Influence Operations Weekly Digest

26 Oct - 1 Nov 2026 · labeled with DISARM Red v1.6.1 · author: Lukáš Czerner

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$ digest --week 2026-W44 --framework disarm-red-1.6.1
┌─ influence operations · weekly digest · DISARM-labeled
│  records  78 digest items · 53 manipulation records labeled
│  labels   351 technique labels · 91 distinct techniques
│  actors   RU 35 · IR 0 · CN 0 · unattributed 13 · domestic 5
└─ status    ok
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Russian, Chinese, Iranian and other state-linked information operations, with a focus on Central Europe and Ukraine.

[-] Disclaimer: This digest is created with the help of AI-enabled tools and may contain inaccuracies. If you find one, let me know.

This week in brief

Russian operations aimed at elections led the week: CeMAS documented four Russian campaigns and actors around Germany's September state votes, and NewsGuard said fake newscasts against two US Senate candidates appear to be Storm-1516's work days before the midterms. Romania's intelligence service blamed a sabotage network coordinated from Russia for a fire at an industrial site beside an arms maker, and Google reported taking down 2,321 YouTube channels in Russia-linked campaigns in the third quarter.

[+] CeMAS found that four Russian campaigns and actors, Operation Overload, Doppelganger, Storm-1516 and the Foundation to Battle Injustice, targeted Germany's September state and local elections, Storm-1516 with a fake Sueddeutsche Zeitung story against Saxony-Anhalt's premier, at 24.4 million views on X.

[+] Google's Q3 influence operations bulletin lists 23 takedowns of Russia-linked campaigns, 2,321 YouTube channels in all, the three largest "linked to a Russian consulting firm", and 14,472 channels in its PRC-linked investigation.

[+] Romania's SRI said "a sabotage network coordinated from the Russian Federation" set the September fire on the Carfil industrial platform in Brasov, with suspects held in Germany and Poland, and the foreign ministry summoned Russia's ambassador.

[+] NewsGuard found fake TV reports accusing Sherrod Brown of sexual assault and Troy Jackson of threatening staff with an ax, which it says point to Storm-1516.

[+] Poland's Prime Minister Donald Tusk said "an army of Russian bots" backed those attacking the rule of law in the Constitutional Tribunal crisis, which Dmitry Medvedev openly called a coup, and Demagog exposed AI videos inventing anti-Polish posts by Ukrainian councillors that it calls "probably Russian".

[+] Ukraine's CCD said a fake Toronto Sun story about a Zelensky nuclear bunker matched Doppelganger's method, while DisinfoWatch, which counted 7.76 million views on X, named no operator.

[+] UK counter-terrorism police charged a man over RAF Fairford with assisting a foreign intelligence service, "we believe that country to be Iran".

[-] Reading the DISARM lines: under every incident, a **disarm** line lists the DISARM Red v1.6.1 techniques evidenced in the sources, grouped by tactic in kill-chain order (plan → prepare → execute → assess). Every ID (e.g. T0085.001) links to its DISARM definition. ~ marks a label inferred rather than stated in a source.

Technique names are in the appendix. Responses, context items and overt state actions are not labeled. Each incident has an ID (e.g. W44-007) used in the pattern summary.

Czechia

No Czech authority attributed a new campaign to a foreign state this week, though the head of BIS, in remarks published on 29 October, warned that after the war Russia will press to enlarge its Prague embassy, with most new staff likely to be intelligence officers. The main exposure was Seznam Zprávy's report that the EU-sanctioned Russian House promoted a concert in a Charles University hall rented by an SPD politician, who denies breaching sanctions, and Odolné Česko counted 183 articles from sanctioned Russian sources on Czech conspiracy websites in September.

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
30 Oct W44-001	Seznam Zprávy reported that the Russian House in Prague, run by Rossotrudnichestvo, which the EU has sanctioned since 2022, promoted as its own a 20 October concert in a Charles University hall that SPD politician Sergej Zujev had rented, and edited its website, Telegram and Facebook posts to hide the venue after the outlet's questions. The faculty's dean said it had been misled, and Zujev denies any breach and calls it his private event.	The Russian House (Rossotrudnichestvo), openly. The suspected sanctions evasion is Seznam Zprávy's finding, which Zujev denies **[media]**	seznamzpravy.cz; ct24.ceskatelevize.cz
disarm not labeled · overt state action			
29 Oct W44-002	BIS director Michal Koudelka told Hlídací pes at a seminar on current security threats in the Chamber of Deputies that he is "absolutely convinced" Russia will press to enlarge its Prague embassy once the war in Ukraine ends, behind talk of "economic diplomacy" and "building bridges": "They could easily send a hundred here, but seventy of them would be intelligence officers." The embassy and two consulates had 135 people with diplomatic or service passports in April 2021, before the Vrbětice expulsions, and the embassy now lists six diplomats.	Russia, per BIS, as a forecast **[official]**	hlidacipes.org
disarm not labeled · response			
28 Oct W44-003	An AFP fact-check republished by CEDMO found that a video said to show Africans in France selling goods looted in the October riots was filmed on a Madrid shopping street in late September, before the unrest. Czech Facebook posts carried it in two versions, one with Polish commentary and one voiced in Russian with Russian on-screen text, and drew more than 220 shares.	Unknown **[unattributed]**	cedmohub.eu
disarm TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0084.003 · TA07 T0151.001 (actor unknown)			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
27 Oct W44-004	Odolné Česko, an initiative of Czech groups including AMO, Datlab, Transparency International and the European Values Center, counted 183 articles translated from 14 EU-sanctioned Russian sources on ten Czech conspiracy websites in September. 63% of the 237 links pointed to state media such as RT, Ukraina.ru, RIA Novosti and Sputnik, and 23% to outlets the US Treasury says Russian intelligence controls, among them the Strategic Culture Foundation, News Front and SouthFront, and CZ24.news alone carried 75 of the articles.	Russian state media and intelligence-run outlets, per Odolné Česko citing the US Treasury, republished by Czech websites **[researcher]**	odolnecesko.cz
disarm TA14 T0004 · TA06 T0084.004 · TA16 T0098.002 · TA05 T0016 T0101 · TA07 T0111 T0152.004			
27 Oct W44-005	The Prague Municipal Court refused to release Jang I-ming, the Chinese correspondent accused of acting for a foreign power, from custody, iDNES reported. The trial, held largely behind closed doors, is due to continue in early November, and the prosecutor seeks three years in prison, a fine and expulsion.	Chinese intelligence, per the prosecution. The defendant denies it **[official]**	idnes.cz
disarm not labeled · context			

Slovakia

No Slovak authority attributed an information operation to a foreign state this week, and Russia's own state bodies did the pushing in the open: the embassy said some Slovak media reports on occupied Oleshky omit or distort the facts, and the foreign ministry demanded punishment for the defacing of a new statue of Marshal Konev. The main exposure was Demagog.sk's debunk of a Bucha-denial post resting on the Russian Global Fact-Checking Network, whose site lists a Slovak former parliamentary assistant among the authors, and Russia put the Bratislava publisher Vidim Books on its "undesirable" list.

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
30 Oct W44-006	The Russian embassy in Bratislava posted a comment on its Telegram channel saying "publications in Slovak media" on occupied Oleshky, which it places in "the Kherson region of the Russian Federation", omit or distort facts, blaming the town's humanitarian situation on Ukrainian shelling, drones and mines and saying it expects Slovak media to report "not from predetermined political schemes".	The Russian embassy in Slovakia, an overt statement **[official]**	Telegram
disarm TA02 ~T0075.001 · TA14 T0004 · TA16 T0097.206 T0143.001 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0151.007			
30 Oct W44-007	Russia's Justice Ministry added Vidim Books, an independent Bratislava publisher of Russian-language books co-founded by the writer Dmitry Glukhovsky, to its register of "undesirable organisations", one of 11 new entries. Russian citizens who cooperate with a listed organisation face up to six years in prison, Pravda reported.	The Russian Prosecutor General's Office and Justice Ministry, an overt act **[official]**	meduza.io; Pravda.sk
disarm not labeled · overt state action			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
30 Oct W44-008	Demagog.sk rated false a Facebook post of 9 October, shared almost 1,000 times, calling the Bucha massacre "staged theatre" on the strength of an analysis by the Global Fact-Checking Network. The network's site lists among the analysis's authors the Slovak Tomáš Špaček, a former parliamentary assistant to an MP elected for Kotlebovci LSNS, and TASS reported on 8 October that the network had verified the victims' identities.	The Global Fact-Checking Network, Russian per Demagog.sk, which cites Reporters Without Borders calling it a tool of Russian propaganda **[researcher]**	Demagog.sk
disarm TA02 ~T0136.001 · TA14 T0004 · TA16 T0097.203 T0100.001 T0143.002 · TA07 T0111 T0151.001			
28-30 Oct W44-009	Russian foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova condemned the "desecration" on 20 and 23 October of a statue of Marshal Ivan Konev unveiled on 3 October in Kružlová, eastern Slovakia, said Russia raised it in Lavrov's 26 October talks with Foreign Minister Blanár, and said it expects Slovak authorities to punish those responsible.	The Russian foreign ministry and embassy, overt statements **[official]**	Telegram
disarm not labeled · overt state action			
26-28 Oct W44-010	As Blanár travelled to Moscow for the intergovernmental commission, opposition PS vice-chair Ivan Korčok alleged that Blanár would ask for 30 Russian citizens to be allowed to work at Slovakia's embassy there and offer in return to let Russia send more "diplomats" to Bratislava, and SaS MP Juraj Krúpa said more embassy staff could strengthen Russian intelligence, though no clear evidence of a deal was given, Pravda reported. Defence Minister Robert Kaliňák said he sees no need for more Russian diplomats in Slovakia.	No foreign operation named. The intelligence concern is the opposition's claim, which the governing side rejects **[media]**	Denník N; Pravda.sk; teraz.sk
disarm not labeled · context			
26-27 Oct W44-011	While Blanár met Lavrov, TASS ran an interview with the deputy speaker of parliament, Tibor Gašpar, who called using frozen Russian assets for Ukraine's army unacceptable and, per Aktuality, welcomed the renewed exchange of military attachés between Slovakia and Russia.	TASS, Russia's state news agency, an overt interview **[media]**	tass.com; aktuality.sk
disarm not labeled · overt state action			

Poland

Prime Minister Donald Tusk said those trying to destroy the rule of law had "the support of an army of Russian bots online" in the fight over the Constitutional Tribunal, without naming accounts, while Dmitry Medvedev openly called the crisis a coup and Rossiya 1 sided with President Nawrocki. The main exposure was a TikTok campaign of AI videos inventing anti-Polish posts by Ukrainian councillors, which Demagog calls "probably Russian" and Ukraine's CCD says matches earlier Russian operations. A Russian detained by police in Świdnica was charged with spying after hundreds of thousands of files, photos of rail and other infrastructure among them, were found on his devices.

