Influence Operations Weekly Digest

8-15 Nov 2026 · labeled with DISARM Red v1.6.1 · author: Lukáš Czerner

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$ digest --week 2026-W46 --framework disarm-red-1.6.1
┌─ influence operations · weekly digest · DISARM-labeled
│  records  119 digest items · 84 manipulation records labeled
│  labels   615 technique labels · 121 distinct techniques
│  actors   RU 47 · IR 1 · CN 2 · unattributed 27 · domestic 7
└─ status    ok
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Russian, Chinese, Iranian and other state-linked information operations, with a focus on Central Europe and Ukraine.

[-] Disclaimer: This digest is created with the help of AI-enabled tools and may contain inaccuracies. If you find one, let me know.

This week in brief

The leak of John Mark Dougan's files drove the week: The Insider read them as the inside of Storm-1516, with GRU and FSB officers directing Dougan, CORRECTIV found that the Center for Geopolitical Expertise financed him, and Czech outlets found Dougan running Czech sites that China pays for, according to the leaked messages. Russian networks worked the Krakow shooting and Spain's coming election, and Poland and Estonia tied sabotage, one case possibly set up to cast suspicion on Ukraine, to Russian services.

[+] The Insider says the leaked files of John Mark Dougan, whom NewsGuard counts as part of Storm-1516, show a GRU Unit 29155 officer under cover at the Center for Geopolitical Expertise using him to route payments and FSB officers handling him, and NewsGuard found him writing "43k articles a month" to steer AI chatbots, partly with Anthropic's Claude.

[+] Since February Dougan has administered gnews.cz and four affiliated Czech sites that, according to the leaked messages, China pays for, with banner ads bought by the Chinese embassy in Prague, Voxpot reported, and Seznam Zprávy says the Czechs involved may have breached EU sanctions.

[+] Antibot4Navalny tied fake videos on the Krakow shooting to the "Kremlin-aligned Matryoshka network", Demagog found the Pravda network repeating the false Ukraine link and, citing DFRLab's Givi Gigitashvili, accounts linked to Storm-1516 blaming the EU, and NASK reported 4,795 items to platforms in four days.

[+] Poland's ABW said two Ukrainians it detained, suspected of espionage and sabotage for Russian services, set fire to vehicles after changing their plates to resemble Ukrainian army ones, which may have been meant "to direct suspicion at the Ukrainian side".

[+] Estonia's KAPO said the GRU coordinated an attempted arson at drone maker Threod Systems on 14 November, and eight residents of Latvia were detained.

[+] France attributed October's sabotage of refrigeration controllers at some 700 supermarket sites to an IRGC unit that, per the technical report, claims some of its attacks through hacktivist avatars and whose propaganda outlet relayed this one.

[+] Matryoshka launched a campaign against Spain's 29 November election with fakes branded as El País, AFP, Euronews and Reuters, per Maldita.es and Antibot4Navalny.

[+] OCCRP and Delfi Estonia mapped over 500 interviews behind some 1,800 Doppelganger articles, among them at least ten current and former AfD politicians.

[-] Reading the DISARM lines: under every incident, a **disarm** line lists the DISARM Red v1.6.1 techniques evidenced in the sources, grouped by tactic in kill-chain order (plan → prepare → execute → assess). Every ID (e.g. T0085.001) links to its DISARM definition. ~ marks a label inferred rather than stated in a source. Technique names are in the appendix. Responses, context items and overt state actions are not labeled. Each incident has an ID (e.g. W46-007) used in the pattern summary.

Czechia

No Czech authority attributed a new campaign to a foreign state this week. The main exposure came from files leaked from the computers of John Mark Dougan, the EU-sanctioned American whom NewsGuard counts as part of Storm-1516, which Voxpot, Seznam Zprávy and The Gnida Project read as showing him running a network of Czech websites for two Czech communists, with China paying for them according to the leaked messages. Chinese state media published MEP Ondřej Dostál's answers under the name of his colleague and China critic Tomáš Zdechovský, Voxpot counted 4,175 articles taken from EU-sanctioned Russian sources on the website founded by an SPD MEP, and Deník N found that Jang I-ming, acquitted although the court found him a member of Chinese intelligence, left Czechia on a police exit order.

