactic presence by actor: records using each DISARM tactic at least once

TACTIC (KILL-CHAIN ORDER)	RUSSIA (N=39)	UNATTRIBUTED (N=24)	IRAN (N=1)
TA01 Plan Strategy	1/39	0/24	[ ]
TA02 Plan Objectives	30/39	8/24	[x]
TA14 Develop Narratives	24/39	8/24	[ ]
TA06 Develop Content	31/39	23/24	[x]
TA15 Establish Assets	6/39	1/24	[ ]
TA16 Establish Legitimacy	20/39	8/24	[x]
TA05 Microtarget	12/39	5/24	[ ]
TA07 Select Channels and Affordances	35/39	22/24	[x]
TA08 Conduct Pump Priming	2/39	3/24	[ ]
TA09 Deliver Content	1/39	3/24	[ ]
TA17 Maximise Exposure	7/39	3/24	[ ]
TA10 Drive Offline Activity	3/39	1/24	[ ]
TA11 Persist in the Information Environment	8/39	7/24	[ ]
TA12 Assess Effectiveness	2/39	0/24	[ ]

Not seen this week: TA13 Target Audience Analysis, TA18 Drive Online Harms. Planning-phase tactics are rarely visible in open sources, so their absence says more about evidence than behaviour. TA02 includes inferred aims. Counting only aims a source states, Russia is 17/39 and unattributed is 2/24.

[1] **Russia speaks in the open as much as in disguise.** An authentic persona (T0143.001) appears in 7/39 Russian records: the ambassador in Prague (W44-007), the embassy in Bratislava (W44-012), the MoD (W44-057), the foreign ministry and its officials (W44-059, -061), the SVR (W44-062) and Medvedchuk (W44-048). Established state media carry the content (T0111) in 14/39, a government institution persona (T0097.206) is in 5/39 and a government official persona (T0097.111) in 4/39. Legitimacy tricks of any kind (TA16) are in 20/39.

[2] **AI media leans to the unattributed side this week.** AI-generated text, images, video or audio appear in 9/24 unattributed records against 6/39 Russian ones. Unattributed records carry most of the AI images (T0086.002: 4 against 2) and both AI audio records (T0088.001: W44-081, -097), while AI video is close to even (T0087.001: Russia 4, unattributed 3). The deepfake of a US Senate candidate (W44-078) is the one AI video with a named operation, Storm-1516.

[3] **Telegram carries Russian records, Facebook and X the unattributed.** Telegram channels (T0151.007) seed 12/39 Russian records against 4/24 unattributed ones. Facebook and unspecified social networks (T0151.001) carry 10/24 unattributed records against 6/39 Russian, and X and TikTok (T0151.008) 10/24 against 7/39.

[4] **News brands are the shared mask, and Doppelganger wears most of the Russian ones.** Impersonation of real outlets, institutions or people (T0143.003, T0149.003) is in 6/39 Russian and 5/24 unattributed records. A news-outlet persona (T0097.202) is in 4/39 Russian records, three of them Doppelganger (W44-041, -063, -083) and one a forged Der Nordschleswiger page (W44-051), and in 3/24 unattributed ones, among them the TikTok videos branded France 24 and Bloomberg (W44-086).

[5] **Leaked files reach the layer fact-checks never see.** Planning (TA01, 1/39) and the operators' own assessment of results (TA12, 2/39: T0133 in W44-041 and -063) appear only in the records built on The Insider's hacked Social Design Agency correspondence. Label density follows the source: records from media reports average 8.6 labels (n=9), against 6.4 for fact-checks (n=41) and for Ukrainian state bodies (n=14).

[6] **Aims are stated for Russian records far more often.** A stated aim (TA02, observed) is in 17/39 Russian records and 2/24 unattributed ones. Across Russian records, stated or inferred, the commonest aims are thwarting support for Ukraine (T0135.002, 10 records), discouraging Ukrainians (T0139.001, 6) and justifying Russian action (T0136.002, 4). Aims get stated where the attributing source analyses intent, which Ukrainian state bodies and researchers do routinely, so part of this gap is a selection effect.

