Influence Operations Weekly Digest

1-8 Nov 2026 · labeled with DISARM Red v1.6.1 · author: Lukáš Czerner

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$ digest --week 2026-W45 --framework disarm-red-1.6.1
┌─ influence operations · weekly digest · DISARM-labeled
│  records  83 digest items · 58 manipulation records labeled
│  labels   392 technique labels · 97 distinct techniques
│  actors   RU 36 · IR 1 · CN 0 · BY 1 · unattributed 15 · domestic 5
└─ status    ok
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Russian, Chinese, Iranian and other state-linked information operations, with a focus on Central Europe and Ukraine.

[-] Disclaimer: This digest is created with the help of AI-enabled tools and may contain inaccuracies. If you find one, let me know.

This week in brief

A clash at a National Guard post near Kyiv drove the week: Ukraine's CCD said it showed signs of external interference, SPRAVDI counted thousands of posts recasting it abroad as proof of secret torture prisons, and researchers tied fakes under nine media, UN and NGO brands to Russia's Matryoshka operation, while politicians in Germany, Poland and Bulgaria spread the claims. A Prague court found a Chinese correspondent to be a member of Chinese intelligence but acquitted him, and hoax bomb threats disrupted flights across Europe.

[+] NewsGuard found nine fake reports imitating outlets and groups from Euronews to Human Rights Watch claiming Ukraine runs "secret prisons", which Antibot4Navalny ties to Matryoshka, after the 2 November clash in Petropavlivska Borshchahivka that Ukraine's CCD said showed "signs of a pre-planned campaign with external interference".

[+] AfD co-leader Alice Weidel shared a false "torture chamber" post about the clash, SPRAVDI counted over 1,600 Polish-language posts on it, and Konkret24 showed that the 14-year-old a Polish MP called its youngest torture victim had been in the crowd outside.

[+] The Prague Municipal Court acquitted the Chinese correspondent Jang I-ming while holding it proven that he is a member of Chinese intelligence, and Deník N reports that he flew to Beijing on 6 November.

[+] Jan Marsalek wrote in 2021 that "we" had "successfully" toppled Austria's chancellor Sebastian Kurz, APA reported from British reporting, a claim Austria's DSN is examining and profil finds unsupported.

[+] Hoax bomb threats disrupted flights across Europe, some emails signed in the name of Male State, a movement founded in Russia, a link AFP has not confirmed, and Spain's foreign minister called hybrid aggression "the most reasonable assumption".

[+] After the Krakow shooting, OKO.press traced a false claim tying the Polish attacker to a Ukraine-linked US group through the Russian Telegram channel Shot and calls the wave "steered by Moscow".

[+] Ukraine's CCD blamed the Russian hacker group Hitcore for fake radiation and chemical alerts pushed through the Air Alert app, and The Kyiv Independent said a hack that sent fake nuclear emails to its subscribers "points to a Russian operation".

[+] Poland's NASK counted almost 6,000 accounts, 36 of them automated and coordinated, spreading falsehoods about the Constitutional Tribunal crisis, without saying who runs them.

[-] Reading the DISARM lines: under every incident, a **disarm** line lists the DISARM Red v1.6.1 techniques evidenced in the sources, grouped by tactic in kill-chain order (plan → prepare → execute → assess). Every ID (e.g. T0085.001) links to its DISARM definition. ~ marks a label inferred rather than stated in a source. Technique names are in the appendix. Responses, context items and overt state actions are not labeled. Each incident has an ID (e.g. W45-007) used in the pattern summary.

Czechia

No Czech authority attributed a new campaign to a foreign state this week, but the Prague Municipal Court found that Jang I-ming, the Chinese correspondent tried for acting for a foreign power, is a member of Chinese intelligence, and still acquitted him because it saw no intent to harm Czech security; Deník N reports he flew to Beijing four days later. BIS director Michal Koudelka warned that once the war ends Russia will run a massive disinformation operation, using the Russian Orthodox Church, to blame NATO for the war. Emailed bomb threats hit Prague flights on two days with no one yet identified, and Čeští elfové reported that the Facebook page of neČT24, which it ties to Sputnik, has disappeared.

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
7 Nov W45-001	Jang I-ming flew back to China on Friday 6 Nov on the direct Prague-Beijing flight, several sources familiar with his departure told Deník N, which writes that his release could ease the situation of a Czech businessman detained in China. His lawyer had said after the verdict that Jang did not plan to leave the country, and the prosecutor that he was under no obligation to stay.	Chinese intelligence, per the Prague court's findings, which are not final **[official]**	Deník N; ct24.ces katelevize.cz
disarm not labeled · context			
5-6 Nov W45-002	Emailed bomb threats hit four Prague-bound flights, from Dublin, Glasgow, Athens and Newcastle, and the airport itself on 5 November, and nine flights to and from Prague on 6 November, part of a Europe-wide wave; searches found no explosives, and the counter-terrorism centre NCTEKK took over the case. An email to a logistics firm at Rome's Fiumicino airport was signed with the name of Male State, a misogynist movement founded in Russia that a Russian court banned as extremist in 2021, but Deník notes the BBC's warning that someone may have used its name, and that as of 5 November no direct evidence tied the threats to Russia or Iran.	Unknown. One email in the wave carried the Male State name, which is unverified **[unattributed]**	respekt.cz; denik.cz
disarm TA06 T0085 · TA16 T0097.208 ~T0143.003 · TA07 T0153.001 (actor unknown)			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
4 Nov W45-003	BIS director Michal Koudelka told the Chamber seminar on current security threats, the one at which, as Hlídací pes reported last week, he warned of a larger Russian embassy, that he is convinced that once the war ends Russia will try "very intensively, by means of a massive disinformation operation, using the Russian Orthodox Church" to persuade Ukrainians in Ukraine and in other EU countries that NATO, not Russia, caused the war: "This is already happening now, but it will be much more massive," Hlídací pes reported. Hlídací pes also wrote that the police see a "crime as a service" phenomenon in which the Russian-speaking criminal milieu in the EU is used "as an intermediary and executor" of crimes with the character of hybrid attacks, from illegal migration to espionage and corruption and influence activities. **disarm** not labeled · response	Russia, per BIS, as a forecast; Russian-speaking criminal networks, per the police as reported by Hlídací pes **[official]**	hlidacipes.org
2-3 Nov W45-004	The Prague Municipal Court acquitted Jang I-ming, Prague correspondent of the Chinese state daily Guangming Daily and the first person prosecuted for unauthorised activity for a foreign power, and released him from custody on 2 Nov: Judge Tome Frankič held it proven that he is a member of Chinese intelligence who acted for a foreign power, built a network of contacts and monitored Czech politics, but not that he intended to harm Czech security, as the offence requires. The prosecutor appealed and challenged the release, so the High Court in Prague will rule, and BIS director Michal Koudelka told MPs on 3 Nov it was "the first time in history that a criminal court has confirmed BIS information", while saying he does not understand how a court can find someone spies yet breaks no law. Former president Miloš Zeman, MEP Ondřej Dostál and MP Jindřich Rajchl used the verdict to attack BIS, Dostál urging the government to send China a note of apology and Rajchl the repeal of the offence. **disarm** not labeled · context	Chinese intelligence, per the court and BIS. The defendant denies it and says he did ordinary journalism **[official]**	ct24.ceskatelevize.cz; ekonomickyd enik.cz; iportal24.cz

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
1 Nov W45-005	Čeští elfové reported that the Facebook page of neČT24, which it says has long been demonstrably tied to the Russian state agency Sputnik, disappeared in the first half of October, "most probably" removed by Meta, and that Facebook now labels links to neČT24's website as coming from a publisher "partially or wholly under the editorial control of the Russian government", a label that appeared on posts by former prime minister Jiří Paroubek and by Vojtěch Němec, who appears as "doktor Vajíčko". Its monitoring of 1-15 October found the strongest hostile narratives to be attacks on President Pavel and his wife over a trip to Morocco around the elections, the claim that the West and NATO provoked the war, and "fascist" Baltic states and Germany threatening Russia; it also found that charts of a drop in Yandex crawler bots during the 8-11 October outages of Yandex data centres hit by Ukrainian strikes were misread as the end of Russian troll farms.	NeČT24, tied to Sputnik per Čeští elfové; the label is Facebook's **[researcher]**	Čeští elfové

disarm not labeled · response

[-] Background: The offence of unauthorised activity for a foreign power, section 318a of the criminal code, has applied since February 2025 and was upheld by the Constitutional Court in February 2026, Česká justice notes; BIS and the counter-terrorism centre NCTEKK detained Jang I-ming on 17 January 2026. China detained a Czech citizen at the end of June, who is under investigation there on suspicion of endangering state security, ČT24 recalls.

Slovakia

No Slovak authority attributed an information operation to a foreign state this week, and the Russian embassy pushed Moscow's lines in the open, relaying in Slovak its claim that the house near Kyiv was a "torture chamber" and that the Kyiv regime's repression "will later be called a real genocide of Ukrainians" and its case against "politicising" sport, while Prime Minister Robert Fico and his sports minister argued that Russia's hockey players should not be kept out. The main exposure was Denník N's report that TASS carried Fico's unsupported claim that the 2003 EU referendum was falsified, and the opposition moved to dismiss Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár, alleging he offered the Russian Centre of Science and Culture an upgraded status, which he denies.

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
1-8 Nov W45-006	As several European federations announced boycotts of matches against Russia in world hockey, STVR reported, the Russian embassy relayed Maria Zakharova's line that sport "must not be politicised" and, on 7 November, her verdict that Finland's plan to bar Russian athletes from the Schengen area is "neo-Nazism". Prime Minister Robert Fico said on 3 November that he had "always been against dragging sport into politics", and Sports Minister Rudolf Huliak said on 8 November that Russians "definitely" should play.	The Russian foreign ministry, relayed by its embassy in Slovakia, overt statements. The Slovak ministers' remarks are their own, and no source links the two **[official]**	spravy.stvr.sk; Telegram; Telegram; TA3; Pravda.sk

disarm not labeled · overt state action

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
6-7 Nov W45-007	Prime Minister Robert Fico said that the 2003 referendum on joining the EU, held on a turnout of about 52 percent, "would not have succeeded had it not been falsified", offering no evidence, noviny.sk reported; he spoke on 6 November in a discussion with former Czech president Václav Klaus at the opening of a school of social democracy, per TA3. Denník N reported that TASS, Russia's state news agency, put the remarks into its international service, Interfax carried them too, and Denník N noted that Fico also aired theories about Soros, the Kuciak murder and 17 November. KDH said the prime minister was moving "toward the disinformation scene", per TA3.	No foreign actor named. Russian state media amplified the claim, per Denník N **[media]**	Noviny.sk; TA3; Denník N; interfax.ru; Denník N
disarm TA14 T0022.001 · TA06 T0087 · TA16 T0097.110 T0143.001 · TA07 T0151.003 · TA08 T0042 (domestic · excluded from FIMI analysis)			
4-6 Nov W45-008	The Russian embassy relayed in Slovak Zakharova's 5 November claim that a house in Petropavlivska Borshchahivka near Kyiv was an "illegal prison and torture chamber" of the "Azov" National Guard corps, and her statement that the Kyiv regime's repression "will later be called a real genocide of Ukrainians". Aktuality reported that from 2 November unconfirmed claims of 40 men tortured there spread on social networks, with videos shared by Telegram channels, while per BBC News Ukraine the National Guard rented the house as a temporary centre for 26 mobilised men, some of them deserters, and the Guard's commander denied there were "hostages". Denník N wrote that "enemy propaganda" had seized the chaotic protest.	The Russian foreign ministry, relayed by its embassy in Slovakia, an overt statement **[official]**	Telegram; aktuality.sk; Denník N
disarm TA02 ~T0135.002 · TA14 T0004 T0068 · TA06 T0023 · TA16 T0097.206 T0143.001 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0151.007			
2-6 Nov W45-009	The embassy's Slovak-language Telegram channel also relayed Zakharova calling Zelensky's remarks on Kyivan Rus "pseudo-historical delusions" serving "neo-Nazi ideology", and new EU money for Ukraine support for "Ukrainian terrorists". On 6 November it carried her statement that the tasks of the "denazification and demilitarisation of Ukraine" "will certainly be fulfilled". It said that "representatives of state bodies of the Slovak Republic" attended its 4 November reception for Russia's National Unity Day at the Russian Centre of Science and Culture, where it opened a photo exhibition for Patriarch Kirill's 80th birthday.	The Russian embassy in Slovakia, overt statements **[official]**	Telegram; Telegram; Telegram
disarm not labeled · overt state action			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
4 Nov W45-010	Progressive Slovakia announced a motion, backed by all opposition parties, to dismiss Blanár, citing among its reasons an upgraded status for the Russian Centre of Science and Culture in Bratislava and more Russian diplomats in Slovakia, TASR reported. PS vice-chair Ivan Korčok said that Blanár sent the Russian ambassador a note proposing privileges and immunities for the head of the centre, which he called "the key centre for spreading Russian propaganda in Slovakia", run by a Russian state agency on the EU sanctions list, and PS MP Beáta Juríik said Slovakia issued Russians 513 Schengen visas in 2024, 1,732 in 2025 and 2,018 by 30 September 2026. Blanár called the claims "untruths and manipulation" and denied both discussing more Russian diplomats and proposing a stronger status for the centre. **disarm** not labeled · context	No foreign operation named. The claims are the opposition's, which the minister denies **[media]**	teraz.sk; Pravda.sk
2 Nov W45-011	Demagog.sk found that a video shared on Slovak Facebook from 23 October, 143 times by 27 October, set masked "students" in Paris beside young women dancing in Serbia using unrelated clips. The masked men were filmed for a music video by the French rap group 8ZT, as Lead Stories had found, and a Serbian journalist posted the video of the dancers on 7 October, during the student protests there. **disarm** TA06 T0084.003 · TA07 T0151.001 (actor unknown)	Unknown **[unattributed]**	Demagog.sk

[-] Background: On 12 September the foreign ministry distanced itself from an exhibition at the Russian Centre of Science and Culture in Bratislava called "Crimean gold: civilised Europe plunders Russian treasures", calling the promotion of seizing a sovereign state's territory by force unacceptable, noviny.sk reported.