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
12-15 Nov W46-001	Files that hackers leaked on 10 November from the computer of John Mark Dougan, the EU-sanctioned former US police officer in Moscow whom NewsGuard counts as part of Storm-1516, show that since February he has administered General News (gnews.cz) and four affiliated Czech sites for Denisa Petrilaková, a Sinologist in Beijing, and her partner Roman Blaško, a former editor-in-chief of the communist Haló noviny now living in Moscow, and according to the leaked messages China funds the sites, with gnews.cz translating China Media Group articles and taking thousands of dollars from the Chinese embassy in Prague for banner ads, Voxpot reported. Seznam Zprávy adds that in the messages Petrilaková says she works for China's CRI and CGTN, that paying Dougan may have breached EU sanctions, and that a contact linked to RIA Novosti had earlier asked Dougan to buy, for cryptocurrency, domains with "Selský rozum" in their names, which is also the name of a Telegram channel BIS describes as linked to Russian intelligence services. The Gnida Project ties Blaško to Alexander Dugin's Center for Geopolitical Expertise, which it calls Dougan's main employer since early 2021.	John Mark Dougan, directed by Russia's FSB and GRU according to the leaked files as Seznam Zprávy reads them, with China as funder and the Chinese embassy buying banner ads according to the leaked messages as Voxpot reads them. Petrilaková and Blaško did not answer Seznam Zprávy's questions **[media]**	voxpot.cz; seznamzpravy.cz; gnidaproject.substack.com
disarm TA02 T0075.001 · TA06 T0084.004 T0085.008 · TA15 T0091.001 T0093.001 T0147 · TA16 T0098 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0111 T0151.007 T0152.004 · TA11 T0130.001 · TA12 T0134.001			
14 Nov W46-002	Russia's ambassador Anna Ponomareva, joined by the head of the Russian House in Prague, I. V. Girenko, laid a wreath at the memorial by Ludvík Svoboda's birthplace in Hroznatín ahead of his 131st birth anniversary and addressed activists of local "patriotic and veteran organisations", the embassy posted on Telegram. The Russian House is run by Rossotrudnichestvo, which the EU put under sanctions in 2022, investigace.cz has reported.	The Russian embassy in Prague and the Russian House (Rossotrudnichestvo), openly **[official]**	Telegram; investigace.cz
disarm not labeled · overt state action			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
13 Nov W46-003	ČTK found that the Chinese mission to the EU sent MEP Ondřej Krutílek (ODS) a protest letter over his late-October visit to Taiwan for the annual Formosa Club meeting, as it did other MEPs, urging him to respect the one-China principle and avoid official contact with Taiwanese authorities. Krutílek says China "has no right to intimidate MEPs". The same report says Pirate MEP Markéta Gregorová was held for about an hour and a half on arrival in Beijing at the end of October, the only one of a 15-member European Parliament delegation stopped, and that she allows it may be linked to the Jang I-ming trial but has not confirmed that.	The Chinese mission to the EU, openly; Chinese border authorities, per Gregorová, who says she was given no reason **[media]**	epochtimes.cz
disarm not labeled · overt state action			
13 Nov W46-004	Demagog.cz debunked a Facebook post claiming that a left-wing, pro-migrant activist was knocked down and trampled by looters while defending her own shop during the Paris riots. The woman in the video stood outside a Franprix store of the Plesio group controlled by Czech businessman Daniel Křetínský, was pulled aside but not knocked down, and said nothing about migration. Citing RTBF, it says the same story appeared in Arabic on X on 18 October, where it drew over 6.5 million views and 43,000 shares, before spreading in other languages.	Unknown **[unattributed]**	Demagog.cz
disarm TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0023.001 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.008 (actor unknown)			
10-13 Nov W46-005	Chinese state broadcasters CGTN and China Radio International published an interview with MEP Ondřej Dostál (elected for Stačilo!) but attributed all his answers to MEP Tomáš Zdechovský (KDU-ČSL), Hlídací pes reported after Zdechovský protested on X on 10 November; Milan Dobrovolný, a Czech influencer and traveller writing a thesis on Chinese propaganda, had spotted it. Zdechovský says the misattribution was deliberate and that quotes under his name and the names of MEPs from Finland and France have appeared in Chinese media several times. The interview dated, by his account, from 12 October, he wrote to the Chinese ambassador in Prague on 10 November, and by 13 November CGTN had corrected the caption, Epoch Times reported.	CGTN and CRI, Chinese state media, openly. That it was deliberate is Zdechovský's view, and he allows it may have been an editor's gross error **[media]**	hlidacipes.org; epochtimes.cz
disarm TA02 ~T0136.004 · TA06 T0023.001 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0111 T0151.001 T0152.004 · TA17 T0039			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
12 Nov W46-006	Voxpot counted 4,175 articles, about 11% of some 39,000 since 2014, that Nová republika, the website founded by Ivan David, now an SPD MEP, took directly from EU-sanctioned Russian sources, and calls it one of the most prominent spreaders of Russian propaganda in Czechia. Its sources include 1,011 articles from the Rossiya Segodnya holding (RIA Novosti, Sputnik, Ukraina.ru), 737 from RT, 722 from Lenta.ru, 565 from the Strategic Culture Foundation, which the US Treasury ties to the SVR, and 110 from SouthFront and News Front, which the US ties to the FSB. Voxpot ranks the site fourth among the sites it monitors, after cz24.news, AC24 and Infokurýr, with data from Odolné Česko and DruIT.	Russian state media and outlets US authorities tie to Russian intelligence, republished by Nová republika, per Voxpot **[media]**	voxpot.cz
disarm TA06 T0084.004 · TA16 T0097.110 T0098.002 T0143.001 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0111 T0152.004			
12 Nov W46-007	A photo of a demonstrator at a March rally in Lodz was falsely presented as the Kraków attacker, to cast him as a far-left "welcomer of migrants", and spread in Czechia. Deník reports that Michal Poláček, a Motoristé sobě candidate for the Chamber of Deputies from Louny, shared it and that the Facebook page Manifest.cz, with 133,000 followers, carried it on to hundreds of shares; Konkret24 found and contacted the man in the photo.	Unknown; Czech accounts and pages, none tied to a foreign state by Deník **[unattributed]**	denik.cz
disarm TA14 T0004 T0068 · TA06 T0084.003 · TA16 T0097.110 T0143.001 · TA07 T0151.003 T0151.008 (actor unknown)			
11 Nov W46-008	Demagog.cz found false a Facebook post from 19 October by Aleš Svoboda, whom it describes as repeatedly posting invented news about Ukrainians in Czechia, that warned of a new migration wave from Ukraine. The post claimed that neighbouring states were closing their borders, that thousands of Ukrainians arrive in Czechia every week, and that Zelensky threatens 20 million refugees unless the EU pays 70 billion euros. Demagog found that its photo of long queues at the Ukrainian-Polish border was created or edited with AI, that the borders stay open, and that Zelensky's warning referred to a Ukrainian defeat, not to EU money; Interior Minister Lubomír Metnar denied any new migration wave on 20 October.	Unknown beyond the posting account; no foreign link named **[unattributed]**	Demagog.cz
disarm TA06 T0023 T0085 T0086.002 · TA07 T0151.001 (actor unknown)			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
9-11 Nov W46-009	After Foreign Minister Petr Macinka called Russian junior women hockey players "manly" on CNN Prima News, for which he later apologised, Maria Zakharova told Match TV that "only an effeminate man could say such a thing". The Russian embassy in Prague told RIA Novosti that the remark was "extremely unfortunate" and showed that "in a frenzied drive to cut Russia off from everything" many in Europe and Czechia had "forgotten what Russian athletes look like". It also accused Prague of effectively intending not to recognise the 30 September Court of Arbitration for Sport ruling admitting Russian hockey players and noted that Czechia keeps its ban on visas for Russians. **disarm** not labeled · overt state action	The Russian foreign ministry and embassy in Prague, overt statements **[official]**	news.rambler.ru; ria.ru
10 Nov W46-010	Jang I-ming, the Guangming Daily correspondent acquitted on 2 November although the court found he was a member of Chinese intelligence, left Czechia on an exit order from the foreigners' police, his lawyer Michal Sýkora confirmed to Deník N. Deník N writes that investigators and prosecutors had wanted to go on prosecuting him after the non-final acquittal, and the headline quotes the prosecutor as angry that he was not told. An accompanying note says the appeal court still awaits him and Czechia is waiting to see whether China releases a Czech detained in Beijing. **disarm** not labeled · context	Chinese intelligence, per the Prague court's non-final findings. The defendant denies it **[official]**	ceska-justice.cz; Deník N; Deník N
9 Nov W46-011	Čeští elfové's monitoring of Czech disinformation websites for 16-31 October found that the monitored sites, among them Aeronet, Protiproud and Nová republika, covered the war "in the spirit of Russian war propaganda": Ukraine was losing, Zelensky was the biggest obstacle to peace, the war was a NATO proxy war, and the sites repeated Russia's demand that NATO pull back to its pre-1997 positions. The main domestic theme was attacks on public service media and support for abolishing the licence fee, and the sites welcomed the proposed repeal of section 318a of the criminal code, unauthorised activity for a foreign power, as a "return of full freedom of speech". **disarm** TA02 ~T0075.001 ~T0135.001 · TA14 T0004 T0022.001 · TA16 T0098.002 · TA07 T0152.004 (domestic · excluded from FIMI analysis)	The monitored Czech websites, per Čeští elfové; no foreign state named **[researcher]**	Čeští elfové