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
31 Oct-1 Nov W44-012	An AI image of President Nawrocki grabbing Constitutional Tribunal judge Anna Korwin-Piotrowska by the arm, which activist Bart Staszewski generated from stills of the 30-31 October scuffle and labelled as AI, was reposted without the label by politicians mostly from the Civic Coalition. Among them were foreign minister Radosław Sikorski, who later deleted it, and Paweł Olszewski, head of the government's Centre for Combating Disinformation, who captioned it "#DamskiBokser".	Domestic. Bart Staszewski made it and said so, and politicians spread it unlabelled, per Demagog as reported by Polskie Radio **[researcher]**	polskieradio24.pl; wirtualnemedia.pl; WP
disarm TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0084.003 T0086.002 · TA16 T0097.110 T0143.001 · TA07 T0151.008 · TA11 ~T0129.009 (domestic · excluded from FIMI analysis)			
31 Oct W44-013	In a televised address on the Constitutional Tribunal crisis, Tusk said that organisations and politicians who want to destroy democracy and the rule of law "in this conflict benefit from the support of an army of Russian bots online", and The Insider notes he named no accounts and gave no data. Jan Grabiec, head of the Prime Minister's chancellery, wrote on X that "numerous Russian troll accounts" were backing PiS's attack on the Tribunal, posting screenshots that WP says are meant to document them.	Russian bot and troll accounts, per Tusk and Grabiec. No Russian state body named **[official]**	gov.pl; theins.ru; WP
disarm not labeled · context			
30-31 Oct W44-014	Russia's foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova linked to a Solovyov Telegram post claiming Tusk backed a "forcible seizure" of the Constitutional Tribunal, and Dmitry Medvedev wrote that Poland had a "coup" using "exactly the same" method "as in neo-Nazi Ukraine", RMF reported. Rossiya 1's main "Vesti" bulletin sided with Nawrocki and illustrated the crisis with AI memes of him kicking Tusk, OKO.press found, and EK Strategic Communications Center traced Zakharova's post into Polish- and English-language Telegram channels, calling the wave "Kremlin FIMI".	Russian officials and state TV, in the open, per RMF, OKO.press and EK **[media]**	Telegram; Telegram; rmf24.pl; OKO.press; eskvsdisinfo.substack.com
disarm TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0086.002 · TA16 T0097.111 T0143.001 · TA07 T0111 T0111.001 T0151.007			
30-31 Oct W44-015	The Telegram channel "Polska Sztuka Wojny" presented a 29 October police readiness order as a leaked secret document, declaring "POLICE WILL USE LIVE AMMUNITION" and asking whether "Tusk's regime" was preparing a "bloody pacification". Police headquarters denied any link to the Tribunal protest, saying the full readiness ordered for 2-8 November is tied to current threats of sabotage and subversion, and EK found the claim carried into English by DD Geopolitics.	The channel "Polska Sztuka Wojny", which EK counts in the Kremlin FIMI wave without saying who runs it **[researcher]**	Telegram; zachod.pl; eskvsdisinfo.substack.com
disarm TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0023.001 · TA05 T0016 · TA07 T0151.007 (actor unknown)			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
30 Oct W44-016	Police in Świdnica detained a 55-year-old Russian on 25 October while he was photographing trains and rail infrastructure, and hundreds of thousands of files were found on his devices, among them photos of rail, airports and telecoms sites in Poland and abroad, according to the National Prosecutor's Office spokesman. Charged with espionage for a foreign intelligence service, he was remanded for three months and denies it, and the special-services minister's spokesman said 90 people have been made suspects in ABW espionage and sabotage cases since January 2024. disarm not labeled · context	An unnamed foreign intelligence service, per police and prosecutors **[official]**	dolnoslaska.policja.gov.pl; swidnica24.pl; OKO.press
30 Oct W44-017	CyberDefence24 reported that the government's bill on restrictive measures would let the interior minister put those supporting foreign information manipulation aimed at Poland's security on a national sanctions list, with fines of up to 20 million zloty, and that the broadcasting regulator KRRiT warned of excessive interference in the media. The Sejm sent the bill back to committee after its second reading on 23 October. disarm not labeled · response	No foreign actor, a policy step **[official]**	cyberdefence24.pl ; Monitor Polski
28-30 Oct W44-018	Ukraine's CCD said that photos of anti-Polish graffiti supposedly found in Kyiv, Lviv, Kryvyi Rih and Chernivtsi are fakes, first put online through Russian propaganda resources and then shared in the Polish segment of social media, a synchrony it calls a coordinated disinformation attack. VoxCheck found the images were likely AI-made or AI-edited. **disarm** TA02 T0066 T0079 · TA06 T0086.002 · TA07 T0151.001	Russian propaganda resources, per Ukraine's CCD **[official]**	cpd.gov.ua; voxukraine.org
29 Oct W44-019	Konkret24 found that Konfederacja MP Krzysztof Mulawa's claim that "Ukrainians will replace Poles" in the mines of the coal company JSW, which JSW's spokesman called "deliberately misleading the public", rested on two specialist contracts JSW gave a Polish subsidiary of a Luxembourg-registered firm. In a second check, it showed that Konfederacja posts saying Ukrainians earn more than Poles drew on a Deloitte report for UNHCR that puts Ukrainian refugees' median pay at 85% of the national median. **disarm** TA06 T0023 T0085 · TA16 T0097.110 T0143.001 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.008 T0152.004 · TA08 T0042 (domestic · excluded from FIMI analysis)	Konfederacja politicians as the spreaders, per Konkret24. No foreign actor named **[researcher]**	konkret24.tvn24.pl; konkret24.tvn24.pl

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
28-29 Oct W44-020	Demagog found that TikTok videos by the account "Zycie obcokrajowców" ("Life of foreigners"), reposted on X and Facebook, attribute invented anti-Polish posts to Ukrainian councillors: their profiles carry no such posts, the profile photos are not theirs, and the AI voiceover uses Russian calques. It says the same people "probably" ran an earlier account spreading false stories about Polish generals' children, and Ukraine's CCD said the campaign is ongoing and its style and use of AI match Russian operations seen before in the Polish information space.	"probably Russian", per Demagog, and consistent with Russian operations, per Ukraine's CCD **[official]**	Demagog; cpd.gov.ua
	disarm TA02 ~T0079 · TA14 T0083 · TA06 T0086.002 T0087 T0088.001 · TA07 T0151.008		
28-29 Oct W44-021	The government's Centre for Combating Disinformation presented its plans, among them a StopDezinfo website and a council of experts, and its head, deputy digital minister Paweł Olszewski, wants it to report spreaders of disinformation to police and prosecutors, CyberDefence24 reported. NASK plans to monitor accounts impersonating some 7,000 candidates in next year's parliamentary election.	No foreign actor named, a policy step **[official]**	gov.pl; cyberdefence24.pl; cyberdefence24.pl
	disarm not labeled · response		
28-29 Oct W44-022	Russia's embassy in Warsaw said the Teatr Wielki staging of the opera "Matki Chersonia" was full of "fake news" about "alleged mass abductions and deportations of Ukrainian children", typical of "Kyiv regime" propaganda, citing a bulletin of Maria Lvova-Belova, for whom the ICC issued an arrest warrant in 2023. A day later it posted Zakharova's demand that Poland restore the Soviet soldiers' cemetery in Warsaw, which she said was vandalised on 18 and 22 October, and punish those responsible, adding that the way to fight such acts is to stop "rewriting history and fuelling Russophobia".	Russia's embassy and foreign ministry, in the open **[official]**	Telegram; Telegram
	disarm TA02 ~T0136.001 · TA14 T0004 · TA16 T0097.206 T0143.001 · TA07 T0151.007		
28 Oct W44-023	INFO OPS Polska analysed a PolitNavigator article by Aleksei Muratov, presented as head of a regional executive committee of United Russia, headlined "Forecast: next will be a war to the last Pole", which casts Poland as an over-militarised "bridgehead of the West" to be used against Russia after Ukraine.	PolitNavigator, a Russian portal, per INFO OPS Polska **[researcher]**	disinfodigest.pl
	disarm TA02 T0135.002 · TA14 T0083 · TA16 T0097.110 T0143.001 · TA05 T0016 · TA07 T0152.004 · TA08 T0042		
28 Oct W44-024	Konkret24 showed that a 27 October X video by Jacek Pawłowicz, one of the leaders of Robert Bąkiewicz's Ruch Obrony Granic, suggesting that three German police cars "near Warsaw" were "German support" to clear the protest camp outside the Constitutional Tribunal, was filmed on the S8 near Wolbórz, about 130 km from Warsaw, with the cars heading west.	Jacek Pawłowicz as the poster, per Konkret24. No foreign actor named **[researcher]**	konkret24.tvn24.pl
	disarm TA06 T0084.003 · TA16 T0097.103 T0143.001 · TA07 T0151.008 (domestic · excluded from FIMI analysis)		

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
28 Oct W44-025	Police counter-terrorism officers detained a Ukrainian, Artem S., in Warsaw on a Romanian European arrest warrant over helping prepare the 14 September arson at a weapons and ammunition plant in Romania, which Notes from Poland ties to a fire beside premises of the arms maker Carfil in Brasov. A Polish court will decide on his extradition.	A sabotage network coordinated from Russia, per Romania's SRI as cited by Notes from Poland **[official]**	cbsp.policja.pl; Notes from Poland

disarm not labeled · context

[-] Background: Gliwice prosecutors said on 22 October they had opened an investigation into a Telegram attempt, exposed by Vot Tak, to recruit someone to set fire to the Flytronic drone plant, and handed it to the ABW.