Poland

No Polish authority attributed a specific campaign to a foreign state this week. NASK counted almost 6,000 accounts, 36 of them automated and coordinated, spreading falsehoods about the Constitutional Tribunal crisis without saying who runs them, while Tusk said that adopting the Russian "coup" narrative serves Russia's policy and warned, with Siemoniak, of Russian sabotage at the Kaliningrad border. The main exposure followed the Krakow shooting of 7 November: OKO.press traced a false claim tying the Polish attacker to a Ukraine-linked US group from an anonymous Polish account to the Russian channel Shot, Belarusian state media and outlets in five other countries, a wave it calls steered by Moscow, and Siemoniak said military services were examining disinformation about the attack "from outside Poland".

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
8 Nov W45-012	After a gunman killed six people in Krakow on 7 November, a false claim that the attacker, a Pole named only as Michał O., was tied to Ukraine through a patch on his vest went from an anonymous Polish Instagram account that backs Grzegorz Braun's party to the Russian Telegram channel Shot, which wrote that he wore the patch of "the American PMC Forward Observations Group", linked to foreign mercenaries who fought for Ukraine (125,000 views), and on to Belarusian state media and outlets in Bulgaria, Greece, Spain, China and Vietnam, OKO.press found. OKO.press says the patch is a different design sold online, that Shot belongs to News Media Holding, which it says the Kremlin closely controls, and calls the wave "steered by Moscow", while special-services coordinator Tomasz Siemoniak said military services were examining disinformation about the crime "from outside Poland", naming no country.	Moscow, per OKO.press, with Shot and Belarusian state media as amplifiers and an anonymous Polish account as the first poster. Siemoniak named no state **[media]**	Telegram; OKO.press; cyberdefence24.pl
disarm TA02 ~T0079 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 ~T0084.001 T0085 ~T0086.004 · TA07 T0111 ~T0151.001 T0151.007 T0152.004 · TA09 ~T0116.001			
7-8 Nov W45-013	Konkret24 rebutted claims, made live by TV Republika's head Tomasz Sakiewicz while a masked police officer stood behind him, that police were absent from Krakow's market square, which the interior ministry's spokeswoman called a "lying narrative", and posts calling the attacker Ukrainian, which Lesser Poland police denied two and a half hours after the attack. It also showed an AI-"enhanced" still of his arrest, posted by Konfederacja MP Bartłomiej Pejo and by a Sprawdzam.to journalist whose post drew at least 1.2 million views before he deleted it, and an AI-made video presented as the attacker saying he would "do something bad", at 2 million views on one copy, while digital minister Krzysztof Gawkowski said his team was reporting false content to platforms, CyberDefence24 reported.	Polish posters, a TV channel and politicians, per Konkret24. No foreign actor named **[researcher]**	konkret24.tvn24.pl; konkret24.tvn24.pl; cyberdefence24.pl
disarm TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0085 T0086.002 T0087.001 · TA16 T0097.102 T0097.110 T0143.001 · TA07 T0111.001 T0151.001 T0151.008 (domestic · excluded from FIMI analysis)			
6 Nov W45-014	The Sejm passed the government's bill on restrictive measures by 240 votes to 202 with one abstention, adding "interference and manipulation of information aimed at national security" as a ground for the national sanctions list, PAP reported. The interior minister would keep the list, with decisions enforceable at once, and Sejm committees added that using freedom of expression or of the press cannot count as such manipulation, Konkret24 wrote before the vote, as politicians of both Konfederacja parties and PiS attacked the bill, warning of censorship and confiscated property.	No foreign actor, a policy step **[official]**	Monitor Polski; portalsamorzadowy.pl; konkret24.tvn24.pl
disarm not labeled · response			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
5-6 Nov W45-015	SPRAVDI found over 1,600 Polish-language posts by the evening of 5 November repeating the "secret Azov prison", "40 hostages" and "tortured 14-year-old" claims, one text about the boy over 250 times, mostly on X and Facebook, of which over 120 came from Russian and Belarusian propaganda outlets, among them about 40 items on the Pravda network's Polish site and seven on TopWar.pl. It said posts by Konfederacja politicians Krzysztof Bosak, Konrad Berkowicz, Krzysztof Mulawa and Paweł Usiądek and by Włodzimierz Skalik of the Confederation of the Polish Crown spread the same claims, noted accounts with signs of inauthentic behaviour, and said most Polish media covered the story correctly; Detector Media relayed the findings.	The Pravda network and TopWar.pl, per SPRAVDI, with Polish politicians it names spreading the same claims **[official]**	SPRAVDI; Detector Media
disarm TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0023 ~T0084.001 · TA16 T0098.002 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0152.004 · TA17 ~T0049.001			
2-6 Nov W45-016	Police headquarters denied posts saying German officers were guarding the Constitutional Tribunal, which Konkret24 traces most likely to a German-language X post about Hamburg police helmet numbers, and dpa found that videos offered as proof of German police in Warsaw show nothing of the kind, tying the German police vans filmed on the S8, which Konkret24 placed near Wolbórz last week, to a Bundespolizei team at a rail police exercise in Spała on 20-21 October. Konkret24 placed a Bundeswehr convoy that users said was heading "to the Tribunal" (380,000 views on TikTok) on the A2 motorway in Lubusz province, and dpa showed that Bundeswehr soldiers whom PiS MP Dariusz Matecki filmed near the Sejm were there for a touring exhibition on 70 years of the Luftwaffe at the German embassy, and that a still shared by MP Włodzimierz Skalik had been edited with an OpenAI tool, per SynthID.	Polish posters and politicians, per Konkret24 and dpa. No foreign actor named **[researcher]**	konkret24.tvn24.pl; dpa-factchecking.com; konkret24.tvn24.pl; dpa-factchecking.com
disarm TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0084.003 T0086.002 T0087.002 · TA16 T0097.110 T0143.001 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.008 T0154.001 (domestic · excluded from FIMI analysis)			
5 Nov W45-017	NASK's Disinformation Analysis Centre found nearly 100 main accounts and almost 6,000 supporting accounts, mainly on X, spreading false content about the Constitutional Tribunal crisis, which put out over 50,000 false posts at the peak from the night of 31 October to 2 November; 36 of them were automated and acting in a coordinated way, some active for nearly ten years, the digital ministry said after the Centre for Combating Disinformation discussed a draft counter-disinformation strategy. The narratives undermined trust in the police and government, alleged German, Russian and EU interference and claimed that Russian intelligence had briefed the president on the Tribunal events, but the ministry names nobody behind the accounts, and NASK counted 42 false narratives between Friday evening, 30 October, and Sunday evening.	Unnamed coordinated and automated accounts, per NASK. No state named **[official]**	gov.pl; cyberdefence24.pl
disarm TA02 ~T0135.004 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0084.003 T0085 · TA07 T0151.008 · TA17 T0049.003 · TA11 T0060 (actor unknown)			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
5 Nov W45-018	Demagog and the coalition Razem Przeciw Dezinformacji launched a campaign called "They're already here" ahead of the 2027 parliamentary election, with an installation by Warsaw's Palace of Culture, a guide to Russian disinformation drawn from examples on the Polish internet, and an appeal to the government to set up a working group that works out who tells citizens about influence attempts. The organisers say they will show that "a deliberate operation of the Russian state" stands behind false content circulating online, and that "we can be sure" Russia's actions will not bypass Poland's election. **disarm** not labeled · response	The Russian state, per Demagog, as a general warning without named accounts **[researcher]**	Demagog; cyberdefence24.pl
5 Nov W45-019	EDMO's Weekly Pulse on Poland's constitutional crisis says Russia "sought to position itself within the controversy", but that "no publicly verifiable evidence has established direct Russian involvement" in President Nawrocki's actions, despite Prime Minister Tusk's claim of Russian bots. It warns that politicians whose positions align with Russia's "are not necessarily Russian agents", and it carries Demagog.pl's finding that an X account of a supposed former soldier vowing to defend the Tribunal was created in October 2026, is run from Georgia and appears to use an AI-generated profile picture. **disarm** TA02 ~T0135.004 · TA15 T0145.002 T0150.001 · TA16 T0097.105 T0143.002 · TA07 T0151.008 · TA11 T0130.001 (actor unknown)	No foreign actor established, per EDMO; Russia (Medvedev, overt) noted **[researcher]**	edmo.eu
4-5 Nov W45-020	Konkret24 showed that a 14-year-old whom Konfederacja MP Konrad Berkowicz, in a post with over 480,000 views, called the youngest person "tortured" in a "secret prison near Kyiv" had been in a crowd trying to get into a building used by the National Guard in Petropavlivska Borshchahivka and was taken inside only after falling off its fence, while MP Włodzimierz Skalik, deputy speaker Krzysztof Bosak and former prime minister Leszek Miller also spread the prison story. Demagog notes that TASS told it the same way as Berkowicz, and The Insider, citing Antibot4Navalny researchers, says over ten fakes from accounts of the Russian Matryoshka network included a TVP World-branded video claiming two Poles may have been held there and ransomed for 30,000 euros. **disarm** TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0086.003 T0087 · TA16 T0097.202 T0097.207 T0143.003 · TA17 T0120	The Matryoshka network, per The Insider and Antibot4Navalny; Polish politicians as spreaders, per Konkret24 and Demagog **[researcher]**	konkret24.tvn24.pl; Demagog; The Insider