[7] **The spread stage is still the least documented.** Of the four stages of the Russian chain, disguise is documented in 20/39 records, manipulated content in 23/39, seeding in 25/39 and spread in 14/39, and amplification proper (TA17) in 7/39. The full chain shows in four records: W44-008, -047, -052 and -078.

russian spoof-to-spread chain · records documenting each stage (n = 39)

disguise →	content →	seed →	spread
persona, spoofed brand, fake front	AI-made or manipulated real media	Telegram, X, Facebook, own or spoofed sites	localization, cross-posting, flooding
TA16	TA06	TA07	TA05 · TA17
20 / 39	**23 / 39**	**25 / 39**	**14 / 39**

All four stages are documented in 4 records: W44-008 (Govorit/Euroview), W44-047 (Russian state media), W44-052 (Pravda/Portal Kombat), W44-078 (Storm-1516). Stages count techniques, not whole tactics. Disguise is any TA16 label. Content is AI-made or edited media (T0023, T0023.001, T0084.003, T0085.001, T0086.002, T0086.003, T0087.001, T0087.002, T0088.001, T0088.002). Seed is T0151.001, T0151.007, T0151.008 or T0152.004. Spread is any TA17 label or T0101. That is why content and seed can count fewer records than TA06 and TA07.

[-] Read with care: Three weeks of records (W41, W42 and W44) are not the four a trend needs. The per-week figures show Russian legitimacy tricks (TA16) at 10/23, 18/31 and 20/39, and amplification (TA17) at 5/23, 4/31 and 7/39, movements three points cannot carry. Iran rests on a single record (W44-079) and China on none, so nothing is said about either. 14 of the 64 manipulation records rest first on Ukrainian state bodies, which are official sources but a party to the war. Some fakes are recorded twice: the Swedish king relaunch (W44-016 duplicates W44-003) adds one to the Russian counts for T0023, T0060, T0087.002, T0111, T0135.001 and T0151.008; the dog collage is in two Russian records (W44-017, -058); and the "eighth father" montage counts once as unattributed (W44-032) and once inside a Russian record (W44-058), where Ukraine's CCD places it in a Russian "staged war" campaign. Labels come from secondary reporting, so they show what was documented, not everything the operators did.

[x] What to track as weeks accumulate

[+] Authentic official voices (T0143.001, now 7/39) and state-media carriers (T0111, now 14/39) against disguise (TA16, now 20/39), as weeks accumulate.

[+] AI media by actor (now 6/39 Russian and 9/24 unattributed), and AI audio fakes of leaders.

[+] Doppelganger after the leak and the French bot network, and whether its German-language posting continues.

[+] Storm-1516 before the 3 November US midterms.

[+] A fourth week of records, which turns the per-week figures into a first trend.

Appendix: DISARM techniques used this week

97 techniques, ordered by tactic along the kill chain. Counts are records, not labels. RU = Russia, UNK = unattributed, IR = Iran, DOM = domestic (excluded from the analysis). Each ID links to its definition in the DISARM framework, published by the DISARM Foundation under CC BY-SA 4.0.

TACTIC	ID	TECHNIQUE	RU	UNK	IR	DOM
TA01	T0073	Determine Target Audiences	1	·	·	·
TA02	T0066	Degrade Adversary	6	·	·	·
TA02	T0075.001	Discredit Credible Sources	1	2	·	·
TA02	T0077	Distract	1	·	·	·
TA02	T0079	Divide	5	·	·	·
TA02	T0135.001	Smear	7	6	·	1
TA02	T0135.002	Thwart	10	·	·	1
TA02	T0135.003	Subvert	1	·	·	·
TA02	T0135.004	Polarise	2	·	·	·
TA02	T0136.001	Defend Reputaton	2	·	1	·
TA02	T0136.002	Justify Action	4	·	·	·
TA02	T0136.004	Boost Reputation	3	·	·	·
TA02	T0137.001	Generate Ad Revenue	·	1	·	·
TA02	T0139.001	Discourage	6	2	·	·
TA02	T0140.003	Spread Hate	1	·	·	·
TA14	T0004	Develop Competing Narratives	13	1	·	1
TA14	T0022.001	Amplify Existing Conspiracy Theory Narratives	4	1	·	2
TA14	T0068	Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis	13	6	·	1
TA14	T0083	Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative	3	·	·	·
TA06	T0023	Distort Facts	17	4	·	2
TA06	T0023.001	Reframe Context	1	2	·	·
TA06	T0084.001	Use Copypasta	1	3	·	·
TA06	T0084.002	Plagiarise Content	·	1	·	·
TA06	T0084.003	Deceptively Labelled or Translated	1	5	1	1
TA06	T0085	Develop Text-Based Content	2	3	·	1
TA06	T0085.003	Develop Inauthentic News Articles	3	1	·	·
TA06	T0085.004	Develop Document	2	2	·	·
TA06	T0085.006	Develop Opinion Article	1	·	·	·
TA06	T0085.008	Machine Translated Text	·	1	·	·
TA06	T0086	Develop Image-Based Content	1	1	·	·
TA06	T0086.002	Develop AI-Generated Images (Deepfakes)	2	4	·	·
TA06	T0086.003	Deceptively Edit Images (Cheap Fakes)	1	1	·	·
TA06	T0086.004	Aggregate Information into Evidence Collages	2	1	·	·
TA06	T0087	Develop Video-Based Content	4	2	·	1
TA06	T0087.001	Develop AI-Generated Videos (Deepfakes)	4	3	·	·
TA06	T0087.002	Deceptively Edit Video (Cheap Fakes)	2	2	·	·
TA06	T0088.001	Develop AI-Generated Audio (Deepfakes)	·	2	·	·
TA06	T0089.003	Alter Authentic Documents	·	1	·	·
TA15	T0091.001	Recruit Contractors	2	·	·	·