[-] Background: Dougan has been on the EU sanctions list since December 2025, Seznam Zprávy notes, for receiving Russian support and instructions to influence elections, discredit politicians and manipulate public opinion.

Slovakia

No Slovak authority attributed an information operation to a foreign state this week, and the Russian embassy again pushed Moscow's lines in the open, relaying in Slovak a claim that the events in Bucha were "staged" and Maria Zakharova's answer on Slovakia's refusal, with Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechia, to fund "so-called aid to Ukraine". Prime Minister Robert Fico repeated his claim that the 2003 EU referendum was falsified, for which Hoaxy a podvody found no credible evidence, four Smer MEPs voted against the European Parliament's call for Russia to return deported Ukrainian children, and Russian state broadcaster VGTRK's Vesti.ru carried Lubos Blaha's claim that the deportation figures were invented. GLOBSEC's annual survey found that 38 percent of Slovaks count Russia as a strategic partner.

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
15 Nov W46-012	Demagog.sk found that a photo of Polish tanks shared on Facebook as the army being sent to the borders with Germany and Lithuania to stop migrants, a post of 31 October shared by more than 900 users, shows Leopard tanks at the military parade in Warsaw on 15 August 2018. Poland's border checks with Germany and Lithuania date from July 2025, and by July 2026 some 300 soldiers were helping the Border Guard there, none from units with tanks; Demagog.sk labelled the post as missing context under its partnership with Meta.	Unknown **[unattributed]**	Demagog.sk
disarm TA06 T0084.003 · TA07 T0151.001 · TA11 T0060 (actor unknown)			
13-14 Nov W46-013	GLOBSEC's annual survey, GLOBSEC Trends 2026: The Reality Check, released on 13 November and based on 13,730 respondents in 14 countries polled online by HarrisX from 11 to 19 May, found that 38 percent of Slovaks count Russia as a strategic partner and 23 percent the US, the lowest share for the US among the countries surveyed, STVR reported. Nearly two thirds of Slovaks blame Russia mainly for the war, but more than half agree the invasion was justified by oppression of Russian speakers in Ukraine and 44 percent say Europeans and Americans provoked it, per TA3; "according to GLOBSEC, Slovakia and Hungary are the other countries", after Bulgaria, "where the Kremlin's claims justifying the Russian invasion are most widely spread", The Sofia Globe wrote. Smer MEP Lubos Blaha wrote on Telegram on 14 November that "according to a survey" Slovaks consider Russia a strategic partner, without naming it.	None named, a survey **[researcher]**	spravy.stvr.sk; TA3; sofiaglobe.com; Telegram
disarm not labeled · context			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
10-14 Nov W46-014	Prime Minister Robert Fico said on 10 November that if Chancellor Merz blocked the EU budget to make every state sign up to a 70 billion euros loan for Ukraine, "I will block it too", having called what Merz was doing "typical blackmail"; TASR reported that Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Czechia refuse to contribute. The Russian embassy relayed in Slovak on 12 November Maria Zakharova's 11 November briefing answer "on the refusal of Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Czechia to take part in the so-called aid to Ukraine", in which she said EU money for Ukraine is "poured" "from Brussels to Bankova Street and then back" through "corruption links" and that the necessity of preparing "for war with Russia" is being forced on the EU's population. On 14 November RT, citing TASS quoted Fico saying that without "huge compromises" by all parties to the talks "the strategy of supporting Ukraine in the war to the last Ukrainian soldier with the aim of weakening Russia" would continue.	The Russian foreign ministry, relayed by its embassy in Slovakia, an overt statement; RT carried Fico's words citing TASS. Fico's remarks are his own, and no source links them to the Russian statements **[official]**	teraz.sk; teraz.sk; Telegram; russiatoday.ru
disarm not labeled · overt state action			
11-13 Nov W46-015	Four of the eight MEPs who voted against the European Parliament's 12 November resolution demanding that Russia return deported Ukrainian children, adopted 536 to 8 with 37 abstentions, were from Smer: Lubos Blaha, Erik Kaliňák, Judita Laššáková and Katarína Roth Neveďalová, Pravda reported; the resolution counts 20,651 verified cases of deportation and forcible transfer by September 2026. Blaha wrote on Telegram that forced deportation of Ukrainian children "is just war propaganda" and a "eurohoax" and that the children were evacuated and "in the overwhelming majority Russian", and Deputy Speaker Tibor Gašpar said such resolutions result from "Russophobic ideology", Denník N reported. Blaha's 11 November video, which he said showed MEPs leaving the chamber as Kaja Kallas spoke on the children, was reported on 13 November by Vesti.ru, whose site names its publisher as the state company VGTRK, relaying his claim that the figures on alleged "deportations" were invented in Kyiv and Brussels.	No foreign actor named. Russian state broadcaster VGTRK's Vesti.ru carried Blaha's claims **[media]**	Pravda.sk; teraz.sk; Telegram; Denník N; Telegram; vesti.ru
disarm TA02 ~T0136.001 · TA14 T0004 T0068 · TA16 T0097.110 T0143.001 · TA07 T0151.007 (domestic · excluded from FIMI analysis)			
12 Nov W46-016	Hoaxy a podvody found that a photo of the 7 November Kraków shooter shaking hands with Polish Interior Minister Marcin Kierwinski is a face swap of a 2024 photo of the minister with Krzysztof Kucicki, then a candidate for a local council in Warsaw, and that a photo said to show the shooter at a left-wing protest does not show him, as Konkret24 confirmed with the person pictured. VOX MEP Hermann Tertsch, who later deleted it, and "political groups such as LSNS" shared the protest photo with the claim the shooter was left-wing.	Unknown. Hoaxy a podvody names sharers, not an originator **[unattributed]**	hoaxyapodvody.sk
disarm TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0084.003 T0086.002 · TA16 T0097.110 T0143.001 (actor unknown)			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
9-12 Nov W46-017	The Russian embassy's Slovak-language Telegram channel also relayed Zakharova calling Transparency International Ukraine a "branch of Soros's structure" and the continued funding of "Ukrainian corrupt officials" the result of "a corruption link between the Kyiv regime and Western countries" (9 Nov), her warning that foreign troops in Ukraine would be "legitimate targets" and that "Europeans have nothing to do at the negotiating table" (10 Nov), her description of the European Commission's new sanctions office as a "vertically integrated company for violating international law" (12 Nov), and her account of the UN Third Committee's 10 November adoption, by 117 votes, of Russia's resolution against glorifying Nazism, saying "former members of the Axis", Germany, Italy and Japan, voted against (12 Nov, continued). **disarm** not labeled · overt state action	The Russian foreign ministry, relayed by its embassy in Slovakia, overt statements **[official]**	Telegram; Telegram; Telegram; Telegram; Telegram
11 Nov W46-018	Demagog.sk found more than 30 social media posts, the most viral reaching hundreds of shares, reactions and comments in a few days, claiming the Kraków shooter fought as a mercenary in Ukraine, for the International Legion, the US group Forward Observations Group or Azov, on the strength of a pirate-flag patch on his gear in a PAP photo. From the available images the patch looks far more like the flag attributed to Blackbeard, used in variants by several special forces, than FOG's version, whose skeleton has a goat-like skull, holds a gun and aims its spear at a red letter F; Demagog.sk cites OKO.press's Anna Mierzynska, whose analysis found that "pro-Russian accounts played a significant role" in spreading the claim to several countries. **disarm** TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0085 · TA07 T0151.001 (actor unknown)	None named. Pro-Russian accounts helped spread it, per OKO.press as cited by Demagog.sk **[researcher]**	Demagog.sk
11 Nov W46-019	The media monitoring firm Slovakia Online, part of NEWTON Media Group, added the ratings of Konšpirátori.sk, the public database of websites a panel rates for misleading, conspiratorial or propagandistic content, to its monitoring, so clients see a listed source's rating beside its articles. **disarm** not labeled · response	No actor named, a new tool **[researcher]**	teraz.sk
10 Nov W46-020	A fake graphic under the logo of a nonexistent portal, "PopradDnes", warning of a three-week cut in electricity and water supplies spread on social media in Spišská Nová Ves, Smižany, Poprad and Kežmarok, Spišiakoviny reported, alongside rumours of a 14-day blackout drawn from the interior ministry's crisis brochure, which advises keeping at least 14 days of food and water. The water utility's spokeswoman dismissed the rumours of two-week outages as pure disinformation, and the district office said no outage was planned and "no exercise is taking place". **disarm** TA06 T0023.001 T0086 · TA16 T0097.201 T0097.202 T0143.002 · TA07 T0151.001 · TA08 T0042 (actor unknown)	Unknown **[unattributed]**	spisiakoviny.sk