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
4 Nov W45-021	Defence24 relayed a report by the independent Belarusian outlet Nasha Niva that Belarusian intelligence is recruiting members of the diaspora on Telegram to put up low-quality AI-made posters and hand out disinformation leaflets, one on how to behave during an occupation of Poland, for 1 euro a piece, then to photograph sites for 150 to 1,400 euros, and to say they work on a film if caught. Defence24 does not rule out that Polish citizens are approached too and points readers to the ABW's reporting bot.	Belarusian intelligence (the KGB), per Nasha Niva as relayed by Defence24 **[media]**	defence24.pl
disarm TA06 T0085 T0086.002 · TA15 T0091.001 · TA07 ~T0151.007 ~T0153.007 · TA11 T0130.001			
2-4 Nov W45-022	Antibot4Navalny said the Matryoshka bot network is "actively exploiting" Poland's political crisis and mocking Tusk's statement about Russian bots, with fake clips branded as BBC, Euronews, DW, MS Now and Bellingcat, one inventing a DW quote of Romania's foreign minister urging Poles to "unite against the Ukrainian invaders". Detector Media found five TikTok videos under the same five brands, posted within half an hour on 2 November from throwaway accounts with 1,100 to 1,350 shares each and no comments, denying "Russian bots" in Poland's crisis and blaming Ukrainian refugees, and all gone from TikTok by the evening of 3 November.	Matryoshka, a "Kremlin-aligned bot network" per Antibot4Navalny. Detector Media says imitating media brands is its "signature" **[researcher]**	bsky.app; Detector Media
disarm TA02 ~T0079 ~T0136.001 · TA14 T0004 T0068 T0083 · TA06 T0087 · TA15 T0150.008 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.008 · TA17 ~T0049.003			
3-4 Nov W45-023	Tusk said Polish services had thwarted "a possible provocation on the border with Russia in the area of Kaliningrad Oblast" after the Border Guard saw unusual movement shortly after midnight, with police, Border Guard, counter-terrorist units and GROM soldiers deployed in the Warmian-Masurian and Podlaskie provinces after warnings of possible sabotage and provocations from Polish and allied services, NATO among them. Siemoniak said Russian services keep hiring people, usually Ukrainians, to commit sabotage "on Russia's orders" and that "something very massive" could happen on either side of the border, and Onet reported, according to OKO.press, that the operation may be linked to Belarusian KGB recruitment on Telegram for a poster and leaflet campaign against Poland.	Russia, per Tusk and Siemoniak; the Belarusian KGB, per Onet as cited by OKO.press **[official]**	gov.pl; gov.pl; OKO.press
disarm not labeled · response			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
2-4 Nov W45-024	INFO OPS Polska found that TASS and NEWS.ru presented the border operation as a reaction to "allegedly prepared" sabotage, that NEWS.ru headlined "Poland got scared of people with flashlights" by blurring the planned operation with the separate night incident, and that URA.RU had Andrei Kolesnik cast it as possible preparation for a provocation against Russia in line with NATO plans, two contradictory lines that both question the Polish decision, though it says the similarities do not show one centrally coordinated operation. CyberDefence24 cited a 2 November Disinfo Digest alert on a message by Aleksandr Kots, widely spread among Russian propagandists, that Poland is preparing a land and sea blockade of Kaliningrad, in a narrative that also had Russia able to destroy Polish and NATO fortifications with nuclear weapons "within a few hours".	Russian media, TASS among them, per INFO OPS Polska **[researcher]**	disinfodigest.pl; cyberdefence24.pl
disarm TA02 ~T0135.002 · TA14 T0004 T0068 · TA06 T0023 · TA05 T0016 · TA07 T0111 · TA08 T0044			
3 Nov W45-025	The prime minister's office wrote that "giving in to the Russian narrative" of a "coup" or an "attack on the Tribunal" is "carrying out Russia's policy", quoted Tusk saying "we see the activity of Russia and pro-Russian politicians, in the world and at home", and named Nigel Farage, Marine Le Pen and Viktor Orban as foreign politicians "linked to Russia". After the National Security Council he said political destabilisation "is exploited and fuelled above all by Russian services".	Russia and its services, per Tusk, with no operation named **[official]**	gov.pl; gov.pl
disarm not labeled · context			
3 Nov W45-026	Konkret24 examined Tusk's remark that opponents of the legal order had won "public compliments from the Kremlin's chief ideologue", which it says may have meant a post on the X account @AGDugin, made the day of his address, wishing the Polish right luck and success. The account has 497,500 followers, and TUA Research said in 2025 that it is run by a Brazilian, Antonio Pires, without conclusive proof, while Dugin's own profiles link to it, and Demagog says it "promotes disinformation narratives aligned with the Kremlin's interests" and warns against using the threat of disinformation in day-to-day political fights.	The account @AGDugin, attributed to Aleksandr Dugin but of disputed operator, per Konkret24 and Demagog **[researcher]**	konkret24.tvn24.pl
disarm not labeled · context			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
2 Nov W45-027	An analysis by ResFutura of online reactions around Tusk's address on the Tribunal found that accounts with high bot scores wrote 0.9% of the hostile posts and that about 100 accounts, almost all on the hostile side, appeared together under the same posts within ten minutes four times more often than chance, without saying who runs them, CyberDefence24 reported. It also reported that police denied a fake order, attributed to the deputy national police commander, telling riot units to carry submachine guns, helmets and body armour.	None named **[researcher]**	cyberdefence24.pl
disarm TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0085.004 · TA16 T0097.206 T0143.003 · TA09 T0116.001 (actor unknown)			
2 Nov W45-028	Konkret24 found that a video shared by Portuguese-language X accounts as Poles singing the anthem and stopping a coup, viewed 2.6 million times, showed a Warsaw Uprising anniversary concert first posted on TikTok in September, and that an image of police surrounding the Tribunal, posted by US actor Kevin Sorbo (86,000 views), was AI-generated.	None named **[unattributed]**	konkret24.tvn24.pl
disarm TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0084.003 T0086.002 · TA07 T0151.008 (actor unknown)			
1 Nov W45-029	Russia's foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova asked readers to imagine foreign ministers and MPs landing on Warsaw's squares, handing out buns and proposing a "third round" of elections, and said Poland's elite had done "exactly this" in Kyiv in 2004 and 2013, when "the protest grew into a putsch and a coup", which OKO.press reads as casting Nawrocki as Yanukovych. Senator Aleksei Pushkov wrote that in the clash between "the Euro-liberal Tusk and the right-wing nationalist Nawrocki" the EU "of course backed its agent of influence Tusk".	Russia's foreign ministry and a Russian senator, in the open **[official]**	Telegram; OKO.press; ria.ru
disarm TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA14 T0022.001 T0068 · TA16 T0097.111 T0143.001 · TA07 T0111 T0151.007 · TA08 T0042			

Germany and Austria

No German or Austrian authority attributed a new disinformation campaign to a foreign state this week. Germany's BfV opened intelligence inquiries into hacks of supermarket cooling systems that pro-Russian Telegram channels credited to Russian hacktivists, while the interior ministry said nothing yet allows attribution, and in Austria the DSN, in reports seen by profil, rated a Bulgarian suspect's account of her 2022 Nazi-sticker campaign against Ukraine for the Marsalek network as a protective claim. The main exposure was Jan Marsalek's chat boast that he helped topple Sebastian Kurz, which Austrian investigators are examining and profil finds unsupported, while in Germany AfD co-leader Alice Weidel spread a false "torture chamber" story about the clash near Kyiv and The Gnida Project flagged a Storm-1516 fake about German military budgets.

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
8 Nov W45-030	Germany: The Gnida Project flagged a new Storm-1516 campaign claiming that, according to a "Transparency International report", a big part of the military budgets of Germany and other European countries is being siphoned off by local politicians and officials. The video it shows runs under the headline "Military cash cow: how elites launder billions in Germany". **disarm** TA02 ~T0135.002 · TA06 T0087 · TA16 T0143.004 · TA07 T0151.008	Storm-1516, per The Gnida Project **[researcher]**	bsky.app
8 Nov W45-031	Austria: Russia's deputy foreign minister Dmitry Lyubinsky told TASS that retaliation for Austria's expulsion of four Russian diplomats on 23 October would be proportionate but "inevitably painful" for Vienna. ORF notes that the Austrian foreign ministry's wording for the expulsions, activities incompatible with diplomatic status, is the usual diplomatic phrase for espionage allegations. **disarm** not labeled · context	The Russian foreign ministry, an overt statement **[official]**	orf.at
7-8 Nov W45-032	Austria: Jan Marsalek, the fugitive former Wirecard executive wanted in several European countries for spying for Russian intelligence services, wrote to the convicted spy-ring leader Orlin Roussev in October 2021 that "we" had "successfully" toppled Chancellor Sebastian Kurz by seizing the phone of his confidant Thomas Schmid, the Telegraph and Bild reported on 7 November, per APA, and the interior ministry confirmed that the British material is part of the ongoing Ott/Marsalek investigation. profil, which has seen the files, reports that the DSN is examining possible "influence on Austrian politics" but that nothing supports the claim: Schmid's phone was seized on 19 November 2019, and 17 of the 18 messages were sent on 22 October 2021, after Kurz resigned on 9 October. Investigators say it is still unknown whether Marsalek, writing of a man who had "worked for us", meant Wirecard or Russian intelligence, and Die Presse also finds doubts warranted, not least over why Moscow would have wanted Kurz gone. **disarm** not labeled · context	Jan Marsalek, by his own claim, which investigators have not confirmed, per APA and profil **[media]**	salzburg24.at; profil; diepresse.com
7 Nov W45-033	Germany: the governing CDU/CSU and SPD have agreed to give the intelligence services new powers in a coalition amendment to the intelligence reform, FAZ reports from Politico: the BND could secretly enter homes, including in Germany, after review by the Independent Control Council, and the BfV could examine organised-crime structures that support the actors it watches, because state or extremist actors use "low-level agents" and "crime-as-a-service". MDR reports that the Bundestag takes up the reform next week, after Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt cited the attacks on supermarket cooling systems in arguing for powers to disrupt attackers' infrastructure. **disarm** not labeled · response	No actor named, a policy step **[official]**	faz.net; mdr.de

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
6-7 Nov W45-034	Germany: the BKA and the Federal Prosecutor published an AI-generated image of an unidentified person on an e-bike, unusually warmly dressed for midsummer, who was near Leipzig/Halle airport between 31 July and 4 August and may be linked to the attempted explosive-drone attack there, and said two suspects have already been identified. t-online names them as Oleg L., who holds Latvian and Russian passports, and the Belarusian Andrei K., both of whom media link to Russia's GRU, and recalls that the federal government blamed Russia in early September, which Moscow denies. **disarm** not labeled · context	Russia, per the federal government, and the GRU, per media reports cited by t-online **[official]**	welt.de; t-online.de
5-7 Nov W45-035	Germany: the BfV says the hacks that switched supermarket cooling systems across Europe to defrost or heat mode are "the subject of current intelligence investigations" and the joint centre for countering hybrid threats (GAZ Hybrid) is examining them, heise and n-tv report from the Handelsblatt, while the interior ministry says no findings yet allow attribution "to a specific actor or a state body". CORRECTIV found that a German pharmaceutical distributor's medicine cooling was also hit and that pro-Russian Telegram channels credited Russian hacktivist groups on 4 November, which the BSI says it has no evidence for, adding that copycats may be claiming the attacks. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov called the accusations "absurd", Hamburger Abendblatt reports from Russian media. **disarm** not labeled · context	Unknown. Pro-Russian Telegram channels credited Russian hacktivists, which the BSI cannot confirm, per CORRECTIV **[official]**	heise.de; n-tv.de; CORRECTIV; abendblatt.de
6 Nov W45-036	Austria: profil reports, from two DSN reports, that Tsveti D., a 50-year-old Bulgarian in Vienna whom prosecutors have treated as a suspect since 2024, apparently downplayed her work for the spy cell around Orlin Roussev, which took its orders from Jan Marsalek. In 2022 she was sent Nazi-propaganda stickers by the kilo to put up near newspaper offices and Russian and Jewish memorials in Vienna, where stencilled graffiti was also to be sprayed, and she admits putting up stickers meant to cast Ukraine and its army in a Nazi light, and the DSN rates her claim that she thought it a "student project" or work for Interpol as a protective claim, citing chats released to Austrian investigators in September. She also watched journalists including Christo Grozev and profil's editor-in-chief Anna Thalhammer, and remains free. **disarm** TA02 T0066 T0135.002 · TA06 T0086 · TA15 T0091.001 · TA16 T0097.112 T0143.002 · TA09 T0117 · TA10 T0057.002 · TA11 T0130.001	The Roussev cell directed by Jan Marsalek, per the DSN as reported by profil, which says the sticker campaign served Putin's propaganda **[official]**	profil