Germany and Austria

No German or Austrian authority attributed a new disinformation campaign to a foreign state, though the federal government called a fake Merz quote "clearly disinformation" and Munich prosecutors confirmed they hold two Belarusians suspected of planning arson near Nuremberg for a foreign government or organisation, whom Romania's SRI ties to a network coordinated from Russia. The main exposure was CeMAS's report that four Russian campaigns and actors targeted September's state and local elections. Where the fakes around the 31 October youth protests were traced, they led to an Instagram user and the Deutschland Kurier, and nobody tied them to a foreign state.

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
26-31 Oct W44-026	Germany: fakes surrounded the "Gen Z regelt" youth protests of 31 October, which drew tens of thousands in more than 30 cities. CORRECTIV and dpa debunked a letter from an invented federal office promising 50 euros of "demo money", which an Instagram user told CORRECTIV he made with ChatGPT "to annoy Nazis", and dpa found no evidence for burning barricades at universities reported by the Deutschland Kurier and showed that videos posted as the march were of 1860 Munich fans. The BfV had warned that parts of the left-wing extremist scene were joining the mobilisation, and named no state.	An Instagram user (the letter) and the Deutschland Kurier (the barricades), per CORRECTIV and dpa. Nobody tied the protests to a foreign state **[researcher]**	tagesschau.de; CORRECTIV; dpa-factchecking.com; dpa-factchecking.com; dpa-factchecking.com; taz.de

disarm TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0084.003 T0085.004 T0086.002 · TA16 T0097.206 T0143.002 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.008 · TA08 T0042 (actor unknown)

30 Oct W44-027	Austria: Mimikama rated false a Facebook reel of a mushroom cloud captioned as a strike that destroyed ten Ukrainian fighter jets, killed 500 soldiers and wiped out two air bases. The same sequence circulated in June 2025 as an "Iranian nuclear test", and AFP traced it to a YouTube channel that describes its videos as AI-made simulations.	Unknown **[unattributed]**	Mimikama

disarm TA06 T0084.003 T0087.001 · TA07 T0151.001 · TA11 ~T0129.009 (actor unknown)

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
30 Oct W44-028	Germany: Ukrinform rebutted a piece by the Global Fact-Checking Network, which it says TASS created, claiming that an investigation by The Telegraph and Welt am Sonntag showed the case against Russia over the attempted drone sabotage of a Ukrainian An-124 at Leipzig/Halle airport was politically motivated. Ukrinform found that one of the network's main arguments was a single sentence The Telegraph misdated, and that it left out the DNA and explosive-device evidence the investigation reported.	The Global Fact-Checking Network, per Ukrinform **[media]**	Ukrinform
	disarm TA02 T0075.001 T0136.001 · TA14 T0004 · TA06 T0023 · TA16 T0097.203 T0143.002 · TA07 T0152.004		
29-30 Oct W44-029	Austria: Ukrainian investigative journalist Mykhailo Tkach, briefly arrested in Vienna on 8 October on suspicion of espionage, read out details from the case files in a video and said the case served to disrupt reporting on Ukraine's former prosecutor general Ruslan Kravchenko, who fled to Austria, ORF reports. Two members of Ukraine's military intelligence HUR remain in custody in Vienna.	Ukraine's HUR in the underlying espionage case, per ORF. Tkach suspects people in contact with Kravchenko of misleading Austrian authorities **[media]**	orf.at
	disarm not labeled · context		
29 Oct W44-030	Germany: CeMAS documented four Russian campaigns and actors around the September state elections in Saxony-Anhalt, Berlin and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and local elections in Lower Saxony: in monitoring from 30 June to 21 September, Operation Overload spread at least 196 fake videos with media logos and 20 fake front pages on X, and Doppelganger 72 election-related posts. Storm-1516 falsely accused Saxony-Anhalt's CDU premier Sven Schulze of child abuse on a fake Sueddeutsche Zeitung site, in at least 636 X posts with 24.4 million views, and CeMAS says inauthentic amplification inflated Overload's and Doppelganger's numbers, while Mimikama notes the report does not measure any effect on votes.	The Russian campaigns Operation Overload (attributed "with high probability"), Doppelganger and Storm-1516, and the Russian organisation Foundation to Battle Injustice, per CeMAS **[researcher]**	CeMAS; Mimikama
	disarm TA02 T0135.001 T0135.003 T0135.004 T0136.006 · TA14 T0022.001 · TA06 T0085.003 T0087 T0088.001 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0151.008 T0152.004 T0153.001 · TA17 T0039 T0049.001 T0119.002		
29 Oct W44-031	Germany: CORRECTIV found no evidence for a quote, reaching hundreds of thousands online, in which former chancellor Gerhard Schröder supposedly said Germans' hard-earned money goes to Ukraine, which now has more money than Germany. A TikTok account that posts only alleged quotes of prominent people shared it first on 26 October.	None named **[unattributed]**	CORRECTIV
	disarm TA06 T0085 · TA07 T0151.008 (actor unknown)		

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
29 Oct W44-032	Germany: dpa debunked a video, circulating since late September, claiming Ukraine's anti-corruption bureau NABU found 140 million dollars in cardboard boxes in a raid on Arsen Zhumadilov, former head of the defence procurement agency. NABU denied any raid, the claim first appeared on a clone of the Ukrainian outlet New Voice of Ukraine that went online on 21 September, two days before the fake was posted, and dpa notes that media spoofing is a classic mark of orchestrated campaigns such as Doppelganger, without attributing this one.	Unknown **[unattributed]**	dpa-factchecking.com
	disarm TA06 T0085.003 T0087 · TA15 T0149.003 T0150.001 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.008 T0152.004 · TA08 T0042		
29 Oct W44-033	Germany: dpa found that a supposed Charlie Hebdo cover on France's protests, showing a cartoon protester shouting "Free Palestine!" beside a looter, was never published, which editor-in-chief Gérard Biard confirmed. A Cologne CDU politician shared it on Facebook.	None named **[unattributed]**	dpa-factchecking.com
	disarm TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0086 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.001 (actor unknown)		
27-29 Oct W44-034	Germany: dpa and Mimikama debunked a quote in which Chancellor Merz supposedly called the Hamburg Nord Stream trial pointless because "the German people have forgiven Ukraine", and a government spokeswoman told dpa it was "clearly disinformation" meant "to confuse or unsettle people". dpa traced near-identical wording to a 17 October post in Russian by the Russian-language X account @RealProstoSerge, but says the quote's origin cannot be established beyond doubt.	Unknown. Spread by a Russian-language X account, per dpa **[unattributed]**	dpa-factchecking.com; Mimikama
	disarm TA06 T0085 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.008 (actor unknown)		
28 Oct W44-035	Germany: the federal cabinet adopted a "sabotage protection ordinance" extending security vetting of staff to more critical-infrastructure sectors, citing the increased threat of hybrid attacks and insider sabotage since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. tagesschau reports that it newly covers plants that can restart the grid after a blackout, large digital energy systems and big waterworks.	No actor named, a policy step **[official]**	bundesregierung.de; tagesschau.de
	disarm not labeled · response		
28 Oct W44-036	Germany: Munich's General Prosecutor's Office confirmed that two Belarusians, aged 39 and 50, have been held since 7 October on suspicion of planning an arson attack in the Nuremberg area, for payment and on behalf of a foreign government or organisation, after Spiegel reported that they are suspected of trying to set fires near a railway line and a power line. Romania has asked for their extradition over the Carfil fire in Brasov.	"a foreign government or organisation", per Munich prosecutors, and a network coordinated from Russia, per Romania's SRI **[official]**	tagesschau.de; Tagesspiegel; nn.de
	disarm not labeled · context		

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
27 Oct W44-037	Germany: The Insider reported, from a German military court ruling, that a Bundeswehr soldier it identifies as Alexander Sautner was for years a member of the Night Wolves biker club and vice-president of its Roads of Victory division in Germany. Military counterintelligence (MAD) materials cited in the ruling say he received instructions from the club's Russian leadership and, in March 2022, urged members to a Berlin rally after a message calling on them to fight on the "information front". **disarm** not labeled · context	The Night Wolves, which The Insider calls Putin-linked, per MAD as cited by The Insider **[media]**	The Insider
27 Oct W44-038	Austria: Russia expelled Austria's economic delegate in Moscow, and the foreign ministry said there was "no justification whatsoever". Die Presse reported that Moscow decided the expulsion more than two weeks earlier, over problems accrediting Russia's trade representative, which would make it unrelated to Vienna's expulsion of four Russian diplomats on 23 October. **disarm** not labeled · context	The Russian authorities, per Austria's foreign ministry **[official]**	orf.at

[-] Background: WDR, NDR and SZ reported on 30 October that US intelligence services told the BND its cooperation was under review after the arrest of former BND president August Hanning, whom prosecutors accuse of trying to pass secret information to "foreign bodies" they have not named, and whose lawyer rejects the charges.

Ukraine

Ukraine's CCD tied a fake Toronto Sun story about a Zelensky bunker to Doppelganger's method and said Russia ran an information operation to blame Ukrainian air defense for the drone strike that killed 14 at Dnipro's railway station. The main exposure was Russia's framing of the Oleshky evacuation, casting itself as the rescuer and Ukraine as the culprit, tracked by SPRAVDI, Detector Media and ISW, and a clone of Euromaidan Press, which the outlet ties, through other researchers, to Storm-1516. The SBU said a student recruited on Telegram was tasked with hacking Odesa's advertising lightboxes to show Russian propaganda.