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
9-10 Nov W46-021	Fico returned on 8 November on social media to his claim that the 2003 EU referendum would not have succeeded had it not been falsified, calling the declared turnout of over 52 percent "pure fabrication", TASR reported, and Defence Minister Robert Kaliňák joined him on 9 November, per Denník N. Peter Mach, who headed the Statistical Office in 2003 and was a vice-chair of the central referendum commission, rejected the claim, saying every member of the commission signed the result without reservation. Hoaxy a podvody found that "even after more than 23 years no credible evidence has been presented" of falsification, with official turnout of 52.15 percent and 92.46 percent voting yes.	No foreign actor named. The claim is Fico's own **[researcher]**	teraz.sk; Denník N; Noviny.sk; hoaxyapodvody.sk
	disarm TA14 T0022.001 · TA16 T0097.110 T0143.001 · TA07 T0151.003 · TA08 T0042 (domestic · excluded from FIMI analysis)		
9 Nov W46-022	The Russian embassy relayed in Slovak a TASS interview of 5 November in which K.M. Logvinov, head of the Russian foreign ministry's department of international organisations, spoke of "the staged events in Bucha", citing the report of an "International Public Tribunal" chaired by M.S. Grigoriev, a member of Russia's Civic Chamber, and an investigation published in early October by an "International Association for Fact-Checking" that he said uncovered "new evidence of falsification".	The Russian foreign ministry, relayed by its embassy in Slovakia, an overt statement **[official]**	Telegram
	disarm TA02 ~T0136.001 · TA14 T0004 · TA16 ~T0097.203 T0097.206 T0097.207 T0143.001 T0143.002 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0111 T0151.007		

[-] Background: On 30 October Demagog.sk rated false a Facebook post calling the Bucha massacre "staged theatre" on the strength of an analysis by what it called "the Russian network GFCN", whose Bucha findings TASS published on 8 October. Russian media call GFCN the "International Association for Fact-Checking" (360.ru), the name the embassy's 9 November post uses.

Poland

The ABW attributed one operation to Russia outright: two Ukrainians it detained burned vehicles for Russian services after fitting them with plates resembling the Ukrainian army's, which it says may have been meant to point suspicion at Ukraine, and prosecutors indicted a helper in last year's rail sabotage for Russian intelligence. The main exposure was Russia's use of the Krakow shooting: Antibot4Navalny and Detector Media tied fake Euronews and DW videos to Matryoshka, Demagog, helped by DFRLab's Givi Gigitashvili, found the Pravda network repeating the false Ukraine link and accounts linked to Storm-1516 blaming the EU, and the digital ministry reported over 2,000 accounts, several dozen of them using Russian or referring to Russia, without saying who runs them. Polish services called the FSB's claim of a Polish spy ring in Kaliningrad "provocation and disinformation", and as "Slava UPA" graffiti appeared on monuments in four cities, a Telegram account offered a journalist 500 dollars to paint one, offers BELPOL says Belarusian or Russian services could be behind.