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
6 Nov W45-037	Germany: ZDF frontal and Spiegel have identified one of the hackers behind October's leak of about 421,000 AfD emails as a US-based programmer, Oleksij L., whom they tie to the account that published the leak and, they say, probably to the online "Com" scene, Tagesspiegel reports. He did not openly admit the hack but said the AfD had become "a tempting target" through lax IT security and that it was not about politics at first, and the outlets found no sign that he had been interested in politics before. **disarm** not labeled · context	A US-based programmer linked to the "Com" scene, per ZDF and Spiegel. No source ties the leak to a state **[media]**	Tagesspiegel
3-6 Nov W45-038	Germany: AfD co-leader Alice Weidel shared an X post by Glenn Diesen, a Norwegian political scientist who, FAZ says, backs up Moscow's narratives about the war on Russia's RT, claiming that a "torture chamber of Zelensky" holding more than 40 mobilised men had been found near Kyiv, with a 14-year-old as its youngest victim, and asked the government to raise it during Zelensky's Berlin visit on 3 November. FAZ, citing the Kyiv Independent's Francis Farrell, found that a woman posing as a paramedic set off the 2 November riot at a National Guard building, that 17 recruits walked out on their own and that the teenager broke his foot falling from a wall he had climbed to insult soldiers and throw stones, and Mimikama found the photo does not prove a rescue from a torture cellar. Volksverpetzer adds that Sahra Wagenknecht shared the post too and later corrected only the photo, and that the SBU said on 4 November that it had detained three suspected organisers, while BSW's Fabio De Masi corrected himself, per FAZ. **disarm** TA02 ~T0135.002 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0023.001 · TA16 T0097.110 T0143.001 · TA07 T0151.008 (domestic · excluded from FIMI analysis)	A post by Glenn Diesen, shared by Weidel and others, per FAZ and Volksverpetzer. Who staged the riot is unproven; Volksverpetzer cites the Kyiv Independent as having no verified information on any role for Moscow **[media]**	faz.net; Mimikama; volksverpetzer.de
3-6 Nov W45-039	Germany: fakes about the 31 October "Gen Z regelt" protests went on after the event. dpa and Mimikama traced a video shared as a huge fire at Berlin riots, which drew more than a million views on one X post and was also used by FPÖ leader Herbert Kickl, to an Easter bonfire in Limassol, Cyprus, posted in May 2024, and CORRECTIV found that a widely shared image of looted Berlin shops with only a workwear store spared was made with an OpenAI tool and had already circulated as showing France and the Netherlands. CORRECTIV also found that classified ads for single shoes stolen from a looted Frankfurt shop were invented. **disarm** TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0084.003 T0086.002 T0086.003 · TA05 ~T0101 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.008 (actor unknown)	None named. Spread among others by Herbert Kickl, per dpa **[unattributed]**	dpa-factchecking.com; Mimikama; CORRECTIV; CORRECTIV

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
5 Nov W45-040	Austria: talks on a new espionage law are moving again after the ÖVP dropped its resistance, and a draft could go to inter-ministerial coordination and then public consultation as soon as next week, Der Standard reports, with a justice ministry spokesman saying no fundamental differences remain. Military intelligence would get more powers if the planned surveillance of dangerous persons holds up legally, and Foreign Minister Beate Meinl-Reisinger wants urgent action against foreign spies in a country Der Standard calls a playground for spies from all over the world.	None named, a policy step **[official]**	derstandard.at

disarm not labeled · response

[-] Background: Orlin Roussev, a Bulgarian arrested in Britain in 2023, was sentenced in London to more than ten years for spying for Russia, per profil, and British authorities have passed part of the hundreds of thousands of messages to and from him to Austria, Die Presse reports.

Ukraine

Ukraine's CCD said the 2 November clash at a National Guard post in Petropavlivska Borshchahivka near Kyiv showed "signs of a pre-planned campaign with external interference", and SPRAVDI counted at least 3,500 posts in 20 languages recasting it abroad as proof of secret "torture chambers", while Russian officials joined in, researchers tied fakes under nine brands to Matryoshka, and the SBU detained three alleged organisers of what it describes as a paid provocation, naming no foreign state. The CCD named the Russian group Hitcore for the 1 November hack of Ukraine's Air Alert app, which pushed fake radiation and chemical alerts, and The Kyiv Independent said a hack of its site and newsletters days later "points to a Russian operation".

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
5-8 Nov W45-041	Novaya Gazeta Europe traced the "Workshop of New Media", a programme launched in May 2021 on the initiative of Sergei Kiriyenko, first deputy head of the Kremlin administration, which its organisers say has trained over 1,700 bloggers, media managers and campaign organisers from 16 countries, 123 of them from occupied Ukraine, and which received about 121 million rubles in contributions in 2024-2025 without naming donors. Yulia Ablets, described as its founder, said graduates passed on "directives" through their channels during Prigozhin's mutiny, and graduates founded International Reporters, which runs headlines such as a denial of the airstrike on Mariupol's maternity hospital No. 3; SPRAVDI relayed the investigation.	Russia's presidential administration, through the Workshop of New Media, per Novaya Gazeta Europe **[media]**	novayagazeta.eu; Telegram

disarm TA15 T0091.002 T0092.001 · TA16 T0098.002 T0100.003 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.007 T0152.004