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
30 Oct-1 Nov W44-039	SPRAVDI rebutted Maria Zakharova's claim that Zelensky is trying to derail peace talks, Chay Bowes, a former RT correspondent in SPRAVDI's words, who claimed Zelensky "threatens Europe" to get money, and retired US Army colonel Douglas Macgregor, who said the Stubb and Store calls with Putin show Europe has admitted defeat. ISW said the Kremlin is portraying Ukraine's long-range strikes as the obstacle to talks, "the latest Russian effort to falsely blame Ukraine". **disarm** TA02 T0135.002 · TA14 T0004 · TA16 T0097.111 T0100.001 T0143.001 · TA07 T0111	Maria Zakharova, Chay Bowes and Douglas Macgregor, per SPRAVDI, and the Kremlin, per ISW **[official]**	Telegram; Telegram; Telegram; ISW

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
31 Oct W44-040	CCD deputy head Alina Alieksieieva said the centre had helped TikTok improve its detection of AI videos of soldiers, which cut their number, and that while "simple" fakes have declined, Russia increasingly exploits sensitive issues and existing divisions in Ukrainian society. **disarm** not labeled · response	Russia, per the CCD **[official]**	CCD Telegram
29-31 Oct W44-041	ISW said Putin tried to falsely blame Ukraine for mining the approaches to Oleshky and for its "humanitarian catastrophe", for which ISW holds the occupation authorities responsible. In an analysis for Detector Media, Yurii Lukanov reported about 50 journalists from RT, Rossiya, Izvestia, Channel One, Zvezda and others accompanying Lantratova, and found that Rossiya-1 presented as a witness the man who ran Oleshky's hospital under occupation, whom a Ukrainian court sentenced in absentia for aiding the aggressor state. **disarm** TA02 ~T0136.004 · TA14 T0004 · TA06 T0023.001 · TA16 T0097.111 T0100.001 T0143.001 · TA07 T0111.001	Putin, per ISW, and Russian state TV, per Detector Media **[researcher]**	ISW; detector.media
27-31 Oct W44-042	As the local truce in occupied Oleshky held from 27 October and residents left on 30-31 October, SPRAVDI rebutted Russian ombudswoman Yana Lantratova's claim that almost no one still wanted to leave, counted about 150 publications casting Russia as the "humane side", and flagged a story it calls staged, in which a woman blames a Ukrainian drone for her husband's death and minutes later says she adores the shows of Russian TV host Olga Skabeyeva. It said a Russian correspondent first wrote that 17 buses were going to Ukraine and four to Russia, then deleted the figures for Ukraine. **disarm** TA02 T0136.004 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0023 · TA16 T0097.111 T0143.001	Yana Lantratova and Russian propaganda, per SPRAVDI **[official]**	Telegram; Telegram; Telegram; Telegram
27-31 Oct W44-043	SPRAVDI said a photo that Zvezda, the Russian defence ministry's TV channel, ran as the tanker carrying Russian diesel to the US, under a "Nice Sanctions" banner, was doctored and, citing Agentstvo, shows another ship, and VoxCheck found the banner was added with AI. SPRAVDI also disputed Russia's UN ambassador Vasily Nebenzia, who said Ukraine belongs on the UN list of child-rights violators, RIA Novosti's anonymous-source account of why Sumy cut its volunteer units, and a TASS claim, citing an anonymous source, that a HUR soldier shot a comrade and went unpunished. **disarm** TA14 T0004 · TA06 T0023 T0084.003 T0086.002 · TA16 T0097.111 T0143.001 · TA07 T0110 T0111	Zvezda, Vasily Nebenzia, RIA Novosti and TASS, per SPRAVDI **[official]**	Telegram; voxukraine.org; Telegram; Telegram; Telegram

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
26-31 Oct W44-044	Fact-checkers caught fabricated scenes of hardship in Ukraine: an AI-made shop notice limiting firewood to two bundles, a video branded as Kyiv outlet 44.ua with AI-generated voices on Ukrainians selling off electric cars over blackouts, a likely AI video of a territorial defence soldier saying no one is left to fight for the 1991 borders, and an AI photo of a soldier's grave in Kropyvnytskyi daubed "traitor" over its Russian-language inscription.	"pro-Russian sources" for the firewood fake and "propagandists" for the 44.ua video, per StopFake. No one named for the rest **[unattributed]**	StopFake; StopFake; voxukraine.org; voxukraine.org
	disarm TA02 ~T0139.001 · TA06 T0086.002 T0087.001 T0088.001 · TA16 T0097.105 T0097.202 T0143.002 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.001 · TA08 T0042 (actor unknown)		
26-31 Oct W44-045	Fakes borrowed foreign media brands: a doctored Haaretz front page claimed Olena Zelenska is opening a rehabilitation centre named after her husband, a doctored L'Alsace cover announced a Ukrainian "national resilience index", and a fake Deutsche Welle screenshot reported a mobilization "record" in Kyiv. The CCD said the Haaretz fake first appeared on Russian Telegram channels, part of a "systematic" campaign against Ukraine's leaders and their families.	Russia, per the CCD, for the Haaretz fake. No one named for the rest **[official]**	StopFake; voxukraine.org; voxukraine.org; CCD Telegram
	disarm TA02 T0135.001 · TA06 T0084.003 T0085.004 T0086.003 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.007		
30 Oct W44-046	Texty found that 26 TikTok videos by the "talking heads" it tracks drew over 2.56 million views on 19-25 October, pushing the line that "all is lost" and that Ukraine is a failed state. Of the destructive YouTube comments it logged, 60% called for capitulation, and almost one in three of those came from bots.	Narratives Texty classes as Russian disinformation, pushed by TikTok bloggers and YouTube bots, per Texty **[researcher]**	Texty
	disarm TA02 ~T0139.001 · TA14 T0022.001 · TA06 T0023 · TA07 T0151.008 T0151.014 · TA09 T0116.001 (actor unknown)		
30 Oct W44-047	Ukraine's foreign ministry protested Russia's plan to use the Khan's Palace in Bakhchysarai, in occupied Crimea, for mass events on 31 October and 1 November glorifying the Russian Empire, whose actions it says led to the forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of Crimean Tatars, and appealed to UNESCO.	Russia, per Ukraine's foreign ministry **[official]**	IMI
	disarm not labeled · response		
28-30 Oct W44-048	VoxCheck debunked nine more fakes that recast local crime reports as acts by soldiers of named units, from the 127th brigade to the 95th air assault brigade, six of them likely made by editing a real outlet's headline. All nine circulated through the Telegram channel dillfrash, the source of similar fakes VoxCheck debunked in the two previous weeks.	None named. VoxCheck links each fake to a post on dillfrash **[unattributed]**	voxukraine.org; voxukraine.org
	disarm TA06 T0023 T0086.003 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.007 (actor unknown)		

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
27-30 Oct W44-049	The SBU described more Russian recruitment through Telegram: a logistics driver in Kyiv region, spotted through his anti-Ukrainian comments in Telegram channels, reported on repairs at the capital region's thermal power plants through an FSB chatbot, and a contract soldier and an unemployed man in Khmelnytskyi region were recruited while seeking "easy" earnings in Telegram channels. SPRAVDI said Z-channels are offering cryptocurrency for photos and videos of strike sites.	The FSB, per the SBU, and Z-channels, per SPRAVDI **[official]**	Telegram; Telegram; Telegram; Telegram
disarm TA15 T0091.001 T0146.007 · TA07 T0151.006 T0151.007 T0153.007			
29 Oct W44-050	After a Russian jet-powered drone struck Dnipro's railway station on 29 October, hitting a platform where a train stood and killing 14, the CCD said Russia launched a large-scale information operation blaming Ukrainian air defense or a "provocation by the Kyiv regime". SPRAVDI traced how the versions shifted, from a drone hit, first reported by channels posing as local, to a drone downed onto the platform by Ukrainian air defense, to a "provocation", and Ukraine's Air Force published photos of the drone's debris.	Resources controlled by Russia, per the CCD, and Z-channels, per SPRAVDI **[official]**	CCD Telegram; Telegram; armyinform.com.ua
disarm TA02 T0136.001 T0136.002 · TA14 T0004 T0068 · TA16 T0097.201 T0097.202 T0143.002 · TA07 T0151.007 · TA08 T0044			
29 Oct W44-051	Euromaidan Press said that a clone of its site, registered on 15 October, ran a fake article blaming a Ukrainian drone for civilian deaths in Kramatorsk, where it says a Russian strike on two buses killed 33 on 8 October. Videos bearing its logo spread on X from 24 October, averaging 400,000 to 500,000 views, which it calls a likely sign of inauthentic amplification, and the clone was taken down after complaints to its host and Cloudflare.	Storm-1516, per The Gnida Project and NewsGuard as cited by Euromaidan Press **[researcher]**	euromaidanpress.com
disarm TA14 T0004 · TA06 T0084.002 T0085.003 T0087.001 · TA15 T0149.003 T0150.001 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.008 T0152.004 · TA17 ~T0049.003			
29 Oct W44-052	The Insider debunked a story spread by RIA Novosti and other Russian outlets that Ukraine's language ombudsman, Olena Ivanovska, had "allowed" doctors to refuse Russian-speaking patients, which Maria Zakharova called "Nazism". In the radio interview cited, Ivanovska called doctors' reluctance to serve Russian speakers "a question of morals", and The Insider says no case of refused treatment has been recorded.	"Kremlin media" and Maria Zakharova, per The Insider **[media]**	theins.ru
disarm TA06 T0023 · TA07 T0111 T0151.007			
28-29 Oct W44-053	ISW reported that Ukraine's 8th Corps called false the Russian MoD's claim to have seized Barylivka in Sumy region, and that a Ukrainian servicemember's report of frequent glide bomb strikes on Dobropillia undermines Russian claims to control the town. ISW said Kremlin officials have "repeatedly weaponized exaggerated claims" of advances as leverage in peace talks.	The Russian MoD, per Ukraine's 8th Corps, and Kremlin officials, per ISW **[researcher]**	ISW; ISW
disarm TA06 T0023 · TA16 T0097.206 T0143.001			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
27-29 Oct W44-054	StopFake found Lenta.ru, Ukraina.ru and Argumenty i Fakty turning Kyiv residents' complaint about the new tenant of their building's basement into an uncovered "secret drone factory", and RIA Novosti presenting November drills by the Coalition of the Willing in Poland as rehearsal for an "invasion of Ukraine within two months". Russian media and Telegram channels also cut Italian defence minister Guido Crosetto's explanation from his remark that Ukraine "can never win this war".	Russian media and Telegram channels, per StopFake **[researcher]**	StopFake; StopFake; StopFake
	disarm TA02 ~T0136.002 · TA06 T0023 T0023.001 T0086.002 · TA05 T0016 · TA07 T0111 T0151.007		
28 Oct W44-055	SPRAVDI said that on 27 October about 238 outlets ran about 8,900 items on Ukraine, among them about 868 casting Putin as open to dialogue, about 300 passing off strikes on civilian targets as hits on the arms industry and about 190 claiming Italy had stopped military aid.	Russia, per SPRAVDI **[official]**	Telegram; Telegram; Telegram
	disarm TA02 T0079 T0136.002 T0136.004 T0139.001 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0023		
28 Oct W44-056	Texty analysed 13,687 YouTube comments mentioning Koncha-Zaspa, the Kyiv suburb associated with the elite, posted from February 2022 to September 2026, and found that 1,240 of the 8,296 accounts behind them showed signs of bots and wrote 27% of the comments. The most common claim, that Koncha-Zaspa is never shelled, hints at a secret deal with Russia and, Texty says, redirects anger after Russian strikes onto Ukraine's own leaders.	Russia, which "controls both the bots and the drones", per Texty **[researcher]**	Texty
	disarm TA02 T0077 · TA14 T0022.001 T0083 · TA06 T0084.001 · TA07 T0151.014 · TA09 T0116.001		
28 Oct W44-057	Rustem Umerov, head of the Foreign Intelligence Service, warned that messages sent in his name to diplomats and partners abroad are trying to make contact and extract information on Ukraine's work with partners and on international negotiations, and SPRAVDI relayed the warning.	Unknown. Umerov names no one **[unattributed]**	Telegram; Telegram
	disarm not labeled · context		
26-28 Oct W44-058	A claim that Zelensky bought a $42 million nuclear bunker in Nova Scotia came from a fake Toronto Sun site, toronto-sun.ca, AFP found, and Canada's DisinfoWatch logged 2,259 posts about it on X with about 7.76 million views by 25 October. The CCD said the forgery's tactic "matches the handwriting of Russian special services" in Doppelganger, while DisinfoWatch found features of both Doppelganger and Storm-1516 but said the evidence does not establish foreign involvement and a domestic hoax remains possible.	Doppelganger, whose method the CCD says the forgery matches. DisinfoWatch says foreign involvement is not established **[official]**	cedmohub.eu; disinfowatch.org; CCD Telegram
	disarm TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA06 T0084.001 T0085.003 · TA15 T0149.003 T0150.001 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.008 T0152.004 · TA08 T0042		