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
10-15 Nov W46-023	"Slava UPA" was painted in red on monuments in Gdynia, Gdansk, Poznan and Warsaw, among them Warsaw's Monument to the Ghetto Heroes, and police in Gdansk detained a 17-year-old Ukrainian on 11 November over seven of them, Defence24 reported, adding that Ukraine's embassy condemned the damage to the Ghetto monument and suggested Russian services were behind the recruitment, and that Polish services are looking into it. A journalist of the Belarusian opposition outlet MOST who answered a job ad in a Białystok emigrant Telegram chat was offered 500 dollars by an account called "Fast Work PL", tied to an anonymous +888 number, to spray "Slava UPA" on a monument in Poznan, later suggesting a QR code beside it, with similar jobs in Warsaw, Wrocław and Lublin; the recruiter wrote that it would be blamed on "a Russian provocation" anyway, and BELPOL's Uladzimir Zhyhar said Belarusian or Russian services could be behind such offers, as Zaxid relayed. Warsaw mayor Rafał Trzaskowski said the scale of similar incidents in other cities meant "a planned provocation" had to be considered, and historian Dariusz Stola wrote that the line was crossed "most likely with Russian inspiration and with Moscow's money".	An anonymous Telegram recruiter; Belarusian or Russian services suspected by BELPOL, Russian services suggested by Ukraine's embassy as reported by Defence24, not confirmed by Polish authorities **[media]**	defence24.pl; news.zerkalo.io; zaxid.net; WP
disarm TA02 T0079 · TA14 T0083 · TA15 T0091.001 · TA07 T0151.006 T0153.004 T0153.007 · TA10 T0057.002 · TA11 ~T0129.010 T0130.004			
9-15 Nov W46-024	Telewizja Republika's claims during its live coverage of the Krakow attack drew official action. Broadcasting council (KRRiT) chair Agnieszka Glapiak opened an inquiry into the broadcast. On 12 November Krakow regional prosecutors opened an investigation into defamation through mass media and an offence OKO.press describes as assault motivated by xenophobia, racism or religious intolerance, after four complaints about station head Tomasz Sakiewicz's on-air claims that there were no police in the market square and that "a group of foreigners" probably did the shooting. On 15 November Lesser Poland police said that the 141 officers sent from Krakow to Warsaw belonged to the prevention unit, not the city command, and that not one city officer had gone, while Rzeczpospolita counted over 5,000 complaints to KRRiT.	A domestic broadcaster; no foreign actor named **[official]**	cyberdefence24.pl; OKO.press; rp.pl
disarm not labeled · response			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
11-14 Nov W46-025	On Poland's Independence Day Russia's FSB said it had uncovered "a network of agents of the Polish special services" in Kaliningrad and detained two agents of Poland's military intelligence and the ABW, a statement the Russian embassy in Warsaw reposted in Polish. Jacek Dobrzynski, spokesman for the special-services coordinator, called it "yet another provocation and disinformation" and urged people not to amplify the hostile message, while foreign ministry spokesman Maciej Wewiór said the ministry was verifying the reports. OKO.press called the material "evidently stretched", and two native speakers asked by the Russian outlet Agentstvo found errors and unnatural phrasing in the Polish messages the FSB released, one saying "it looks like a translation", Meduza reported.	Russia's FSB, in the open; Polish services call the claim disinformation **[official]**	Telegram; defence24.pl; OKO.press; meduza.io
disarm TA14 T0004 · TA06 ~T0085.008 T0087 · TA16 T0097.206 T0143.001 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0111.001 T0151.007			
13 Nov W46-026	President Karol Nawrocki vetoed the amendment that would have let authorities order illegal online content blocked, the second bill implementing the EU's Digital Services Act, saying the Senate had brought back "the spectre of a censor official" and that citizens feared a "censorship law". Digital minister Krzysztof Gawkowski called it "a black day" for safety online and said the government would prepare another bill, and his deputy Dariusz Standerski called the president's claim that one comment could get a whole platform blocked "classic disinformation". Notes from Poland notes that Poland still has not fully implemented the DSA.	No foreign actor, a policy step **[official]**	cyberdefence24.pl ; cyberdefence24.pl; Notes from Poland
disarm not labeled · context			
13 Nov W46-027	Konkret24 found that a video of "boxers" beating Ukrainian recruitment officers in a gym, shared in Polish with almost 470,000 views on one post, looks staged and dates from May: Ihor Mosiychuk, a former Ukrainian MP whose activity Ukraine's CCD classes as pro-Russian propaganda, posted it on Facebook on 27 May 2026. Konkret24 cites the regional outlet IPC South, which reported that the film spread on Russian propaganda channels in May and that readers placed the gym in Shchaslyvtseve on the Russian-occupied Arabat Spit, and says Russian propaganda is trying to use anger over mobilisation, "in this case by preparing a staged film".	Russian propaganda, per Konkret24 drawing on IPC South **[researcher]**	konkret24.tvn24.pl
disarm TA02 ~T0139.001 · TA14 T0083 · TA06 T0084.003 T0087 · TA07 T0151.001 ~T0151.007 ~T0151.008 · TA11 T0060			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
11-13 Nov W46-028	In her briefing of 11 November, which the Russian embassy posted in Polish on 12 November under the heading "On threats to security and social stability in Poland", Russia's foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova condemned the Krakow attack, in which a Russian woman was wounded, and repeated the ministry's advice to Russians to avoid travel to Poland "because the socio-political situation in this country continues to deteriorate". The embassy also wrote on the 60th anniversary of the first Soviet broadcast of the series "Four Tank-Men and a Dog" that "official Warsaw" had set a course to erase Polish-Soviet brotherhood in arms and demolish monuments, and called the ban on Russian ski jumpers at World Cup events in Wisła and Zakopane "openly anti-Russian". **disarm** not labeled · overt state action	Russia's foreign ministry and embassy in Warsaw, in the open **[official]**	Telegram; Telegram; Telegram
12-13 Nov W46-029	Independence March day brought new AI fakes, in what CyberDefence24 called another occasion to use generated material "to build reach or stoke tensions". Konkret24 showed that an aerial "march" photo posted by PiS MEP Anna Zalewska (over 100,000 views, deleted the next day) and Konfederacja MP Konrad Berkowicz (almost 40,000) shows a metro entrance that does not exist and leaves out real towers such as Varso, with a detector putting the chance of AI at 94.3%, and that a video shared as this year's march was posted no later than 1 August 2023 and likely shows a Warsaw Uprising anniversary. Deputy digital minister Dariusz Standerski said unlabelled deepfakes should be among the first cases for the new AI supervisory commission, possibly with "the first penalties". **disarm** TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0084.003 T0086.002 · TA16 T0097.110 T0143.001 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.008 (domestic · excluded from FIMI analysis)	Polish politicians and users, per Konkret24. No foreign actor named **[researcher]**	cyberdefence24.pl ; konkret24.tvn24.pl; cyberdefence24.pl
12 Nov W46-030	Detector Media analysed 145 posts from 68 Russian- and Polish-language Telegram channels between 7 and 9 November, using data from LetsData, and found 107 of them (74%) came from channels LetsData labels "destructive actors", such as Ukraina.ru, RT, Tsargrad, Ostashko and Oleg Tsaryov. The claim tying the attacker to Ukraine appeared in at least 43 posts in 32 channels, and surfaced before any official comment. The version about a Forward Observations Group patch first appeared in the dataset on Ukraina.ru, citing Shot, and within an hour and a half was on RT, Tsargrad, Ostashko and Oleg Tsaryov; the channels that spread it have about 3.7 million subscribers in all. A false report that the wounded Russian woman had died reached over 900,000 subscribers before the Russian embassy denied it about two hours later. The study found Telewizja Republika the most-used Polish source of footage, which it says is not direct evidence of the station's ties to Russia. StopFake republished it. **disarm** TA02 ~T0079 T0135.003 · TA14 T0004 T0068 T0083 · TA06 T0084.001 T0085 · TA07 T0111 T0151.007 · TA08 T0044	Russian and pro-Russian Telegram channels and Russian state media, per Detector Media **[researcher]**	ms.detector.media ; StopFake