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
3-8 Nov W45-042	SPRAVDI found about 16,000 posts in Ukrainian and Russian on the 2 November clash at a National Guard post in Petropavlivska Borshchahivka near Kyiv, where posts claimed about 40 men were held and tortured, a claim police denied, over 6,000 of them pushing false claims of "hostages", a "concentration camp" or "shooting of protesters", about 2,280 posted by over 1,100 Russian resources, and a wave of at least 3,500 posts in 20 languages on FIMI resources on 2-3 November. It said Maria Zakharova claimed there are "many such" places in Ukraine and Dmitry Peskov that the scandal had gained "global resonance", and that Alice Weidel and Florian Philippot, among the European right, spread the same claims, while ISW said senior Kremlin officials called the house a "torture chamber", likely exploiting the lack of confirmed information "to sow discord in Ukrainian society". Russian media then cited anonymous Russian security sources for National Guard "secret prisons" in Kharkiv, and RIA Novosti an anonymous "antifascist underground of Odesa" for 50 to 70 secret prisons where "every fifth prisoner dies", claims SPRAVDI says rest on no evidence.	Russian resources, officials and media, RIA Novosti among them, per SPRAVDI, and Kremlin officials, per ISW **[official]**	SPRAVDI; Telegram; ISW; Telegram; Telegram
disarm TA02 T0066 T0135.001 T0135.002 T0135.003 T0139.001 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0085 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0111 T0151.001 T0151.007 T0151.008 T0152.004			
4-7 Nov W45-043	The Insider found that RIA Novosti turned a remark by Kyrylo Budanov, head of the Presidential Office, that many such buildings are rented for troops into an admission of many "torture basements", and that Channel One and RIA presented the woman detained as an organiser of the clash as one of Ukraine's top 100 doctors with professional awards, when it could find no such list for 2025 and her decoration comes from a private association whose awards, it says, can in effect be bought.	RIA Novosti and Channel One, per The Insider **[researcher]**	theins.ru; theins.ru
disarm TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0023 · TA07 T0111 T0111.001 ~T0151.007 · TA08 T0042			
6 Nov W45-044	The Gnida Project flagged a new Storm-1516 fake claiming that Ukraine's anti-corruption bureau NABU seized two cars belonging to Zelensky's family and found $28 million in briefcases inside. The video carries the logos of NABU and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office, and one X post of it showed 131,000 views in the screenshot Gnida posted.	Storm-1516, per The Gnida Project **[researcher]**	bsky.app
disarm TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA06 T0087 · TA16 T0097.206 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.008			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
6 Nov W45-045	Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service warned that Russian services recruit Ukrainian refugees for sabotage in Europe through offers of "easy" money in social media and job-search chats, starting with photographing a site or putting up stickers and moving on to surveillance, damage and arson, SPRAVDI reported. The warning, as relayed, puts sabotage acts in Europe linked to Russia since 2022 at about 200, 21% of them in Poland, with over 170 perpetrators identified, Ukrainians among them, and says the Kremlin uses Ukrainians to hide its role and stoke hostility toward refugees.	Russian special services, per the Foreign Intelligence Service **[official]**	Telegram
disarm TA02 T0140.003 · TA15 T0091.001 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.004 · TA10 T0127.002 · TA11 T0130.001			
6 Nov W45-046	The CCD said an event in occupied Donetsk titled "Two peoples - one goal", with United Russia representatives and leaders of an Italian party presented as Russia's "friends and partners", was a propaganda stunt meant to show European recognition of the occupation. It said the party is unknown in Italy and was created in the occupied territories around an Italian journalist who regularly stays in Russia and cooperates with the Kremlin.	Russia and its occupation authorities, per the CCD **[official]**	CCD Telegram
disarm TA02 T0136.002 · TA16 T0097.110 T0143.002 · TA10 T0057 · TA11 T0130.001			
3-6 Nov W45-047	Fakes about "secret prisons" in Ukraine built on the 2 November clash in Petropavlivska Borshchahivka near Kyiv: NewsGuard found nine fake reports imitating Euronews, Libération, La Croix, France 24, Franc-Tireur, TVP World, The Jerusalem Report, UN Action and Human Rights Watch, spread in Russian, French and English on X, Telegram and Bluesky, and Detector Media showed that the real Libération and La Croix of 3 November led on other stories and that no Jerusalem Report issue of that date exists. Antibot4Navalny, which named the campaign, says each fake drew under 1,000 organic views and that Matryoshka "very unlikely" invented the narrative, since its first post came long after the story went viral.	Matryoshka, a Russian influence operation per Antibot4Navalny and NewsGuard. Detector Media attributes the covers to Russian and pro-Russian Telegram channels **[researcher]**	united24media.com ; newsguardriskbriefing.substack.com; Detector Media; bsky.app
disarm TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0086.003 T0087 · TA16 T0097.202 T0097.207 T0143.003 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0151.007 T0151.008			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
3-6 Nov W45-048	A crowd clashed with National Guard troops on 2 November at a house in Petropavlivska Borshchahivka near Kyiv after social media posts claimed about 40 men were held and tortured in its basement; the National Guard said it rents the house as a temporary post for mobilised troops and men detained after going absent without leave, and Kyiv region police denied any illegal detention, ISW reported. The CCD said the events showed "signs of a pre-planned campaign with external interference", counting 361 Facebook posts with one standard text and the "concentration camp" story in 110 Russian channels, Presidential Office head Kyrylo Budanov said outside influence was now established, and the SBU detained three alleged organisers, saying a woman provoked the clashes "in exchange for monetary reward", after taking an order on 30 October to get a guardsman out of the post in a fake ambulance run, and posted manipulative claims to incite unrest. NSDC secretary Ihor Klymenko spoke of well-organised groups of people who "just earn money" and said Ukraine had in effect lost mobilisation in the information space, and the State Bureau of Investigation is investigating a possible excess of authority by a military official, alongside internal inquiries the General Staff listed.	Unnamed organisers working for money, per the SBU; "external interference", per the CCD, which says Russian propaganda tried to channel the anger, and outside influence, per Budanov, neither naming who interfered **[official]**	united24media.com ; ISW; radiosvoboda.org; Telegram; Telegram; detector.media; Telegram; Telegram
disarm TA02 T0135.003 · TA06 T0084.001 · TA15 T0091.001 · TA16 T0097.100 T0143.002 · TA07 T0151.001 ~T0151.007 T0151.008 · TA17 T0049 · TA10 T0057.001 T0126.001 (actor unknown)			
3-6 Nov W45-049	The SBU and the Prosecutor General's Office notified former presidential spokeswoman Yulia Mendel in absentia of suspicion of treason and of justifying Russia's aggression, saying her public statements "discredit Ukraine internationally"; the SBU notes she is presumed innocent. On 4 November she spoke at an AfD event in the Bundestag titled "Switzerland of the East: a neutral and peaceful Ukraine", which Green parliamentary manager Irene Mihalic called a reversal of victim and aggressor, and SPRAVDI said Russian resources and the Pravda network spread her Berliner Zeitung interview as an admission that "capitulation" is inevitable, its German machine translation rendering Zelensky as "Gruene".	Mendel, per the SBU's suspicion, and Russian resources and the Pravda network, per SPRAVDI **[official]**	Telegram; detector.media; Telegram
disarm TA02 T0135.001 T0135.004 T0139.001 · TA06 T0023.001 T0085.008 · TA16 T0098.002 T0100.001 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0152.004			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
2-6 Nov W45-050	SPRAVDI counted about 1,700 posts on FIMI resources on 30 October-1 November casting Russia as a "humanitarian peacemaker" in occupied Oleshky, RT and Sputnik among them, and 688 more on 2 November, 97% from the Pravda network, on sites including news-pravda.com, deutsch.news-pravda.com and capitoldaily.news; on one day this week 255 posts tied Melania Trump's role to the idea that Washington and Moscow should settle peace without Kyiv and Europe. ISW said Kirill Dmitriev, who attended a White House event marking the truce, praised its humanitarian success "without acknowledging" that Russia's invasion and occupation are responsible for the crisis, part of a Kremlin effort to use limited humanitarian cooperation "to court the Trump Administration".	Russia's FIMI resources and the Pravda network, per SPRAVDI, and Kirill Dmitriev, per ISW **[official]**	Telegram; Telegram; Telegram; ISW
disarm TA02 T0136.001 T0136.002 T0136.004 · TA14 T0004 T0068 · TA06 T0023.001 · TA16 T0097.111 T0098.002 T0100.001 T0143.001 · TA07 T0111 T0152.004			
2-6 Nov W45-051	Detector Media found that Rossiya 1 presented as an "exclusive" first reaction from the Oleshky evacuation a woman whom the channel Tavria, which Detector Media calls another propaganda outlet, had shown in at least eight reports and whose departure from the town it places around January 2026, and whose account of her husband's death differed from one she gave Argumenty i Fakty nine days earlier; SPRAVDI relayed the finding. SPRAVDI also rebutted Russian outlets citing a former Kherson city councillor, Yurii Pohrebnyi, for the claim that most men of military age refused to evacuate to Ukraine, and Texty found 23 TikTok videos on Oleshky by the bloggers it tracks drew over 1.47 million views in a week, with Oleshky the subject of 76% of the destructive YouTube comments it logged, nearly one in four of those from a bot.	Rossiya 1 and its presenter Yevgeny Popov, a United Russia Duma member, per Detector Media; Russian media, per SPRAVDI; TikTok bloggers and YouTube bots, per Texty **[researcher]**	antonina.detector.media; Telegram; Telegram; Texty
disarm TA02 ~T0136.004 · TA14 T0004 · TA06 T0023 · TA16 T0097.102 T0100.001 T0143.001 · TA07 T0111 T0111.001			
2-6 Nov W45-052	The SBU described more Russian recruitment: a Kharkiv shop assistant noticed by Russian services through her pro-Kremlin comments in Telegram chats who scouted backup command posts, an unemployed woman in Sumy found by the FSB while seeking "easy" earnings in Telegram chats, and a fitter at a chemical plant in Dnipropetrovsk region, recruited the same way and caught in Kamianske, whose case went to court for preparing a bomb of 1.5 kg of plastic explosive to plant in one of the plant's workshops. In Odesa a retired merchant sailor recruited by the FSB through an acquaintance who had left for Russia was held for guiding drones onto air-defence positions, and five "agitators" in four regions were notified of suspicion over posts on Odnoklassniki, Facebook and Telegram justifying the invasion.	The FSB and Russian special services, per the SBU **[official]**	Telegram; Telegram; Telegram; Telegram; Telegram
disarm TA15 T0091.001 · TA07 T0151.006 T0153.007 · TA10 T0127.002			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
5 Nov W45-053	A Shahed drone shot down on the evening of 4 November near positions of the 427th "Rarog" brigade, reportedly heading for Kyiv, carried propaganda leaflets alongside its warhead, calling to "stop the arbitrariness" of recruitment offices and inviting Kyiv residents to scan a QR code and vote on a name for a "Ukrainian volunteer brigade" in the Russian army, said Robert "Madyar" Brovdi, commander of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces, reported by dev.ua. He warned that the code is most likely a trap to steal data or infect phones, and SPRAVDI relayed the warning.	Russian forces, per Brovdi **[official]**	dev.ua; Telegram
disarm TA02 ~T0139.001 · TA06 T0085 · TA07 T0153.004			
5 Nov W45-054	Russian media and milbloggers reported the arrest of Russian military blogger Vladimir Romanov ("Romanov Lite") over his Oleshky coverage, ISW said, calling it likely part of Kremlin efforts to censor critical voices, after his 30 October post that 17 buses were going to Ukraine and four to Russia undercut Russia's "narrative curation". SPRAVDI said he has not posted since 31 October, that no official confirmation of a prosecution exists, and that TV host Vladimir Solovyov had called on air for him to be jailed.	Russian authorities, per ISW, which hedges the arrest as reported **[researcher]**	ISW; Telegram; Telegram
disarm not labeled · context			
3-5 Nov W45-055	Texty mapped a network of several dozen Ukrainian bloggers and activists, with over 21 million subscribers across platforms, who cast mobilisation as illegal and recruitment offices as criminal, and whose posts Russian media amplify; it found the Borshchahivka video that started the clash shared over 1,500 times in 12 hours, and says Kremlin-run Telegram channels posing as Ukrainian opposition, "ZeRada", "Legitimny" and "Resident", framed a July clash in Lviv as a revolt. Texty stresses that "network" here does not mean a single centre or proven coordination, and Detector Media summarised the study with the same caveat.	Domestic bloggers and activists, amplified by Russian media and, per Texty, Kremlin-run Telegram channels **[researcher]**	Texty; Detector Media
disarm TA02 T0139.001 · TA14 T0083 · TA06 T0087 · TA16 T0097.103 T0143.001 · TA07 T0151.008 (domestic · excluded from FIMI analysis)			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
2-5 Nov W45-056	SPRAVDI tracked the Pravda network turning the week's news against support for Ukraine: 732 posts, about 90% of them on the Pravda network, where one text ran on 77 sites, said US aid would end whatever the midterms brought; 459 posts, 98% from the network, recast NABU's "Midas" and "Carthage" cases as proof that "corruption is the system", also via rtenafrique.tv, sk.news-front.su, hlavnespravy.sk, Sputnik Uzbekistan and esrt.website; and about 490 posts on 3 November presented the "Koalicja" exercise in Poland as a British and French plan to "open fire on Russians". It also counted about 1,080 posts on 30 October-1 November casting Europe and Kyiv as blocking peace and about 280 using corruption cases, a Danish-funded ammunition purchase among them, to allege that Western aid is stolen.	The Pravda network and other FIMI resources, per SPRAVDI **[official]**	Telegram; Telegram; Telegram; Telegram; Telegram
disarm TA02 T0135.002 T0139.001 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0023 T0084.001 · TA16 T0098.002 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0111 T0152.004 · TA08 T0042			
2-5 Nov W45-057	The Insider caught Maria Zakharova claiming the West has begun winding down its "anti-Russian project" on the day the EU announced a new 4.36 billion euro package for Ukraine, and Detector Media, relaying a StopFake debunk, said Russian media presented the renaming of a Kharkiv boulevard after the Omega special forces centre as the "decommunisation" of a "Stalinist" Bohdan Khmelnytsky, when the city council acted to end duplicate street names.	Maria Zakharova, per The Insider, and Russian media, per StopFake as relayed by Detector Media **[researcher]**	theins.ru; Detector Media
disarm TA06 T0023 · TA16 T0097.111 T0143.001 · TA07 T0111 · TA08 T0042			
1-5 Nov W45-058	The CCD rebutted three panic stories: a Kyiv cholera, dysentery and hepatitis A "epidemic", which the city's disease control centre said did not exist; a revived claim that mobile service and internet would be cut during air raid alerts, whose links led to one anonymous Telegram channel hunting subscribers for advertising money; and a doctored screenshot of Iranian state TV IRINN showing missile threats to Kyiv, Lviv and Odesa. SPRAVDI added that the Iranian MP behind the real remarks spoke to Euronews of US bases in Italy and Germany, not of Ukraine.	None named; Telegram channels, per the CCD **[unattributed]**	CCD Telegram; CCD Telegram; CCD Telegram; Telegram
disarm TA02 T0137.001 · TA14 T0083 · TA06 T0023 T0086.003 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.007 · TA17 T0122 · TA11 T0060 (actor unknown)			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
1-5 Nov W45-059	On the evening of 1 November intruders reached the operator interface of Ukraine's "Air Alert" app and pushed false alerts of radiation, a chemical attack and street fighting, and custom messages in Russian linking to a Telegram channel, its developers Ajax Systems and Stfalcon said; SPRAVDI pointed to a Russian-language caption about Oreshnik. The CCD blamed the Russian hacker group Hitcore, and AP reported that Mash, a Russian Telegram channel with links to the security services, said Hitcore representatives claimed responsibility, which AP could not verify; the CCD said the aim was panic, which did not take hold. The same night Russia's emergencies ministry app sent fake warnings of nuclear launches, which ISW attributes to likely Ukrainian hackers.	The Russian hacker group Hitcore, per the CCD; the developers name no one **[official]**	Telegram; Telegram; CCD Telegram; nv1.com; CCD Telegram; ISW
disarm TA02 T0135.003 · TA06 T0085 · TA15 T0147.004 T0150.005 · TA17 T0122			
4 Nov W45-060	The Kyiv Independent said intruders reached its content management system and a newsletter service and sent four emails in Russian and English, the first at 1 a.m. claiming "Zelensky launched a nuclear warhead at Kyiv" after meeting Putin and naming an anonymous Telegram channel, the later ones claiming a physical attack on Zelensky. The outlet says the content "points to a Russian operation" and notes similarities with the air alert hack, without claiming the same actor; its editor-in-chief Olga Rudenko called it the first attack of its kind on the outlet.	Suspected Russian, per The Kyiv Independent, which names no group **[media]**	Kyiv Independent
disarm TA06 T0085 · TA15 T0150.005 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0152.004 T0153.001 · TA17 T0122 · TA18 T0123			
2-3 Nov W45-061	Mozhem Obyasnit found that a new 300-page Russian school textbook for 10th and 11th graders, "Russia's Army Defending the Fatherland", claims Zelensky wanted nuclear weapons and that Ukraine's army was preparing to attack Donbas and Crimea, cites a "Moskal's blood" cocktail and "mass burning" of Russian books as proof of Russophobia, and gives "10 steps to becoming a contract soldier" with outdated requirements. SPRAVDI relayed the finding.	The publisher Prosveshchenie and the Public Council at Russia's Defence Ministry, whose joint project it is, per Mozhem Obyasnit **[media]**	Telegram; Telegram; pointmedia.io
disarm not labeled · overt state action			
2 Nov W45-062	SPRAVDI analysed over 31,000 articles, posts and comments from Russian FIMI resources in October and found that output on Europe's protests rose from 400-1,300 a day to nearly 3,000 at the height of unrest in France and Spain, with almost half pushing the line that "Europe is burning". Pravda (Portal Kombat), RT and DruschbaFM were the main spreaders, and over 87% of the material was in English, French, Spanish, German and Italian.	The Pravda network, RT and DruschbaFM, per SPRAVDI **[official]**	SPRAVDI
disarm TA02 T0135.003 · TA14 T0022.001 T0068 · TA16 T0098.002 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0111 T0151.007 T0152.004			

[-] Attribution note: The CCD, SPRAVDI, the SBU, the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Prosecutor General's Office, the State Bureau of Investigation, the police, the National Guard, Ukraine's armed forces, the Presidential Office and the NSDC are Ukrainian state bodies and a party to the war. Their attributions are official, but not neutral.

Wider Europe and beyond

No authority in this section pinned a new information campaign on a named state this week. Romania's anti-terrorism prosecutors, citing US authorities, tied a 2024 sabotage plan to a Russian intelligence network, the European Commission called Putin's decoration of Transnistria's leader part of Russia's strategy to keep Moldova divided, and Estonia's KAPO warned that Russian intelligence recruits students at Russian universities. The main exposure was a wave of hoax bomb threats against European flights and broadcasters, some signed with the name of a movement banned in Russia, which Spain's foreign minister said was most reasonably "an attempt at hybrid aggression", alongside a new Storm-1516 fake in France, NewsGuard's tally of the Storm-1516 fakes against US Senate candidates, and the first Matryoshka videos Antibot4Navalny has seen on Tumblr.