TACTIC	ID	TECHNIQUE	RU	UNK	IR	DOM
TA15	T0146.007	Automated Account Asset	1	·	·	·
TA15	T0149.001	Domain Asset	1	·	·	·
TA15	T0149.004	Redirecting Domain Asset	2	·	·	·
TA15	T0149.007	VPN Asset	1	·	·	·
TA15	T0150.001	Newly Created Asset	1	·	·	·
TA15	T0150.008	Bulk Created Asset	1	1	·	·
TA16	T0097.100	Individual Persona	1	·	·	·
TA16	T0097.101	Local Persona	4	·	·	·
TA16	T0097.102	Journalist Persona	1	1	·	·
TA16	T0097.105	Military Personnel Persona	1	·	·	·
TA16	T0097.110	Party Official Persona	1	3	·	2
TA16	T0097.111	Government Official Persona	4	·	·	·
TA16	T0097.202	News Outlet Persona	4	3	·	·
TA16	T0097.203	Fact Checking Organisation Persona	1	·	·	·
TA16	T0097.206	Government Institution Persona	5	1	1	·
TA16	T0097.207	NGO Persona	1	·	·	·
TA16	T0098.002	Leverage Existing Inauthentic News Sites	5	1	·	2
TA16	T0100.001	Co-Opt Trusted Individuals	3	·	·	·
TA16	T0100.003	Co-Opt Influencers	1	·	·	·
TA16	T0143.001	Authentic Persona	7	2	1	2
TA16	T0143.002	Fabricated Persona	9	1	·	·
TA16	T0143.003	Impersonated Persona	6	5	·	·
TA16	T0143.004	Parody Persona	1	·	·	·
TA16	T0144.002	Persona Template	1	·	·	·
TA05	T0016	Create Clickbait	2	2	·	·
TA05	T0101	Create Localised Content	8	1	·	·
TA05	T0102.001	Use Existing Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles	2	2	·	·
TA07	T0110	Formal Diplomatic Channels	1	·	·	·
TA07	T0111	Traditional Media	14	·	·	·
TA07	T0111.001	TV	1	·	·	·
TA07	T0151.001	Social Media Platform	6	10	·	2
TA07	T0151.002	Online Community Group	1	3	·	·
TA07	T0151.003	Online Community Page	1	3	·	·
TA07	T0151.004	Chat Platform	1	·	·	·
TA07	T0151.006	Chat Room	2	·	·	·
TA07	T0151.007	Chat Broadcast Group	12	4	1	·
TA07	T0151.008	Microblogging Platform	7	10	·	·
TA07	T0151.014	Comments Section	·	1	·	·
TA07	T0152.004	Website Asset	12	2	·	2
TA07	T0153.007	Direct Messaging	1	·	·	·
TA08	T0042	Seed Kernel of Truth	2	3	·	2
TA09	T0114.001	Social Media	1	·	·	·
TA09	T0116.001	Post Inauthentic Social Media Comment	1	1	·	·
TA09	T0117	Attract Traditional Media	·	2	·	1

TACTIC	ID	TECHNIQUE	RU	UNK	IR	DOM
TA17	T0039	Bait Influencer	1	·	·	·
TA17	T0049.003	Bots Amplify via Automated Forwarding and Reposting	2	·	·	·
TA17	T0119.001	Post across Groups	1	2	·	·
TA17	T0119.002	Post across Platform	3	1	·	·
TA17	T0122	Direct Users to Alternative Platforms	2	2	·	·
TA10	T0057	Organise Events	1	1	·	·
TA10	T0057.002	Conduct Symbolic Action	1	·	·	·
TA10	T0127.002	Encourage Physical Violence	1	·	·	·
TA11	T0060	Continue to Amplify	5	3	·	1
TA11	T0128.005	Change Names of Information Assets	1	·	·	·
TA11	T0129.007	Delete Accounts/Account Activity	1	1	·	·
TA11	T0129.009	Remove Post Origins	·	2	·	·
TA11	T0130.001	Conceal Sponsorship	3	1	·	·
TA12	T0133	Measure Effectiveness	2	·	·	·