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
27 Oct W44-059	The SBU said it had detained a 21-year-old student in Odesa whom Russian services found while he sought "easy" earnings in Telegram chats, and one of whose first tasks was to hack the system controlling the city's advertising lightboxes, with software his handlers supplied, to show Russian propaganda.	Russian special services, per the SBU **[official]**	Telegram
disarm TA02 T0135.003 · TA15 T0091.001 T0149.009 T0150.005 · TA07 T0151.006 ~T0153.007 · TA10 T0127.002			

[-] Attribution note: The CCD, SPRAVDI, the SBU, Ukraine's armed forces, its foreign ministry and its Foreign Intelligence Service are Ukrainian state bodies and a party to the war. Their attributions are official, but not neutral.

Wider Europe and beyond

Romania's SRI blamed a sabotage network coordinated from Russia for the September fire on the Carfil industrial platform in Brasov, and UK counter-terrorism police charged a man with assisting what they believe is Iran's intelligence service over the RAF Fairford incident. Lithuania linked the suspects in the Vilnius Starlink arson attempt to attacks in Bulgaria and Poland without establishing a motive. The main exposures were Google's takedown of 2,321 YouTube channels in Russia-linked campaigns, two more fake TV reports against US Senate candidates that NewsGuard says point to Storm-1516, and an unauthorized online poll of Gagauzia's voters with Russian traces.

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
1 Nov W44-060	Moldova's Reintegration Policy Bureau called "absurd speculations" a 30 October claim by Transnistria's self-styled security ministry that Moldovan special services run TikTok, Instagram and Telegram pages to sway the region's residents and recruit them for "subversive activities", saying it fits "well-known local propaganda patterns and narratives".	Transnistria's self-styled security ministry, per Moldova's Reintegration Policy Bureau **[official]**	newsmaker.md
disarm not labeled · overt state action			
27-31 Oct W44-061	Fact-checkers traced more fakes about France's protests to Russian sources. An AI image of a Putin souvenir shop, supposedly the only shop in Paris that rioters spared, ran on Russian Telegram channels and on URA.RU, and Myth Detector found that the Russian embassy in Kenya posted it on X on 20 October, while StopFake also debunked a fabricated RTL screenshot, carried by Argumenty i Fakty, of a Russian tourist chasing rioters out of a Louis Vuitton shop, and AI-made CCTV footage of a Marseille looter in a "Kyiv" hoodie, which it says propagandists seized on but does not trace.	Russian Telegram channels and media and the Russian embassy in Kenya, per StopFake and Myth Detector **[researcher]**	StopFake; mythdetector.com; StopFake; StopFake
disarm TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0086.002 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA07 T0111 T0151.001 T0151.007 T0151.008			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
30 Oct W44-062	Google's Influence Operations Bulletin for Q3 lists 23 takedowns of campaigns it links to Russia, 2,321 YouTube channels in all, plus 39 domains blocked from Google News and Discover. The three largest, 1,929 channels, were "linked to a Russian consulting firm" it does not name, smaller sets posted in Polish, Romanian, Armenian and Ukrainian or backed Moldova's pro-Russian opposition, and Google also removed 14,472 channels in its ongoing PRC-linked investigation and 50 in campaigns linked to Iran. **disarm** TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0152.004 T0152.006 · TA09 ~T0114.001	Russia, China and Iran, per Google **[platform]**	blog.google
30 Oct W44-063	Moldova's StratCom centre found an unauthorized online poll on opinesta.com, with no declared organizer or funder, collecting Gagauzia residents' views of the candidates for governor in the 15 November election, on a domain registered on 27 July with Russian-language elements, VK and Odnoklassniki references and an identifier tied to Russia's Volga federal district. Three Facebook pages with at most six followers promoted it in about 24 ads from 26 October, and the centre warned such polls can be used for fabricated results or to back fraud claims after the vote. **disarm** TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0029 T0151.003 T0152.004 · TA09 T0114.001 · TA11 T0130.001 (actor unknown)	Not identified. StratCom notes Russian-language and Russian-platform traces **[unattributed]**	stratcom.md
30 Oct W44-064	INFO OPS Polska tracked Russian propaganda channels presenting Vilnius on 27 October as a Soviet "gift" to Lithuania, and Russian-language channels promoting autonomy for a "Narva People's Republic", a campaign it says Estonia's security services identified as an information operation in March. **disarm** TA02 ~T0079 ~T0135.003 · TA14 T0004 T0083	Russian propaganda channels, per INFO OPS Polska **[researcher]**	disinfodigest.pl
29-30 Oct W44-065	Lithuanian police identified two German citizens as suspects in the 18 October arson attempt on Starlink equipment in Vilnius and linked them to Starlink arson attacks in Bulgaria and Poland. Both were arrested in Germany at Bulgaria's request, Lithuanian prosecutors suspect them of forming a terrorist group, and investigators are examining possible ties to Russia but have not established the motive. **disarm** not labeled · context	Not established. A Russia link is under investigation, per Lithuanian law enforcement **[official]**	lrt.lt; The Insider
27-30 Oct W44-066	Before Bulgaria's 1 November presidential run-off, Factcheck.bg debunked a fabricated claim that Andrey Gyurov said he would send troops to Ukraine if NATO's Article 5 were triggered, whose first post drew over 3,700 shares and which it calls part of a disinformation campaign using fear of war to sway voters. It also debunked an AI video in which Gyurov supposedly says he is Jewish, an AI image of him kissing the Ukrainian flag shared in groups it calls pro-Russian, and a fabricated quote of Iliana Yotova. **disarm** TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA14 T0083 · TA06 T0084.001 T0085 T0086.002 T0087.001 T0088.001 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA05 T0102.001 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.002 T0151.003 (actor unknown)	Unnamed. No state named **[researcher]**	factcheck.bg; factcheck.bg; factcheck.bg; factcheck.bg; factcheck.bg