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
7 Nov W45-063	Estonia's Internal Security Service KAPO warned that undercover intelligence officers at Russian universities identify and recruit students, as nearly 400 Estonians study in Russia, and its bureau chief Marta Tuul said recruits may not be activated immediately. The Russian embassy in Estonia promotes Russian higher education on its website, with scholarships regardless of academic performance and free language courses, and the report cites Nikita Kuzmin, recruited by the GRU while studying in St Petersburg and sentenced to four years.	Russian intelligence services, per KAPO **[official]**	news.err.ee
disarm not labeled · response			
4-7 Nov W45-064	Before Gagauzia's 15 November governor election, Moldova's Socialist leader Igor Dodon asked whether the vote could "be considered fair" if his party's candidate Fedor Gagauz were removed over TikTok accounts the party says are not its own, and Russia's Izvestia quoted Igor Shornikov, a former deputy foreign minister of Transnistria, saying "direct falsification of voting results is quite likely". Gagauzia's electoral council said it had received no complaint and would run the vote "with impartiality and transparency".	Izvestia, an overt Russian media report, and Igor Dodon **[media]**	newsmaker.md; iz.ru
disarm TA14 T0022.001 · TA16 T0100.001 · TA07 T0111.002			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
3-7 Nov W45-065	Hoax bomb threats disrupted flights across Europe in waves on 3, 5 and 6 November, per Al Jazeera, with diversions to Plovdiv, Vienna, Venice and Warsaw Modlin and fighter escorts in Italy and Hungary, and on 6 November an email to European broadcasters claimed devices were hidden in their buildings, per Reuters via CNBC. Emails to the Sofia and Rome airports were signed "fighters of the Male State", the name of a movement Russia banned as extremist in 2021, but AFP has no confirmation that the group sent them, its founder denies any role, and talk of his ties to the FSB is unconfirmed. Spain's foreign minister José Manuel Albares said "the most reasonable assumption is that we are facing an attempt at hybrid aggression", per RFE/RL, Ireland's defence minister Helen McEntee said she did not think anybody could rule Russia out "at this moment in time", and Paris prosecutors opened an inquiry on 7 November that will check for any links to foreign powers.	Unknown. The emails used the Male State name, a link AFP has not confirmed, and Spain's foreign minister suspects hybrid aggression without naming a state **[unattributed]**	aljazeera.com; cnbc.com; armymedia.bg; RFE/RL; irishnews.com; denik.cz
disarm TA06 T0085 · TA16 T0097.208 ~T0143.003 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0153.001 (actor unknown)			
6 Nov W45-066	Factcheck.bg debunked a claim that the tanker Minerva Zen delivered Russian diesel to the US after a Trump-Putin deal, when TankerTrackers, Vortexa and the operator say it carried liquid nitrogen fertiliser. In Bulgarian it ran on 12 October on Pogled.info, a site Factcheck.bg says has spread Russian disinformation before, days before it spread on social media, in groups such as one of nearly 90,000 members named for Rumen Radev, while the earliest post it found was by the X account Russian Market (@runews) on 10 October.	Pogled.info and the X account Russian Market, per Factcheck.bg. No state named **[researcher]**	factcheck.bg
disarm TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0023.001 · TA16 T0098.002 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.002 T0151.003 T0151.008 T0152.004 · TA08 T0042 (actor unknown)			
6 Nov W45-067	CheckFirst released a rebuilt dataset of the Pravda network, which it calls a pro-Kremlin website ecosystem: 15,046,455 articles since June 2023 on 88 sites in 47 languages, 6.8 million of them in 2025 and 5.2 million so far in 2026, about 18,000 a day over the last month. It republishes in bulk from Russian state media, led by TASS and RIA Novosti, and pro-Kremlin Telegram channels, and CheckFirst concludes that "exposure did not stop the network, and neither did sanctions".	The Pravda network (Portal Kombat), linked by VIGINUM to the Crimea-based firm TigerWeb, per CheckFirst **[researcher]**	checkfirst.network
disarm TA06 T0084.004 · TA16 T0098.002 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0111 T0151.007 T0152.004			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
5-6 Nov W45-068	Matryoshka is mocking Montenegro and Albania for asking NATO for expert help against Russian disinformation, a request Politico reported on 4 November, with fakes branded as Euronews, Reuters, DW, Montenegro's public broadcaster RTCG, BBC, France 24 and Politico, per Antibot4Navalny. It says the campaign is the first in its years of monitoring in which Matryoshka published its videos on Tumblr, through burner accounts named "Untitled" with handles that look machine-generated.	Matryoshka, "Kremlin-aligned" per Antibot4Navalny **[researcher]**	bsky.app; bsky.app; bsky.app
disarm TA02 ~T0136.001 · TA14 T0004 T0068 · TA06 T0087 · TA15 T0150.008 · TA16 T0097.202 T0097.207 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.008			
4-6 Nov W45-069	Putin awarded Transnistria's leader Vadim Krasnoselsky the Order of Honour at the Kremlin on 4 November, praising the region for developing "despite difficult conditions and attempts at external pressure" and for working to "preserve the Russian language". Moldova's Reintegration Policy Bureau announced a five-year ban on his leaving Moldova, President Maia Sandu said Russia will make "more attempts to destabilize the situation" and "to create the perception of destabilization" to slow Moldova's EU accession, and European Commission spokesperson Christian Wigand called the award "part of Russia's strategy to keep the Republic of Moldova divided". Russia's ambassador-designate Oleg Ozerov called Chisinau's reaction "vehement" and the award a recognition of merit with no "ideological connotation".	The Kremlin, an overt act; Russia's strategy, per Moldova's president and the European Commission **[official]**	balkaninsight.com ; newsmaker.md; newsmaker.md; newsmaker.md; newsmaker.md
disarm not labeled · overt state action			
5 Nov W45-070	Romania's anti-terrorism prosecutors DIICOT said the Bucharest Court of Appeal on 2 November approved the in-absentia arrest of Oemis Romagoza Durruthy, a 35-year-old Cuban living in Russia, for allegedly paying a Colombian in June and July 2024 to scout an oil and gas site in Ilfov county for an arson or bomb attack, a plan police stopped, and DIICOT, citing US authorities, calls him "a high-ranking member" of the "Russian Intelligence Services Network", citing a US Justice Department release of 15 September. After the Colombian's arrest, Russian Telegram channels falsely presented a short-circuit fire in Bragadiru, Teleorman county, on 1 August 2024 as a successful attack on a fuel centre meant for Ukraine, using images of other fires.	The Russian Intelligence Services Network, per DIICOT citing US authorities, and Russian Telegram channels **[official]**	euronews.ro; stiripesurse.ro
disarm TA06 ~T0023 ~T0084.003 · TA15 T0091.001 · TA07 ~T0151.007 ~T0153.007 · TA10 T0127.002 · TA11 T0128.001			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
5 Nov W45-071	Myth Detector found that a video of a masked man carrying a TV, shared as Ukrainians looting in Marseille during France's October protests, is AI-generated, with an invisible SynthID watermark and a 75% AI score from Hive. ANNA-News, which Myth Detector calls a pro-Kremlin news agency, posted it on VK as Ukrainian "lyceum students" caught looting, and two Russian-language Facebook accounts posted stills from it on 23 October.	ANNA-News and Russian-language Facebook accounts, per Myth Detector. Creator unknown **[researcher]**	mythdetector.com
	disarm TA02 T0066 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0084.001 T0087.001 · TA07 T0111 T0151.001 ~T0151.008		
5 Nov W45-072	Factcheck.bg found that images showing a Russian flag, or a supposed Ukrainian forces' mark, on the sea drone that sank the container ship CONTSHIP JET in Bulgaria's economic zone on 28 October are AI-manipulated, at 91% to 98% AI probability in two detection tools, while the original Maritime.bg video shows no markings. Posts with the Russian flag drew over 2,000 likes from 29 October and those with the Ukrainian mark over 2,300 likes and 1,300 shares, and no authority has said who launched the drone.	Unknown **[unattributed]**	factcheck.bg
	disarm TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0086.002 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.008 (actor unknown)		
5 Nov W45-073	Factcheck.bg debunked claims that a 14-year-old boy filmed being led out of a house near Kyiv during the 2 November clashes had been mobilised and tortured for days, which the boy himself refuted, and which AfD leader Alice Weidel and former Bulgarian MP Rumen Petkov had spread.	No state named, per Factcheck.bg **[researcher]**	factcheck.bg
	disarm TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0023.001 T0085 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.003 (actor unknown)		
5 Nov W45-074	Russia's Prosecutor General's Office declared Droa, the Georgian opposition party of the jailed Elene Khoshtaria, an "undesirable" organisation, citing its "so-called exposure of the local ruling elite's ties with Russia" and members with "strongly Russophobic views" who seek to "discredit our country's actions regarding Georgia". Droa answered that Russia targeted it for calling Abkhazia and Tskhinvali occupied and for exposing alleged "secret ties" between Georgian Dream and Moscow.	Russia's Prosecutor General's Office, an overt act **[official]**	civil.ge
	disarm not labeled · overt state action		
5 Nov W45-075	On 4 November, after the Democrats' midterm win, the Iranian embassy in Lebanon posted an AI-generated video of Trump smashing up the Oval Office, and pro-Russian and pro-Chinese accounts shared it and similar videos, together at 8.2 million views, NewsGuard found. It also found pro-Iran users, among them Jackson Hinkle at 303,300 views, baselessly blaming the CIA and Mossad for Senator Chris Murphy's stroke after he criticised a plan to restart the war with Iran.	The Iranian embassy in Lebanon (overt) and pro-Iran, pro-Russian and pro-Chinese accounts, per NewsGuard **[researcher]**	newsguardriskbriefing.substack.com
	disarm TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0087.001 · TA16 T0097.206 T0143.001 · TA07 T0151.008		

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
4-5 Nov W45-076	Lithuania expelled three Ukrainian citizens, the State Security Department VSD said, for paid assignments from "hostile" foreign intelligence services, passed to them through Telegram and other messengers, and banned them for five years, saying such services recruit through messaging apps and social media because the method "is easy to implement". Interior Minister Martynas Katelynas said the tasks included filming specific sites and interviewing certain people, and the VSD said it acted "before any actual damage to the state had been caused". **disarm** not labeled · context	Unnamed hostile foreign intelligence services, per the VSD **[official]**	lrt.lt; lrt.lt
2-5 Nov W45-077	The Gnida Project flagged a Storm-1516 video on 2 November claiming that the newly published book "Le Crépuscule des princes" quotes Édouard Philippe on Gabriel Attal's supposed cocaine addiction, carrying its publisher Éditions du Rocher's branding. 20 Minutes found the line is not in the book, and co-author Jérémy Marot attributed the video to Storm-1516, per 20 Minutes; the Paris prosecutor opened an inquiry in August into suspected Russian interference against Philippe and Attal. **disarm** TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA06 T0015.001 T0087 · TA16 T0097.205 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.008 · TA08 T0042	Storm-1516, per The Gnida Project and the book's co-author Jérémy Marot **[researcher]**	bsky.app; fr.qz.com
4 Nov W45-078	Liliana Vitu, director of Moldova's StratCom centre, said narratives against Gagauzia's vote, such as that Chisinau wants to "destroy" the autonomy, and the requirement that candidates know Romanian, were spread in a coordinated way, "in itself an indication of possible foreign interference", but "we cannot say that we have seen any interference so far". **disarm** TA14 T0083 · TA08 T0042 (actor unknown)	No state named; coordinated narratives she calls a possible sign of foreign interference, per Moldova's StratCom director **[official]**	ipn.md
4 Nov W45-079	Veridica debunked a PolitNavigator report that Moldova had ceded control of its border to Ukrainian guards who would "hunt" draft evaders on Moldovan soil, quoting Alexei Lungu of the Sansa party, which Veridica calls affiliated with the fugitive Ilan Shor. Joint border checks have run for almost ten years, and the two new protocols were still under review in Kyiv on 30 October, per Moldova's border police. **disarm** TA02 T0136.002 · TA14 T0083 · TA16 T0100.001 · TA07 T0152.004 · TA08 T0042	PolitNavigator, per Veridica **[researcher]**	veridica.ro
4 Nov W45-080	Myth Detector found Georgian and Russian-language outlets still spreading a claim that Serbia's election-winning Student List would bar arms re-exports to Ukraine, after Reuters amended its 26 October story to say the coalition's leaders "had not expressed a position". The pro-government Georgian outlet Apriori and Russian-language outlets including Vzglyad, Gazeta and Rosbalt carried the claim, some posts with RT Balkan excerpts in which no Student List figure discussed arms exports. **disarm** TA06 T0084.003 · TA07 T0151.001 (actor unknown)	Georgian and Russian-language outlets, per Myth Detector. No state named **[researcher]**	mythdetector.com

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
2 Nov W45-081	NewsGuard, which last week said fake newscasts against US Senate candidates pointed to Storm-1516, now says the fake newscasts and deepfake that the "Russian influence operation Storm-1516" made against the Democrats Sherrod Brown, Troy Jackson and James Talarico drew 2.8 million views across 3,790 social media posts before the 3 November midterms, and that WABI called its fake "fabricated".	Storm-1516, per NewsGuard **[researcher]**	newsguardrealitycheck.com
disarm TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA06 T0087.001 T0087.002 T0088.001 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.001			
2 Nov W45-082	WatchDog.MD found that Russia's army recruits foreigners through paid Facebook and Instagram ads without disclaimers, four of them aimed at Moldova in September from three pages with no apparent military link, offering 482,000 lei and Russian citizenship, and 86 aimed at other countries between 29 June and 29 September. Uzbek pages advertised drone-assembly jobs at about 50,000 dollars without mentioning the army, and the data from their sites went to a server in Duesseldorf.	Russian army recruiters, per WatchDog.MD **[researcher]**	watchdog.md
disarm TA15 T0091.001 · TA16 T0097.106 T0143.002 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0151.003 T0153.007 · TA09 T0114.001 · TA17 T0122 · TA11 T0130.001			
2 Nov W45-083	APA-Faktencheck found short TikTok and X clips before the US midterms that open with real Vanity Fair interviews with Jennifer Aniston, Meryl Streep, Jennifer Garner and Mark Ruffalo, then switch to AI-cloned voices urging viewers not to vote for the Democrats, and are usually deleted within hours. APA says the masterminds are unknown, but that the campaign resembles operations attributed to Russia or Russia-linked actors.	Unknown. APA says it resembles operations attributed to Russia or Russia-linked actors **[researcher]**	apa.at
disarm TA06 T0087.002 T0088.001 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.008			

Actors and techniques

Russian operations again dominated, from Matryoshka's spoofed brands and Storm-1516's fakes to Russian officials and state media speaking in the open about the clash near Kyiv. China appeared through the Prague verdict, Belarus through intelligence recruitment on Telegram, and Iran through an embassy's AI video of Trump.