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
12 Nov W46-031	StopFake rated false a claim, spread by "a number of pro-Russian sources" after a Krakow-based Ukrainian blogger's post about dating, that sexually transmitted infections in Poland rose eighteenfold because of Ukrainians. Data from Poland's public health institute show syphilis cases rising from 1,403 in 2021 to 2,968 in 2023, and StopFake says migration from Ukraine affected the figures mainly for HIV, to a degree that cannot be measured precisely. **disarm** TA06 T0023 (actor unknown)	Unnamed pro-Russian sources, per StopFake **[researcher]**	StopFake
12 Nov W46-032	The National Prosecutor's Office indicted a Ukrainian, Volodymyr B., for taking part in Russian intelligence activity against Poland and helping two other Ukrainians with the sabotage of rail line 7 near Mika and Gołąb in autumn 2025, including driving one of them to reconnoitre the site in September 2025. Prosecutors say the attacks were meant "to seriously intimidate many people and influence public opinion"; the two alleged perpetrators, whom Notes from Poland names as Yevhenii Ivanov and Oleksandr Kononov, left Poland on 16 November 2025 and are wanted under Interpol red notices. **disarm** not labeled · context	Russian intelligence, per the National Prosecutor's Office **[official]**	infosecurity24.pl ; Notes from Poland
12 Nov W46-033	The ABW published excerpts of an interview with its deputy head, Colonel Małgorzata Zochowska, saying the agency had checked whether the avalanche of "Bloody Friday" rumours of further attacks after October's school stabbings "could have been inspired from outside", and that "such a scenario was not confirmed"; social panic, unverified reports and limited trust in official messages had driven it. It added that false information and ready-made interpretations spread in the same way after the Krakow attack. **disarm** not labeled · context	No foreign actor found, per the ABW **[official]**	abw.gov.pl
9-11 Nov W46-034	Antibot4Navalny said the "Kremlin-aligned Matryoshka network" was weaponizing the Krakow shooting to drive a wedge between Ukraine and France, Germany, Italy and Poland, claiming the shooter was a pro-Ukrainian mercenary or worked for Ukraine's SBU, that aid to Ukraine left Polish police underfunded, and that weapons resold by Ukraine will enable more violence, with videos that seem to have been spliced from real news reports, organic reach "typically under 1K" views per post and copies on Tumblr; CyberDefence24 relayed it. Detector Media found fakes branded Euronews, DW, WSJ, Time and CNN, two posted on X on 9 November with over 245,000 views each when recorded, one using a real statement by the Lesser Poland police spokeswoman with false claims only in burned-in subtitles, and the same videos posted almost simultaneously by five Tumblr accounts with generated names, the first time it has seen the campaign there. **disarm** TA02 T0079 ~T0135.002 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0087.002 · TA15 T0150.008 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.008 · TA17 T0039 T0119.002	Matryoshka, a "Kremlin-aligned" network per Antibot4Navalny; a Russian campaign by its hallmarks, per Detector Media **[researcher]**	bsky.app; cyberdefence24.pl; Detector Media