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
27-30 Oct W44-067	In the US, NewsGuard found a fake Cleveland 19 news segment, its audio dubbed over a real broadcast, claiming four former staffers accuse Ohio Senate candidate Sherrod Brown of sexual assault, posted on X on 26 October, with one later post of it at 536,700 views by the next morning. A second fake, dubbed over a WABI report, claims Maine candidate Troy Jackson threatened staff with an ax, and NewsGuard says the format and amplification point to Storm-1516, which The Gnida Project named in both cases, while PolitiFact found the operation appears to push fewer narratives than in 2024.	Storm-1516, "apparently" per NewsGuard and named by The Gnida Project **[researcher]**	newsguardrealitycheck.com; newsguardrealitycheck.com; politifact.com
	disarm TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA06 T0087.002 T0088.001 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.008		
26-30 Oct W44-068	Romania's intelligence service SRI said it had identified "a sabotage network coordinated from the Russian Federation" behind the 14 September fire on the Carfil industrial platform in Brasov, next to a subsidiary of the state arms maker Romarm, and that recruitment usually happens through social media. The foreign ministry summoned Russia's ambassador on 27 October, the embassy said no evidence had been presented, and the EU told the OSCE it would respond with all instruments available, including its hybrid toolbox, if Romania asks.	Russia, per Romania's SRI and foreign ministry **[official]**	sri.ro; cotidianul.ro; euronews.ro; eeas.europa.eu
	disarm not labeled · context		
29 Oct W44-069	SPRAVDI counted 376 posts in a day presenting European debate on talks with Moscow, after Finland's President Alexander Stubb and Norway's Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store spoke with Putin, as a split in Europe, some under the headline "Shut up, Mette!" over Mette Frederiksen's criticism of the call. The Pravda network carried 7,756 of the 8,411 FIMI-marked posts it logged that day.	The Pravda network and RT, per SPRAVDI **[official]**	SPRAVDI
	disarm TA02 T0079 T0135.002 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0023 · TA16 T0098.002 · TA07 T0111 T0152.004		
29 Oct W44-070	SPRAVDI found that the photo in a Russian foreign ministry post on X, carrying Maria Zakharova's claim that a billboard in Moldova advertises recruitment to Ukraine's armed forces, was taken in Zaporizhzhia on 20 March 2024, according to Getty Images.	Russia's foreign ministry, per SPRAVDI **[official]**	SPRAVDI
	disarm TA06 T0084.003 T0085 · TA16 T0097.206 T0143.001 · TA07 T0151.008		
29 Oct W44-071	Veridica described a social media campaign under the hashtag #russiaisnotmyenemy telling Romanians that "Russia is not our enemy, but a friend", which it says is spread mainly by supporters of extremist parties, especially followers of Calin Georgescu, and aims to persuade Romanians that Russia is not behind the wave of hybrid attacks on the country.	The Kremlin as sponsor, per Ukraine's Centre for Strategic Communications as cited by Veridica **[official]**	veridica.ro
	disarm TA02 T0135.002 T0136.001 · TA14 T0004 · TA06 T0015.001 T0085 · TA07 T0151.001		

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
29 Oct W44-072	NewsGuard found pro-Iran accounts, among them the X account @IRANIRGCC, spreading on 26 October, before Israel's election, a fabricated Netanyahu quote in which he supposedly tells the US "we can take you out of it", attached to real footage of a December 2025 speech that contains no such words.	Pro-Iran social media users, per NewsGuard. No state named **[researcher]**	newsguardriskbriefing.substack.com
	disarm TA02 T0079 T0135.001 · TA06 T0085 · TA07 T0151.008 · TA11 T0060 (actor unknown)		
28 Oct W44-073	Veridica debunked claims by Vitaly Ignatiev, foreign minister of Transnistria's unrecognized government, in an interview with RIA Novosti, that Chisinau is "investing in war, not peace", noting that Moldova's 2026 defence budget is under 100 million euros, about 0.5% of GDP.	Vitaly Ignatiev, via RIA Novosti, per Veridica **[researcher]**	veridica.ro
	disarm TA02 T0135.002 · TA14 T0004 T0083 · TA06 T0023 · TA16 T0100.001 · TA07 T0111 T0151.007 T0152.004		
27 Oct W44-074	UK counter-terrorism police charged two 24-year-old Londoners under the National Security Act in the investigation into the 27 September incident at RAF Fairford: Mohmed Ahmad Abdulkarim with assisting a foreign intelligence service, "in this case, we believe that country to be Iran", and Nouman Essghir over suspected activity at a prohibited place on 22 August. Prosecutors said Abdulkarim acted for a handler called "Ali", who police believe works for Iran, and received about 70,000 pounds, AP reported, and Iran denies involvement.	Iran, per UK counter-terrorism police **[official]**	counterterrorism.police.uk; clickondetroit.com
	disarm not labeled · context		
27 Oct W44-075	Myth Detector found 445 fake Facebook accounts coordinating likes on posts by Georgia's Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, parliament speaker Shalva Papuashvili and Tbilisi mayor Kakha Kaladze on the pages of the pro-government broadcasters Imedi and Rustavi 2, posts that ranged from calls to ban the opposition to claims that Western institutions undermine Georgia's sovereignty. 438 of the accounts were created on 25-26 August 2026 and 316 use AI-generated profile photos.	Unnamed operators of what Myth Detector calls pro-government trolls **[researcher]**	mythdetector.com
	disarm TA15 T0145.001 T0145.002 T0150.008 · TA16 T0097.101 T0143.002 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.001 · TA17 T0049.001 (domestic · excluded from FIMI analysis)		
27 Oct W44-076	VIGINUM published a technical report on GlobUs, presented as a "club of experts" or a humanitarian association and run by two Russian "influence entrepreneurs" it places in the "Prigozhin galaxy", Yulia Berg and Andrei Gromov, with a focus on Cameroon and the Republic of Congo. It assesses GlobUs as a facade for information manipulation and political interference.	GlobUs and its two Russian leaders, per VIGINUM **[official]**	sgdsn.gouv.fr
	disarm TA16 T0097.204 T0097.207 T0100.001 T0143.002 · TA07 T0152.004 · TA11 T0130.001		

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
26 Oct W44-077	ODIHR and its partner observer delegations said Serbia's 25 October election took place in "an online environment marked by inflammatory rhetoric and information manipulation", with coordinated bot attacks on social media accounts and coordinated inauthentic activity amplifying ruling-party messages in Facebook and X comments. Most of the mission's interlocutors worried more about domestic disinformation than foreign interference, and the statement calls the ruling party's claims of a foreign-backed "colour revolution" unsubstantiated.	Domestic, per ODIHR's interlocutors. No foreign state named **[official]**	ODIHR; ODIHR
disarm TA14 T0022.001 · TA16 T0097.110 T0143.001 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.008 T0151.014 · TA09 T0116.001 T0117 · TA18 T0048 (domestic · excluded from FIMI analysis)			
26 Oct W44-078	Promo-LEX reported that pupils in Transnistria's Ukrainian-language schools are to learn history from Russian textbooks written under Putin's adviser Vladimir Medinsky, which it says reproduce Kremlin propaganda about the war, under a 2027-2031 programme of Tiraspol's self-styled education ministry.	Russia (Medinsky's textbooks) and the Tiraspol authorities, per Promo-LEX **[researcher]**	promolex.md
disarm not labeled · overt state action			

Actors and techniques

Russian operations again dominated, from Storm-1516's fake newscasts in the US to Russian officials speaking openly on Poland's constitutional crisis. Iran appeared through the RAF Fairford charges and pro-Iran accounts before Israel's election, and China through Google's PRC-linked takedowns and the Prague espionage trial.

OPERATION OR ACTOR	ORIGIN	WHAT IT DID THIS WEEK	WHERE SEEN
Storm-1516	Russia per NewsGuard, The Gnida Project and CeMAS	Fake newscasts against US Senate candidates Sherrod Brown and Troy Jackson, which NewsGuard says appear to be its work, a clone of Euromaidan Press blaming Ukraine for the Kramatorsk strike, and, per CeMAS, a fake Sueddeutsche Zeitung story against Saxony-Anhalt's premier before September's vote.	The US (X), Ukraine and Germany
Operation Overload (Matryoshka)	Russia per CeMAS	At least 196 fake videos with media logos and 20 fake front pages around Germany's September elections, with little sign of organic spread, per CeMAS.	Germany (X)
Doppelganger (Social Design Agency)	Russia per CeMAS	72 election-related posts in German before September's votes, mostly linking to fake Welt and Spiegel sites, and Ukraine's CCD says the fake Toronto Sun bunker story matches its method, which DisinfoWatch does not confirm.	Germany and Canada
Pravda network (Portal Kombat)	Russia per SPRAVDI	Carried 7,756 of the 8,411 FIMI-marked posts SPRAVDI logged on one day, and its news-pravda.com was among the sites casting European talk of dialogue with Moscow as a split.	Internationally, mostly in English, German, French and Spanish

OPERATION OR ACTOR	ORIGIN	WHAT IT DID THIS WEEK	WHERE SEEN
Russia-linked YouTube networks	Russia per Google	23 takedowns of 2,321 channels in Q3, the three largest "linked to a Russian consulting firm", with sets posting in Polish, Romanian, Armenian and Ukrainian.	On YouTube, Google News and Discover
Russian officials and state media	Russia (overt)	Zakharova and Medvedev on Poland's Tribunal crisis, the embassy in Warsaw on an opera and a Soviet cemetery, the embassy in Bratislava on Oleshky and Zakharova on the Konev statue, the Russian House in Prague, the embassy in Kenya, Nebenzia at the UN, and Zvezda, RIA Novosti and TASS, while Rossiya 1 sided with Nawrocki.	Poland, Slovakia, Czechia, Ukraine, Moldova and France
Russian sabotage networks	Russia per Romania's SRI and foreign ministry	The Carfil fire in Brasov, with Belarusian suspects held in Germany and a Ukrainian detained in Poland.	Romania, Germany and Poland
Telegram recruitment	Russia (its special services, the FSB in three cases) per the SBU	Recruits spotted while seeking "easy" earnings in Telegram chats or through their anti-Ukrainian comments, one tasked with hacking advertising screens to show propaganda.	Ukraine
Global Fact-Checking Network	Russia per Ukrinform and Demagog.sk	Recast a German investigation of attempted drone sabotage at Leipzig/Halle airport as politically motivated, and supplied the analysis behind a Slovak post calling the Bucha massacre "staged theatre".	Germany and Slovakia
Iran	Iran per UK counter-terrorism police and Google	A man charged with assisting what police believe is Iran's intelligence service over RAF Fairford, 50 YouTube channels removed, and, with no state named, pro-Iran accounts spreading a fake Netanyahu quote per NewsGuard.	The UK and Israel
China	China per Google and Czech prosecutors	14,472 YouTube channels removed in Google's PRC-linked investigation, and the Prague trial of a Chinese correspondent accused of acting for a foreign power.	On YouTube and in Czechia
GlobUs	Russia per VIGINUM	A "club of experts" run by two figures from the "Prigozhin galaxy", which VIGINUM assesses as a facade for information manipulation.	Cameroon and the Republic of Congo
Technique: spoofed media brands	Russia-linked where attributed	Fakes imitated the Toronto Sun, Euromaidan Press, Cleveland 19, WABI, Haaretz, L'Alsace, Deutsche Welle, RTL, 44.ua and New Voice of Ukraine.	Ukraine, the US, Canada, Germany and France
Technique: AI images, video and voices	Russian or pro-Russian sources where attributed, and one domestic	AI fakes included videos of Ukrainian councillors, anti-Polish graffiti, an image of Nawrocki, a video of Gyurov, a Putin souvenir shop in Paris, a Marseille looter, soldiers and scenes of hardship in Ukraine, and a mushroom cloud over Ukrainian air bases.	Poland, Bulgaria, France, Ukraine and Austria
Technique: invented quotes of leaders	Actors mostly unnamed	Merz on the Nord Stream trial, Schröder on Ukraine's wealth, Gyurov on sending troops, Yotova, and Netanyahu before Israel's election.	Germany, Bulgaria and Israel

New research and reports

Google's quarterly bulletin brought the week's platform takedowns, and CeMAS's study of Germany's September elections the main European exposure. Storm-1516's US fakes drew three NewsGuard reports and a PolitiFact round-up.