OPERATION OR ACTOR	ORIGIN	WHAT IT DID THIS WEEK	WHERE SEEN
Matryoshka (Operation Overload)	Russia per NewsGuard, "Kremlin-aligned" per Antibot4Navalny	Fake reports under nine media, UN and NGO brands claiming Ukraine runs "secret prisons", spoofed BBC, DW and Bellingcat clips on Poland's Tribunal crisis, and a campaign mocking Montenegro and Albania that took it onto Tumblr for the first time, per Antibot4Navalny.	Ukraine, Poland, Montenegro and Albania (X, Telegram, Bluesky and Tumblr)

OPERATION OR ACTOR	ORIGIN	WHAT IT DID THIS WEEK	WHERE SEEN
Storm-1516	Russia per NewsGuard, flagged by The Gnida Project	A fake Transparency International report on German military budgets, a fake NABU seizure of Zelensky family cars, a fake book passage about Gabriel Attal, and the three US Senate fakes NewsGuard now puts at 2.8 million views.	Germany, Ukraine, France and the US (X)
Pravda network (Portal Kombat)	Russia per SPRAVDI and pro-Kremlin per CheckFirst	Carried almost all of the 688 posts SPRAVDI counted on Oleshky on 2 November, most of those on US aid and Ukrainian corruption cases, and about 40 Polish items on the clash near Kyiv, and CheckFirst counts 15 million articles on 88 sites in 47 languages since June 2023.	Poland, Germany and across Europe
Russian foreign ministry and embassies	Russia, in the open	Maria Zakharova on a "torture chamber" near Kyiv and a "genocide of Ukrainians", relayed in Slovak by the embassy in Bratislava, on Poland's crisis as a second Maidan and on Finland's plan to bar Russian athletes as "neo-Nazism", and Deputy Foreign Minister Dmitry Lyubinsky promising Austria "painful" retaliation.	Slovakia, Poland, Austria and Ukraine
Russian state media	Russia, in the open	RIA Novosti on "secret prisons" and Budanov's remarks, Channel One on the detained woman, Rossiya 1 on Oleshky, TASS carrying Fico's referendum claim, and Izvestia floating falsification before Gagauzia's vote.	Ukraine, Slovakia and Moldova
Shot (News Media Holding)	Russia per OKO.press	Falsely tied the Krakow attacker to a Ukraine-linked US group, a claim Belarusian state media and outlets in five more countries carried on.	Poland (Telegram)
Workshop of New Media	Russia's presidential administration per Novaya Gazeta Europe	A programme launched on Sergei Kiriyenko's initiative that its organisers say has trained over 1,700 bloggers, media managers and campaign organisers, 123 from occupied Ukraine.	Russia and occupied Ukraine
Russian special services	Russia per the SBU, Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service, Estonia's KAPO and Poland's special-services coordinator	Recruits found in Telegram chats offering "easy" earnings, refugees hired for sabotage in Europe, students spotted at Russian universities, and saboteurs, usually Ukrainians, hired for attacks in Poland.	Ukraine, Poland and Estonia
Belarusian intelligence (KGB)	Belarus per Nasha Niva as relayed by Defence24	Telegram recruitment of diaspora members to put up AI-made posters and hand out leaflets for 1 euro a piece, which Onet, as cited by OKO.press, says may be linked to the Kaliningrad border operation.	Poland (Telegram)
Hitcore	A Russian hacker group per Ukraine's CCD	Reached the operator side of Ukraine's Air Alert app and pushed fake radiation, chemical and street-fighting alerts. AP could not verify a claim of responsibility made in its name.	Ukraine
Jan Marsalek's network	Russia per APA and DSN reports seen by profil	Marsalek's unconfirmed boast of helping topple Kurz, and a 2022 Nazi-sticker campaign in Vienna to cast Ukraine as Nazi.	Austria

OPERATION OR ACTOR	ORIGIN	WHAT IT DID THIS WEEK	WHERE SEEN
Chinese intelligence	China per the Prague Municipal Court's non-final verdict and BIS	Jang I-ming, Guangming Daily's Prague correspondent, found to be a member who built contacts and monitored Czech politics, then acquitted for lack of intent to harm.	Czechia
Male State (name used)	A movement founded in Russia and banned there in 2021, per RFE/RL	Its name was on hoax bomb emails to the Sofia and Rome airports, a link AFP has not confirmed and its founder denies.	Bulgaria, Italy and across Europe
Iranian embassy in Lebanon	Iran, in the open, per NewsGuard	Posted an AI video of Trump smashing up the Oval Office after the midterms, which pro-Russian and pro-Chinese accounts shared with similar videos.	The US (X)

New research and reports

CheckFirst's rebuilt Pravda dataset was the week's largest release, OKO.press and SPRAVDI traced how single false claims travelled, and Texty mapped the network behind anti-mobilisation content. No platform published a takedown report.

DATE	PUBLISHER	TITLE OR TOPIC	WHY IT MATTERS
8 Nov	OKO.press	"Layered disinformation about the Krakow attacker: the Kremlin manipulates on an international scale"	Traces the patch claim hour by hour from a Polish account to Shot and outlets in five countries.
7 Nov	ARD-faktenfinder	"Welche Fakes rund um die Midterms kursieren"	A German round-up of US midterm fakes, with CeMAS's Julia Smirnova on Russia's near "industrial scale" of election manipulation.
6 Nov	CheckFirst	"Introducing our new Pravda network dataset: 15 million articles in 47 languages"	A rebuilt dataset of the network, more than doubled to 15 million articles, showing it kept growing after exposure and sanctions.
6 Nov	SPRAVDI	"Secret Azov torture chamber and teenage prisoner: who in Poland spreads the lie about Petropavlivska Borshchahivka"	Maps over 1,600 Polish-language posts and the politicians and Russian and Belarusian outlets spreading them.
5 Nov	NewsGuard	"Fakes of the week: Trump trashes Oval Office; Ukraine hides torture chambers"	Covers the "secret prisons" fakes and the Iranian embassy's AI Trump video.
5 Nov	EDMO	"Poland's constitutional crisis: between foreign interference and genuine alignments"	Separates Russia's open exploitation of the crisis from unproven claims that Russia directed it.
5 Nov	Novaya Gazeta Europe	"Media army without shoulder straps"	Traces the Kremlin's Workshop of New Media and its graduates in occupied Ukraine and abroad.
4 Nov	StratCom Moldova	"National Information Resilience Index"	Finds EU support at 57% nationally but 8% in Gagauzia and Taraclia, days before Gagauzia votes.
4 Nov	INFO OPS Polska	"Border under narrative pressure: mechanisms of Russian propaganda around Kaliningrad Oblast"	Shows how Russian outlets turned a preventive police operation into both ridicule and a war threat.
4 Nov	DFRLab	"How political messaging spread in Armenian diaspora Facebook groups before the 2026 elections"	Finds 20 accounts wrote almost 20% of 175,797 pre-election posts, without attributing them to the Russian state.

DATE	PUBLISHER	TITLE OR TOPIC	WHY IT MATTERS
3 Nov	Texty	"A network of 21 million subscribers: who spins anti-mobilisation sentiment in Ukraine"	Separates three channels it says the Kremlin runs from a wider crowd it finds no proof is coordinated.
2 Nov	SWP	"Europa braucht Antworten auf Russlands Sabotagekampagne"	Argues that Germany and its partners should name Russia's sabotage acts as one orchestrated campaign.
2 Nov	WatchDog.MD	"How does the Kremlin recruit mercenaries from around the world on Facebook?"	Traces 90 Russian army recruitment ads in Meta's Ad Library to sites, forms and recruiters.
2 Nov	CEPA	"How China Might Target US Midterms"	Notes that no research shows Chinese disinformation playing a pivotal role, and points to blind spots in WeChat and Chinese AI models.

What to watch next week

Gagauzia's vote, Poland's Independence March and the Dublin summits are the dates to watch, with talks on Ukraine in Abu Dhabi.

[+] 9-13 Nov: The Bundestag takes up the intelligence services reform with its new powers against "low-level agents", per MDR.

[+] 10-11 Nov: US-mediated talks between Ukraine and Russia in Abu Dhabi, per Steve Witkoff as relayed by SPRAVDI.

[+] 11 Nov: Poland's Independence March in Warsaw, which President Nawrocki said he will join.

[+] 12-13 Nov: Over 50 leaders meet in Dublin for the European Political Community summit and an informal EU summit, under Ireland's biggest-ever security operation after the hoax threats.

[+] 13 Nov: President Nawrocki's 21 days to sign or veto the law letting authorities order illegal online content blocked run out, counting from 23 October.

[+] 15 Nov: Gagauzia elects its governor and assembly, where Moldova's StratCom director expects narratives prepared for either outcome and Izvestia has already floated falsification.

[+] No date: The High Court in Prague rules on the prosecutor's appeal against Jang I-ming's acquittal, per ČT24.

[+] No date: Russia's announced retaliation for Austria's expulsion of four diplomats, per ORF.

[+] No date: The Polish Senate's vote on the restrictive measures bill, with information manipulation as a ground for listing, passed by the Sejm on 6 November.

[-] Coverage gap: This issue does not draw on Manipulátoři.cz, the European Values Center, PAP Fake Hunter, Demagog.org.pl's full list of fact-checks, Slovakia's SIS, GLOBSEC, VIGINUM's own publications, the EEAS, EUvsDisinfo's database, US federal statements on the midterms, or Hungarian, Latvian and Nordic sources. Finding nothing there is not proof that nothing happened.

TTP patterns this week

Russia is the state behind 36 of the 38 records with a state actor this week, attributed or suspected, with one record each for Belarus and Iran, and 15 manipulation records have no known actor. What set the Russian records apart was the borrowed brand: Matryoshka and Storm-1516 spoofed outlets and institutions by name rather than on lookalike domains, and much of the week's content was hung on one event, the clash near Kyiv. This is the fifth set of records, so the per-week figures can be read as a short trend, but the numbers below are n/N records and most rest on a handful of cases.

[x] Tactic presence by actor: records using each DISARM tactic at least once

TACTIC (KILL-CHAIN ORDER)	RUSSIA (N=36)	UNATTRIBUTED (N=15)	BELARUS (N=1)	IRAN (N=1)
TA02 Plan Objectives	23/36	4/15	[ ]	[x]
TA14 Develop Narratives	18/36	9/15	[ ]	[x]
TA06 Develop Content	27/36	13/15	[x]	[x]
TA15 Establish Assets	10/36	2/15	[x]	[ ]
TA16 Establish Legitimacy	26/36	7/15	[ ]	[x]
TA05 Microtarget	11/36	2/15	[ ]	[ ]
TA07 Select Channels and Affordances	32/36	13/15	[x]	[x]
TA08 Conduct Pump Priming	7/36	2/15	[ ]	[ ]
TA09 Deliver Content	3/36	1/15	[ ]	[ ]
TA17 Maximise Exposure	6/36	3/15	[ ]	[ ]
TA18 Drive Online Harms	1/36	0/15	[ ]	[ ]
TA10 Drive Offline Activity	5/36	1/15	[ ]	[ ]
TA11 Persist in the Information Environment	5/36	3/15	[x]	[ ]

Not seen this week: TA01 Plan Strategy, TA13 Target Audience Analysis, TA12 Assess Effectiveness. Planning-phase tactics are rarely visible in open sources, so their absence says more about evidence than behaviour. TA02 includes inferred aims. Counting only aims a source states, Russia is 11/36 and unattributed is 2/15.