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
10 Nov W46-035	Demagog traced how Russian and pro-Russian sources used the Krakow attack: the false link to Forward Observations Group, posted on X before 7 pm on the day of the attack by accounts Demagog knows for spreading disinformation, was taken up by the Telegram channel Olej w Głowie, the Polish-language Pravda site and International Radio Belarus, and after 8:30 pm by the Russian Telegram channel SHOT, which belongs to News Media Holding, linked to the EU-sanctioned Aram Gabrelyanov. DFRLab analyst Givi Gigitashvili sent Demagog posts from accounts linked to Storm-1516: one suggested the attacker had links to "Ukrainian Nazis", while more blamed the Polish government and the EU, one claiming the EU was staging attacks in Poland because its coup had failed; one such post by "The Architect" drew 12,000 reactions and over 80,000 views. Demagog says the Pravda sites have "proven ties to Russia" and also cites Matryoshka videos flagged by Antibot4Navalny.	Accounts linked to Storm-1516, per DFRLab's Gigitashvili via Demagog; Shot, the Pravda network and International Radio Belarus, per Demagog **[researcher]**	Demagog
	disarm TA02 ~T0079 · TA14 T0004 T0022.001 T0068 · TA06 T0085 · TA16 T0098.002 · TA07 T0111 T0151.007 T0151.008 T0152.004		
10 Nov W46-036	The ABW said it detained two Ukrainians in Minsk Mazowiecki on 3 November who, on behalf of Russian special services, reconnoitred military and critical infrastructure sites across Poland and set fire to vehicles, first changing their number plates to resemble those of Ukrainian army vehicles, which "may have been meant to hinder establishing the real background of the events and to direct suspicion at the Ukrainian side". They were paid partly in cryptocurrency, charged with espionage and sabotage, and remanded for three months.	Russian special services, per the ABW **[official]**	abw.gov.pl
	disarm TA15 T0091.001 · TA10 T0127.002 · TA11 T0129.010 T0130.004		
10 Nov W46-037	Konkret24 showed "how Russia tried to play" the Krakow attack: News.ru and Russian-language Telegram tied the Polish attacker to Ukraine through a Blackbeard pirate patch that differs from Forward Observations Group's logo, and a LiveJournal user called him "an admirer of Ukraine and LGBT" on the strength of an image of a masked gunman with a Ukrainian flag that three detectors found entirely AI-generated. Konkret24 quotes SPRAVDI as saying X was heavily promoting thousands of posts with that image to Polish audiences, with at least 10 million views in 48 hours, and says former Polish judge Tomasz Szmydt, who fled to Belarus in 2024, repeated the patch story on Vladimir Solovyov's online channel on 8 November and suggested Ukrainian services were involved.	Russian and pro-Russian sources, per Konkret24 **[researcher]**	konkret24.tvn24.pl
	disarm TA02 ~T0079 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0085 T0086.002 · TA16 T0097.102 T0100.001 T0143.001 · TA07 T0111 ~T0151.007 T0151.008 T0152.001		

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
10 Nov W46-038	Photos of fake leaflets bearing the Independence March logo, said to be posted around Warsaw, spread online with a QR code that led not to an auction for the march, as advertised, but to an altered image of the Krakow attacker with a red-and-black flag, which TVP Info links to the OUN and UPA, and the words "WE CAN REPEAT IT 11.11"; march spokesman Rafał Buca told TVP Info it was meant to frighten people off and announced legal steps.	Unknown **[unattributed]**	tvp.info
	disarm TA02 T0139.003 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0085.004 T0086.003 · TA16 T0097.208 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.001 T0153.004 · TA10 T0057.002 (actor unknown)		
10 Nov W46-039	Demagog rated false a 9 November Facebook post by MP Marek Jakubiak that Warsaw police had declared "the highest alert level", which publicist Cezary Gmyz had posted on X before writing four minutes later that it had been called off; police and the interior ministry denied it, and commenters had read the supposed alert as a move against the Independence March, which Prime Minister Tusk said nobody intended to ban.	A Polish MP and publicist, per Demagog. No foreign actor named **[researcher]**	Demagog
	disarm TA06 T0085 · TA16 T0097.110 T0143.001 · TA07 T0151.003 (domestic · excluded from FIMI analysis)		
10 Nov W46-040	Konkret24 found that a video and photo of UK defence secretary Wes Streeting in a skirt, heels and a handbag at the 8 November Remembrance Sunday ceremony are obvious fakes, probably made with AI; an English post had 1.9 million views on X and a Polish one 760,000, from accounts Konkret24 says are known for spreading fakes.	Unknown **[unattributed]**	konkret24.tvn24.pl
	disarm TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0086.002 T0087.001 · TA07 T0151.008 (actor unknown)		
8-10 Nov W46-041	Digital minister Krzysztof Gawkowski said over 2,000 accounts had been reported to platforms for spreading false narratives about the Krakow attack, among them automated bots posting in several languages and "several dozen accounts" using Russian or referring to Russia, "signals that need special attention, although their presence alone does not settle the origin or coordination of the whole operation", with the top false narratives passing 250 million views in 24 hours. Per NASK, Super Biznes reported, the claim that the government staged the attack with the EU's involvement may have reached 200 million views, the claim that the attacker was a soldier almost 18 million, and the claim that the government organised the attack to get the Independence March cancelled 5.6 million; NASK's spokeswoman told PAP it reported 4,795 items to platforms between 7 and 10 November.	Unnamed accounts, some Russian-language, per the digital ministry and NASK; no state named **[official]**	cyberdefence24.pl; superbiz.se.pl; xyz.pl
	disarm TA02 T0135.003 T0135.004 · TA14 T0022.001 T0068 · TA06 T0085 · TA05 T0101 · TA17 T0049.003 (actor unknown)		

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
9 Nov W46-042	INFO OPS Polska traced the Krakow attack through Russian media: EADaily's 7 November headline "The Krakow shooter may be a mercenary of the Ukrainian Armed Forces", citing Shot's post of 8:37 pm, Moskovsky Komsomolets' "Poland on the brink of explosion" citing Bloomberg, and Kommersant's false report that the wounded Russian woman had died, corrected after the Russian embassy denied it, which INFO OPS Polska says probably came from misreading a Polish ministry statement. It found five lines of attack, from undermining aid to Ukraine to deepening domestic divisions, and says the narratives reinforce each other "without the need for central coordination".	Russian state media, news sites and Telegram channels, per INFO OPS Polska **[researcher]**	disinfodigest.pl
	disarm TA02 ~T0079 T0135.002 T0135.003 T0135.004 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0085 · TA05 T0016 · TA07 T0111 T0151.007 · TA08 T0042		
9 Nov W46-043	Fakes about the Krakow attacker kept coming. Konkret24 showed that an image of interior minister Marcin Kierwinski shaking the attacker's hand, posted on Facebook under the name Mariusz Jan Frankiewicz and shared over 900 times, is AI-made, and the ministry's spokeswoman said profiles linked to TV Republika spread it and that the case goes to prosecutors. It also found that a man at a pro-refugee march, whom Vox MEP Hermann Tertsch and Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, a social adviser to the president, presented as the attacker, is someone else, and Demagog showed that a man pictured beside the attacker, labelled a PO or PiS activist, works for the Polish Committee for Standardization.	Polish posters and politicians and a Spanish MEP, per Konkret24 and Demagog. No state actor named **[researcher]**	konkret24.tvn24.pl; konkret24.tvn24.pl; Demagog
	disarm TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0023.001 T0084.003 T0086.002 · TA16 T0097.110 T0143.001 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.002 T0151.008 · TA11 ~T0129.009 (domestic · excluded from FIMI analysis)		

[-] Background: According to the MOST material carried by Zerkalo, in July 2026 prosecutors sent to court the case of a Ukrainian, Illia K., accused of 47 offences, among them sabotage, for painting "Slava UPA" and red-and-black flags on monuments from November 2024 to August 2025. The rail sabotage near Mika for which Volodymyr B. was indicted took place on 15 November 2025, when an explosive was detonated under a freight train, per InfoSecurity24.