DATE	PUBLISHER	TITLE OR TOPIC	WHY IT MATTERS
30 Oct	Google	"Influence Operations Bulletin Q3 2026"	Lists 23 Russia-linked takedowns and 14,472 channels in the PRC-linked investigation.
30 Oct	PolitiFact	"Russian influence operation linked to attacks targeting Democrats in Maine, Ohio, Texas"	Brings Clemson and ISD researchers together on three fake Senate-race scandals tied to Storm-1516.
30 Oct	Texty	Russian disinformation monitoring on TikTok and YouTube, 19-25 October	Finds YouTube bots now demanding immediate capitulation.
30 Oct	INFO OPS Polska	Russian propaganda against the Baltic states' sovereignty	Tracks the "Soviet gift" line on Vilnius and the "Narva People's Republic".
30 Oct	EUvsDisinfo	"Russia introduces new laws to jail critics, but denies it holds any political prisoners"	Sets Moscow's "political prisoner" charges against Ukraine beside the 1,825 political prisoners Memorial recognises in Russia.
29 Oct	CeMAS	Wahlen im Visier, on Russian information manipulation around Germany's 2026 state elections	Documents four Russian operations aimed at state and local votes, which CeMAS calls a first at this scale.
29 Oct	NewsGuard	"Russia Strikes Again, Targeting Maine's Troy Jackson"	The third Democratic Senate candidate targeted by apparent Storm-1516 fakes since 20 October.
29 Oct	NewsGuard	"In pivotal Senate race, Russia targets another Democrat; Japan PM assassination faked by China"	Also covers pro-China users faking the Japanese prime minister's assassination and the pro-Iran Netanyahu fake.
29 Oct	Euromaidan Press	"A Russian disinformation campaign cloned Euromaidan Press to blame Ukraine for Russia's own strike on Kramatorsk (we took the fake down)"	A spoofed outlet's own account, with the steps it used to get the clone taken down.
29 Oct	EDMO	"The Factory of Discord: How Foreign Actors Exploit Social Unrest in Europe"	Finds foreign actors exploited Europe's October protests, but no evidence that a single command orchestrated them.
28 Oct	Texty	Trolls and bots blaming Koncha-Zaspa for Russian strikes	Shows bots redirecting anger after strikes onto Ukraine's elite across four years of YouTube comments.
28 Oct	AFP via CEDMO	"Unfounded Zelensky Canadian bunker story originated on imposter website"	Traces the bunker story to a fake Toronto Sun domain.
27 Oct	VIGINUM	GlobUs, a Russian influence and information interference structure in Africa	A technical report on a front VIGINUM ties to the "Prigozhin galaxy".
27 Oct	NewsGuard	"Russia Fabricates Sexual Assault Charges Against Sherrod Brown"	A dubbed Cleveland 19 newscast naming four real former staffers.
27 Oct	Odolné Česko	Disinformation radar, September 2026	Counts sanctioned Russian sources republished on Czech conspiracy websites.

DATE	PUBLISHER	TITLE OR TOPIC	WHY IT MATTERS
27 Oct	Myth Detector	"The 'Visible Hand' of Pro-Government Trolls: 445 Troll Accounts Coordinate Against the 'Deep State,' the West, and the Opposition"	A second network of fake accounts boosting Georgia's government, after the first was deactivated.
27 Oct	EDMO	"Beyond Disinformation: How Russia Constructs the Meaning of War - and How to Counter It"	Argues that debunking needs narrative literacy and inoculation beside it.
26 Oct	DisinfoWatch	"Fake Toronto Sun story spreads Zelenskyy bunker hoax to millions on X"	Counts 7.76 million views in four days and declines to name an operator.

What to watch next week

The US midterms and the Prague espionage trial are the dates to watch, with Poland on alert for sabotage.

[+] 2 Nov: The trial of Jang I-ming, the Chinese correspondent accused of spying, is due to resume in Prague.

[+] 2-8 Nov: Polish police units are on full readiness over "current threats of sabotage and subversion", per police headquarters.

[+] 3 Nov: The US midterm elections, where Clemson's Darren Linvill expects Storm-1516 "to create narratives undermining trust in the election on and after election day".

[+] 6-10 Nov: Technical-level talks between Russia, the US and Ukraine are expected in Abu Dhabi, Zelensky said.

[+] 15 Nov: Gagauzia's governor election, where StratCom warned that an unauthorized poll could be used to cast the vote as a "referendum against Chisinau".

[+] No date: Results of Bulgaria's 1 November presidential run-off and any claims that follow.

[+] No date: President Nawrocki's decision on the bill on blocking illegal online content, which reached him on 23 October.

[+] No date: Extradition decisions on the Carfil suspects held in Germany and Poland.

[+] No date: The EU's proposed 100 FIMI sanctions listings still await adoption.

[-] Coverage gap: This issue does not draw on Manipulátoři.cz, the European Values Center, PAP Fake Hunter, Demagog.org.pl's full list of fact-checks, StopFals, EUvsDisinfo's database, the BfV's own releases, or Hungarian and Nordic sources. Finding nothing there is not proof that nothing happened.

TTP patterns this week

Russia is the state behind all 35 records with a state actor this week, attributed or suspected, and 13 manipulation records have no known actor; no record rests on Iran or China. What set the Russian records apart was less disguise than borrowed credibility: officials, diplomats and state media speaking as themselves, and a few cloned news sites on fresh domains. This is the fourth set of records, so the per-week figures can now be read as a first, short trend, but the numbers below are n/N records and most rest on a handful of cases.

[x] Tactic presence by actor: records using each DISARM tactic at least once

TACTIC (KILL-CHAIN ORDER)	RUSSIA (N=35)	UNATTRIBUTED (N=13)
TA02 Plan Objectives	24/35	4/13

TACTIC (KILL-CHAIN ORDER)	RUSSIA (N=35)	UNATTRIBUTED (N=13)
TA14 Develop Narratives	22/35	6/13
TA06 Develop Content	24/35	12/13
TA15 Establish Assets	5/35	0/13
TA16 Establish Legitimacy	24/35	5/13
TA05 Microtarget	6/35	3/13
TA07 Select Channels and Affordances	31/35	13/13
TA08 Conduct Pump Priming	4/35	2/13
TA09 Deliver Content	2/35	2/13
TA17 Maximise Exposure	2/35	0/13
TA10 Drive Offline Activity	1/35	0/13
TA11 Persist in the Information Environment	1/35	3/13

Not seen this week: TA01 Plan Strategy, TA13 Target Audience Analysis, TA18 Drive Online Harms, TA12 Assess Effectiveness. Planning-phase tactics are rarely visible in open sources, so their absence says more about evidence than behaviour. TA02 includes inferred aims. Counting only aims a source states, Russia is 14/35 and unattributed is 1/13.

[1] **Russia speaks in the open as often as in disguise.** An authentic persona (T0143.001) appears in 10/35 Russian records, among them the embassies in Bratislava and Warsaw (W44-006, -022), Zakharova and Medvedev on Poland's Tribunal crisis (W44-014), the ombudswoman on Oleshky (W44-042) and the foreign ministry's billboard post (W44-070). A government official persona (T0097.111) is in 5/35 and established state media carry the content (T0111) in 10/35.

[2] **Legitimacy reaches its highest share in four weeks, driven by open voices.** TA16 Establish Legitimacy is in 24/35 Russian records, against 10/23, 18/31 and 20/39 in the three earlier issues. The rise is uneven rather than steady, and most of this week's figure is overt: 13 of the 24 carry no fabricated, impersonated or parody persona, 10 of them officials or embassies speaking as themselves. Part of it comes from rules added this week, such as labelling local-news channel personas (W44-050) and proxy officials fielded as sources (T0100.001, in 5/35 records, among them W44-041 and -073).

[3] **Cloned news sites on fresh domains sit on the Russian side, partly by construction.** A lookalike domain (T0149.003) with a newly created asset (T0150.001) is in 3/35 Russian records and 0/13 unattributed ones: the New Voice of Ukraine clone behind the NABU fake (W44-032), the Euromaidan Press clone tied to Storm-1516 (W44-051) and the fake Toronto Sun (W44-058). Only the Euromaidan Press clone carries a named operation: dpa and Ukraine's CCD tie the other two to Russia by comparing the spoof itself with Doppelganger, so the rules file them under Russia for the very marker counted here. A news-outlet persona (T0097.202) is in 8/35 Russian records and 4/13 unattributed ones, so the brand is a shared mask.

[4] **Telegram carries Russian records, Facebook the unattributed.** Telegram channels (T0151.007) seed 10/35 Russian records against 2/13 unattributed ones, while Facebook and unspecified social networks (T0151.001) carry 7/13 unattributed records against 6/35 Russian ones. X and TikTok (T0151.008) are close to even, 8/35 against 5/13.