[1] **One clash drove the week's Russian content.** Responding to a breaking event (T0068) is in 15/36 Russian records, six of them on the 2 November clash near Kyiv (W45-008, -015, -020, -042, -043, -047) and the rest on Poland's Tribunal crisis (W45-022, -029), the Krakow shooting (W45-012), the Kaliningrad border operation (W45-024) and other news. It is in 7/15 unattributed records too. Two of the six clash records (W45-015, -042) rest first on SPRAVDI, a Ukrainian state body.


[2] **Brands were borrowed, not cloned on new domains.** An impersonated persona (T0143.003) is in 9/36 Russian records and 4/15 unattributed ones, a news-outlet persona (T0097.202) in 7/36 Russian records and an NGO persona (T0097.207) in 3/36, the "secret prison" fakes under nine brands among them (W45-020, -047) and Matryoshka's Montenegro campaign (W45-068). No record this week carries a lookalike domain (T0149.003), against 3/35 Russian records last week.

[3] **Legitimacy reaches 26/36 Russian records, its highest share in five issues.** TA16 Establish Legitimacy is in 26/36, after 10/23, 18/31, 20/39 and 24/35. Half of it is disguise and half is not: 13 of the 26 carry a fabricated, impersonated or parody persona, while the others include officials and diplomats speaking as themselves (T0143.001, 5/36, such as W45-008 and -029) and co-opted speakers (T0100.001, 5/36, such as W45-050 and -051).

[4] **Assets and recruitment are documented in a larger share than in the last three issues.** TA15 Establish Assets is in 10/36 Russian records, against 6/31, 6/39 and 5/35 in the three issues before, though below the first issue's 7/23. Recruitment of contractors (T0091.001) is in 5/36 (W45-036, -045, -052, -070, -082), encouragement of physical violence (T0127.002) in 3/36 and direct messages from handler to recruit (T0153.007) in 3/36, and two hijacked trusted channels add compromised assets (T0150.005: the Air Alert app, W45-059, and The Kyiv Independent, W45-060). Two of the recruitment records (W45-045, -052) rest on Ukrainian state bodies.

[5] **Telegram carries Russian records, Facebook and X the unattributed.** Telegram channels (T0151.007) seed 10/36 Russian records against 2/15 unattributed ones, while Facebook and unspecified social networks (T0151.001) carry 7/15 unattributed records against 6/36 Russian ones, and X and TikTok (T0151.008) 7/15 against 9/36. Mislabelled or moved footage (T0084.003) is in 5/15 unattributed records.

[6] **The full chain shows more often, mostly through SPRAVDI's counts.** Of the four stages of the Russian chain as this edition counts them, legitimacy is documented in 26/36 records, manipulated content in 15/36, seeding in 25/36 and spread in 13/36. Amplification proper (TA17) is in 6/36, after 5/23, 4/31, 7/39 and 2/35, so it moves without a direction. The full chain shows in five records (W45-008, -015, -047, -049, -056), three of which (W45-015, -049, -056) rest first on SPRAVDI.



All four stages are documented in 5 records: W45-008, W45-015 (Pravda/Portal Kombat), W45-047 (Matryoshka/Overload), W45-049 (Pravda/Portal Kombat), W45-056 (Pravda/Portal Kombat). Stages count techniques, not whole tactics. Disguise is any TA16 label. Content is AI-made or edited media (T0023, T0023.001, T0084.003, T0085.001, T0086.002, T0086.003, T0087.001, T0087.002, T0088.001, T0088.002). Seed is T0151.001, T0151.007, T0151.008 or T0152.004. Spread is any TA17 label or T0101. That is why content and seed can count fewer records than TA06 and TA07.

[-] Read with care: these are five consecutive issues, and the 26 October and 1 November issues fall in one ISO week, so the per-week rows are issues rather than calendar weeks. 11 of the 58 labelled records rest first on Ukrainian state bodies, which are official sources but a party to the war, and they carry 8.0 labels on average against 6.4 for fact-checks (n=27) and 5.8 for media reports (n=12), so label density follows the source. Belarus (W45-021) and Iran (W45-075) rest on one record each, too few for any pattern. Four Russian records are attributed only as suspected (W45-060, -071, -079, -083), and W45-083 rests on a resemblance APA draws. Two records are duplicates and count twice: W45-047 of -020 (the "secret prison" fakes) and W45-065 of -002 (the hoax bomb threats). Part of the TA15 rise comes from rules added this week for hijacked apps and outlets and for training programmes (W45-041, -059, -060). Labels come from secondary reporting, so they show what was documented, not everything the operators did.

[x] What to track as weeks accumulate

[+] Legitimacy in Russian records (TA16, now 26/36 after 10/23, 18/31, 20/39 and 24/35), split between open voices and disguise.

[+] Borrowed brands (T0097.202 with T0143.003) against lookalike domains (T0149.003, none this week).

[+] Asset and recruitment documentation (TA15, now 10/36), and how much of it rests on Ukrainian state bodies.

[+] Hijacked trusted channels (T0150.005) after the Air Alert app and The Kyiv Independent.

[+] Matryoshka and Storm-1516 in Europe after the US midterms, with 4 records each this week.

Appendix: DISARM techniques used this week

97 techniques, ordered by tactic along the kill chain. Counts are records, not labels. RU = Russia, UNK = unattributed, BY = Belarus, IR = Iran, DOM = domestic (excluded from the analysis). Each ID links to its definition in the DISARM framework, published by the DISARM Foundation under CC BY-SA 4.0.

TACTIC	ID	TECHNIQUE	RU	UNK	BY	IR	DOM
TA02	T0066	Degrade Adversary	3	·	·	·	·
TA02	T0079	Divide	2	·	·	·	·
TA02	T0135.001	Smear	6	·	·	1	·
TA02	T0135.002	Thwart	6	·	·	·	1
TA02	T0135.003	Subvert	3	1	·	·	·
TA02	T0135.004	Polarise	1	2	·	·	·
TA02	T0136.001	Defend Reputaton	3	·	·	·	·
TA02	T0136.002	Justify Action	3	·	·	·	·
TA02	T0136.004	Boost Reputation	2	·	·	·	·
TA02	T0137.001	Generate Ad Revenue	·	1	·	·	·
TA02	T0139.001	Discourage	4	·	·	·	1
TA02	T0140.003	Spread Hate	1	·	·	·	·
TA14	T0004	Develop Competing Narratives	6	·	·	·	·
TA14	T0022.001	Amplify Existing Conspiracy Theory Narratives	3	·	·	·	1
TA14	T0068	Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis	15	7	·	1	3
TA14	T0083	Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative	2	2	·	·	1
TA06	T0015.001	Use Existing Hashtag	1	·	·	·	·
TA06	T0023	Distort Facts	8	1	·	·	·
TA06	T0023.001	Reframe Context	2	2	·	·	1
TA06	T0084.001	Use Copypasta	4	1	·	·	·
TA06	T0084.003	Deceptively Labelled or Translated	1	5	·	·	1
TA06	T0084.004	Appropriate Content	1	·	·	·	·
TA06	T0085	Develop Text-Based Content	5	4	1	·	1
TA06	T0085.004	Develop Document	·	1	·	·	·
TA06	T0085.008	Machine Translated Text	1	·	·	·	·
TA06	T0086	Develop Image-Based Content	1	·	·	·	·
TA06	T0086.002	Develop AI-Generated Images (Deepfakes)	·	3	1	·	2
TA06	T0086.003	Deceptively Edit Images (Cheap Fakes)	2	2	·	·	·
TA06	T0086.004	Aggregate Information into Evidence Collages	1	·	·	·	·
TA06	T0087	Develop Video-Based Content	7	·	·	·	2
TA06	T0087.001	Develop AI-Generated Videos (Deepfakes)	2	·	·	1	1
TA06	T0087.002	Deceptively Edit Video (Cheap Fakes)	2	·	·	·	1
TA06	T0088.001	Develop AI-Generated Audio (Deepfakes)	2	·	·	·	·
TA15	T0091.001	Recruit Contractors	5	1	1	·	·
TA15	T0091.002	Recruit Partisans	1	·	·	·	·
TA15	T0092.001	Create Organisations	1	·	·	·	·
TA15	T0145.002	AI-Generated Account Imagery	·	1	·	·	·

TACTIC	ID	TECHNIQUE	RU	UNK	BY	IR	DOM
TA15	T0147.004	Mobile App Asset	1	·	·	·	·
TA15	T0150.001	Newly Created Asset	·	1	·	·	·
TA15	T0150.005	Compromised Asset	2	·	·	·	·
TA15	T0150.008	Bulk Created Asset	2	·	·	·	·
TA16	T0097.100	Individual Persona	·	1	·	·	·
TA16	T0097.102	Journalist Persona	1	·	·	·	1
TA16	T0097.103	Activist Persona	·	·	·	·	1
TA16	T0097.105	Military Personnel Persona	·	1	·	·	·
TA16	T0097.106	Recruiter Persona	1	·	·	·	·
TA16	T0097.110	Party Official Persona	1	·	·	·	4
TA16	T0097.111	Government Official Persona	3	·	·	·	·
TA16	T0097.112	Government Employee Persona	1	·	·	·	·
TA16	T0097.202	News Outlet Persona	7	1	·	·	·
TA16	T0097.205	Business Persona	1	·	·	·	·
TA16	T0097.206	Government Institution Persona	2	1	·	1	·
TA16	T0097.207	NGO Persona	3	·	·	·	·
TA16	T0097.208	Social Cause Persona	·	2	·	·	·
TA16	T0098.002	Leverage Existing Inauthentic News Sites	7	1	·	·	·
TA16	T0100.001	Co-Opt Trusted Individuals	5	·	·	·	·
TA16	T0100.003	Co-Opt Influencers	1	·	·	·	·
TA16	T0143.001	Authentic Persona	5	·	·	1	5
TA16	T0143.002	Fabricated Persona	3	2	·	·	·
TA16	T0143.003	Impersonated Persona	9	4	·	·	·
TA16	T0143.004	Parody Persona	1	·	·	·	·
TA05	T0016	Create Clickbait	1	·	·	·	·
TA05	T0101	Create Localised Content	10	2	·	·	·
TA07	T0111	Traditional Media	12	·	·	·	·
TA07	T0111.001	TV	2	·	·	·	1
TA07	T0111.002	Newspaper	1	·	·	·	·
TA07	T0151.001	Social Media Platform	6	7	·	·	2
TA07	T0151.002	Online Community Group	·	1	·	·	·
TA07	T0151.003	Online Community Page	1	2	·	·	1
TA07	T0151.004	Chat Platform	1	·	·	·	·
TA07	T0151.006	Chat Room	1	·	·	·	·
TA07	T0151.007	Chat Broadcast Group	10	2	1	·	·
TA07	T0151.008	Microblogging Platform	9	7	·	1	4
TA07	T0152.004	Website Asset	11	1	·	·	·
TA07	T0153.001	Email Platform	1	2	·	·	·
TA07	T0153.004	QR Code Asset	1	·	·	·	·
TA07	T0153.007	Direct Messaging	3	·	1	·	·
TA07	T0154.001	AI LLM Platform	·	·	·	·	1
TA08	T0042	Seed Kernel of Truth	6	2	·	·	1
TA08	T0044	Seed Distortions	1	·	·	·	·
TA09	T0114.001	Social Media	1	·	·	·	·

TACTIC	ID	TECHNIQUE	RU	UNK	BY	IR	DOM
TA09	T0116.001	Post Inauthentic Social Media Comment	1	1	·	·	·
TA09	T0117	Attract Traditional Media	1	·	·	·	·
TA17	T0049	Flood Information Space	·	1	·	·	·
TA17	T0049.001	Trolls Amplify and Manipulate	1	·	·	·	·
TA17	T0049.003	Bots Amplify via Automated Forwarding and Reposting	1	1	·	·	·
TA17	T0120	Incentivize Sharing	1	·	·	·	·
TA17	T0122	Direct Users to Alternative Platforms	3	1	·	·	·
TA18	T0123	Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations	1	·	·	·	·
TA10	T0057	Organise Events	1	·	·	·	·
TA10	T0057.001	Pay for Physical Action	·	1	·	·	·
TA10	T0057.002	Conduct Symbolic Action	1	·	·	·	·
TA10	T0126.001	Call to Action to Attend	·	1	·	·	·
TA10	T0127.002	Encourage Physical Violence	3	·	·	·	·
TA11	T0060	Continue to Amplify	·	2	·	·	·
TA11	T0128.001	Use Pseudonyms	1	·	·	·	·
TA11	T0130.001	Conceal Sponsorship	4	1	1	·	·