[5] **The Polish-Ukrainian wedge returns.** Dividing neighbours or allies (T0079) is in 5/35 Russian records, stated in three (W44-018, -055, -069) and inferred in two (W44-020, -064). Two are aimed at Poles: the fake anti-Polish graffiti (W44-018), which Ukraine's CCD says Russian propaganda resources seeded, and the AI videos of invented posts by Ukrainian councillors (W44-020), whose style the CCD says matches earlier Russian operations. Exploiting an audience's fears (T0083) is in 5/35. A stated aim of any kind (TA02,

observed) is in 14/35 Russian records and 1/13 unattributed ones, and boosting Russia's image (T0136.004) appears in 3/35, two around the Oleshky evacuation (W44-041, inferred, and -042) and one casting Putin as "open to dialogue" (W44-055).

[6] The spread stage is still the least documented, and thinner this week. Of the four stages of the Russian chain as this edition counts them, the legitimacy stage, which counts open official voices as well as disguise, is documented in 24/35 records, manipulated content in 19/35, seeding in 26/35 and spread in 5/35. Amplification proper (TA17) is in 2/35, against 5/23, 4/31 and 7/39 earlier, and one of the two rests on a low-confidence inference from view counts (W44-051). The full chain shows in two records, CeMAS's election report (W44-030) and the Euromaidan Press clone (W44-051).

russian spoof-to-spread chain · records documenting each stage (n = 35)

disguise →	content →	seed →	spread
persona, spoofed brand, fake front	AI-made or manipulated real media	Telegram, X, Facebook, own or spoofed sites	localization, cross-posting, flooding
TA16	TA06	TA07	TA05 · TA17
24 / 35	**19 / 35**	**26 / 35**	**5 / 35**

All four stages are documented in 2 records: W44-030 (Matryoshka/Overload), W44-051 (Storm-1516). Stages count techniques, not whole tactics. Disguise is any TA16 label. Content is AI-made or edited media (T0023, T0023.001, T0084.003, T0085.001, T0086.002, T0086.003, T0087.001, T0087.002, T0088.001, T0088.002). Seed is T0151.001, T0151.007, T0151.008 or T0152.004. Spread is any TA17 label or T0101. That is why content and seed can count fewer records than TA06 and TA07.

[-] Read with care: the 26 October and 1 November issues both fall in ISO week 44, so the four per-week rows are four consecutive issues, the minimum a trend needs, not four calendar weeks. This week's rules moved some counts: an overt state-media interview is no longer labelled (W44-011), a proxy official fielded by state media is T0100.001 rather than T0039 (W44-073), and each takes a record out of the Russian TA17 count, so its fall to 2/35 is partly a labelling effect. 10 of the 48 labelled records with a foreign or unknown actor rest first on Ukrainian state bodies, which are official sources but a party to the war. Storm-1516 is named in three records (W44-030, -051, -067) and Doppelganger in one (W44-030), and invoked only by comparison in two more (W44-032, -058), too few for a pattern of their own. Google's Q3 bulletin is a single record (W44-062) with 4 labels, against 6.8 on average for fact-checks (n=29), because the bulletin describes each takedown in a line. Labels come from secondary reporting, so they show what was documented, not everything the operators did.

[x] What to track as weeks accumulate

- [+] Legitimacy in Russian records (TA16, now 24/35 after 10/23, 18/31 and 20/39), split between open voices and disguise, and whether the rise holds without rule changes.
- [+] Lookalike domains with fresh registrations (now 3/35), and how many carry an attribution beyond the spoof itself.
- [+] Storm-1516 on and after the 3 November US vote, and whether European targets follow.
- [+] The Polish-Ukrainian wedge (T0079 in 5/35) after the councillor videos and the graffiti.
- [+] Amplification (TA17, now 2/35) under the tightened T0039 rule.

Appendix: DISARM techniques used this week

91 techniques, ordered by tactic along the kill chain. Counts are records, not labels. RU = Russia, UNK = unattributed, DOM = domestic (excluded from the analysis). Each ID links to its definition in the DISARM framework, published by the DISARM Foundation under CC BY-SA 4.0.

TACTIC	ID	TECHNIQUE	RU	UNK	DOM
TA02	T0066	Degrade Adversary	1	·	·
TA02	T0075.001	Discredit Credible Sources	2	·	·
TA02	T0077	Distract	1	·	·
TA02	T0079	Divide	5	1	·
TA02	T0135.001	Smear	5	2	1
TA02	T0135.002	Thwart	5	·	·
TA02	T0135.003	Subvert	3	·	·
TA02	T0135.004	Polarise	1	·	·
TA02	T0136.001	Defend Reputaton	5	·	·
TA02	T0136.002	Justify Action	3	·	·
TA02	T0136.004	Boost Reputation	3	·	·
TA02	T0136.006	Cultivate Support for Ally	1	·	·
TA02	T0139.001	Discourage	1	2	·
TA14	T0004	Develop Competing Narratives	13	·	·
TA14	T0022.001	Amplify Existing Conspiracy Theory Narratives	2	1	1
TA14	T0068	Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis	6	4	1
TA14	T0083	Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative	5	1	·
TA06	T0015.001	Use Existing Hashtag	1	·	·
TA06	T0023	Distort Facts	9	2	1
TA06	T0023.001	Reframe Context	2	1	·
TA06	T0084.001	Use Copypasta	2	1	·
TA06	T0084.002	Plagiarise Content	1	·	·
TA06	T0084.003	Deceptively Labelled or Translated	3	3	2
TA06	T0084.004	Appropriate Content	1	·	·
TA06	T0085	Develop Text-Based Content	2	4	1
TA06	T0085.003	Develop Inauthentic News Articles	4	·	·
TA06	T0085.004	Develop Document	1	1	·
TA06	T0086	Develop Image-Based Content	·	1	·
TA06	T0086.002	Develop AI-Generated Images (Deepfakes)	6	3	1
TA06	T0086.003	Deceptively Edit Images (Cheap Fakes)	1	1	·
TA06	T0087	Develop Video-Based Content	3	·	·
TA06	T0087.001	Develop AI-Generated Videos (Deepfakes)	1	3	·
TA06	T0087.002	Deceptively Edit Video (Cheap Fakes)	1	·	·
TA06	T0088.001	Develop AI-Generated Audio (Deepfakes)	3	2	·
TA15	T0091.001	Recruit Contractors	2	·	·
TA15	T0145.001	Copy Account Imagery	·	·	1
TA15	T0145.002	AI-Generated Account Imagery	·	·	1
TA15	T0146.007	Automated Account Asset	1	·	·
TA15	T0149.003	Lookalike Domain	3	·	·

TACTIC	ID	TECHNIQUE	RU	UNK	DOM
TA15	T0149.009	Internet Connected Physical Asset	1	·	·
TA15	T0150.001	Newly Created Asset	3	·	·
TA15	T0150.005	Compromised Asset	1	·	·
TA15	T0150.008	Bulk Created Asset	·	·	1
TA16	T0097.101	Local Persona	·	·	1
TA16	T0097.103	Activist Persona	·	·	1
TA16	T0097.105	Military Personnel Persona	·	1	·
TA16	T0097.110	Party Official Persona	1	·	3
TA16	T0097.111	Government Official Persona	5	·	·
TA16	T0097.201	Local Institution Persona	1	·	·
TA16	T0097.202	News Outlet Persona	8	4	·
TA16	T0097.203	Fact Checking Organisation Persona	2	·	·
TA16	T0097.204	Think Tank Persona	1	·	·
TA16	T0097.206	Government Institution Persona	4	1	·
TA16	T0097.207	NGO Persona	1	·	·
TA16	T0098.002	Leverage Existing Inauthentic News Sites	2	·	·
TA16	T0100.001	Co-Opt Trusted Individuals	5	·	·
TA16	T0143.001	Authentic Persona	10	·	4
TA16	T0143.002	Fabricated Persona	4	2	1
TA16	T0143.003	Impersonated Persona	7	4	1
TA05	T0016	Create Clickbait	3	1	·
TA05	T0101	Create Localised Content	4	1	·
TA05	T0102.001	Use Existing Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles	·	1	·
TA07	T0029	Online Polls	·	1	·
TA07	T0110	Formal Diplomatic Channels	1	·	·
TA07	T0111	Traditional Media	10	·	·
TA07	T0111.001	TV	2	·	·
TA07	T0151.001	Social Media Platform	6	7	3
TA07	T0151.002	Online Community Group	·	1	·
TA07	T0151.003	Online Community Page	·	2	·
TA07	T0151.006	Chat Room	2	·	·
TA07	T0151.007	Chat Broadcast Group	10	2	·
TA07	T0151.008	Microblogging Platform	8	5	4
TA07	T0151.014	Comments Section	1	1	1
TA07	T0152.004	Website Asset	11	1	1
TA07	T0152.006	Video Platform	1	·	·
TA07	T0153.001	Email Platform	1	·	·
TA07	T0153.007	Direct Messaging	2	·	·
TA08	T0042	Seed Kernel of Truth	3	2	1
TA08	T0044	Seed Distortions	1	·	·
TA09	T0114.001	Social Media	1	1	·
TA09	T0116.001	Post Inauthentic Social Media Comment	1	1	1
TA09	T0117	Attract Traditional Media	·	·	1
TA17	T0039	Bait Influencer	1	·	·

TACTIC	ID	TECHNIQUE	RU	UNK	DOM
TA17	T0049.001	Trolls Amplify and Manipulate	1	·	1
TA17	T0049.003	Bots Amplify via Automated Forwarding and Reposting	1	·	·
TA17	T0119.002	Post across Platform	1	·	·
TA18	T0048	Harass	·	·	1
TA10	T0127.002	Encourage Physical Violence	1	·	·
TA11	T0060	Continue to Amplify	·	1	·
TA11	T0129.009	Remove Post Origins	·	1	1
TA11	T0130.001	Conceal Sponsorship	1	1	·