Germany and Austria

No German or Austrian authority attributed a new information operation to a foreign state this week, and German security authorities still have not said who hacked supermarket cooling systems in Germany after France blamed a unit of Iran's Revolutionary Guards for its cases. The main exposure was the leak of John Mark Dougan's files, which CORRECTIV says confirm his work for the Moscow centre that European and US authorities hold behind Storm-1516 and include a contact's November 2024 suggestion that "it is possible to help pro-Russian forces" in Germany's coming election, while OCCRP and Delfi Estonia found at least ten current and former AfD politicians among the people interviewed for Doppelganger outlets. The Bundestag passed an intelligence reform that lets the BND disable servers of state hackers and disinformation actors, and Austria's government agreed a tougher espionage law that also punishes "throwaway agents".

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
11-15 Nov W46-044	Germany: CORRECTIV, which saw the leaked files in advance with The Insider, says they confirm that John Mark Dougan in effect worked for Valery Korovin's Center for Geopolitical Expertise, which European and US authorities hold behind Storm-1516 and to which the federal government attributed Storm-1516's campaign against the 2025 Bundestag election. The files show payments from 2022 by Yuri Khoroshevsky, whom the Washington Post, citing a European intelligence service's documents, placed in GRU unit 29155, and a Signal contact saved as "Vlad FSB" suggesting in November 2024 work on Germany, France, Poland or Britain, as with the coming Bundestag election "it is possible to help pro-Russian forces"; CORRECTIV found no concrete trace of work on that election in the leak, and Dougan, who says he advises the centre, denies taking money from anyone named Yuri and any link to election interference. The Gnida Project adds that Dougan sent a press card of the Czech site General News to Liane Kilinc, whom it describes as an exposed FSB agent, and that she has used the website of her association, the East German Board of Associations, to post Storm-1516 and R-FBI content.	Storm-1516 and the Center for Geopolitical Expertise, per European and US authorities and the federal government as cited by CORRECTIV; the GRU link per the Washington Post **[official]**	CORRECTIV; gnidaproject.substack.com
disarm TA01 T0073 · TA02 T0136.006 · TA06 T0084.002 T0085.001 · TA15 T0091.001 · TA16 T0097.102 T0098.001 T0143.002 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0152.004 T0154.001 · TA11 T0129.006 T0130.001 · TA12 T0132			
12-14 Nov W46-045	Germany: Stefan Keuter, deputy leader of the AfD's Bundestag group, withdrew in a short statement his remark at a 2 November AfD press conference that the group has contacts with the US State Department and with Russia's foreign ministry and presidential administration "and of course on both sides also with the affiliated intelligence services", calling it "unintentionally misleading and factually incorrect", dpa reports. Group leader Tino Chrupalla reportedly warned that such remarks could bring an accusation of high treason, dpa says it remains unclear whom Keuter meant, and Tagesspiegel reports the matter reached the Bundestag floor.	No actor named; who Keuter meant is unclear, per dpa **[media]**	boerse.de; Tagesspiegel
disarm not labeled · context			
11-14 Nov W46-046	Austria: profil's faktiv found unsupported a 9 November post by FPÖ MP Susanne Fuerst, the party's foreign and EU policy spokeswoman, that the Krakow gunman of 7 November "was probably a left-wing rainbow/Refugees Welcome activist", written in reply to Foreign Minister Beate Meinl-Reisinger calling him a right-wing extremist; Polish ministers point to far-right ideology, the motive is not established, and the FPÖ said the post was deliberately worded in the subjunctive. APA-Faktencheck found the left-wing claim cannot be backed up, that an image purported to show the attacker with a Ukrainian-flag patch was made or altered with AI, and that a Lodz demonstrator shown as him is someone else, citing dpa.	None named. Spread among others by FPÖ MP Susanne Fuerst, per profil **[unattributed]**	profil; apa.at
disarm TA14 T0004 T0068 · TA06 T0084.003 T0086.002 · TA16 T0097.110 T0143.001 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.008 (actor unknown)			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
13 Nov W46-047	Germany: the Bundestag passed the intelligence services reform by 308 votes to 190 with 71 abstentions, CDU/CSU and SPD for, AfD and Die Linke against, the Greens abstaining. Under the government's explanatory memorandum the BND may act "(proactively)" in a specific threat situation from foreign powers, which according to the interior ministry includes shutting down or disabling servers of state hacker groups or disinformation actors. Chancellery minister Nina Warken said foreign powers "disguise sabotage as an accident, espionage as business and propaganda as opinion", the Greens' Konstantin von Notz spoke of a Russian "shadow war" with "state-terrorist attacks", and Die Linke's Clara Buenger said Interior Minister Dobrindt was creating a "new German secret police". **disarm** not labeled · response	No actor named, a policy step **[official]**	bundestag.de
11-13 Nov W46-048	Germany: Russia's ambassador in Berlin, Sergei Nechayev, told TASS on 11 November that solving the "terrorist attack" on Nord Stream is a "litmus test" for German justice and that the question of compensation should follow, the embassy posted. Deputy foreign minister Dmitry Lyubinsky told TASS on 13 November that "stories have been deliberately planted in the Western media" so that those who ordered the sabotage escape, and contrasted the Hamburg trial with how quickly, he said, German authorities blamed Russia for the Leipzig drone incident. **disarm** not labeled · overt state action	The Russian foreign ministry and its embassy in Berlin, overt statements **[official]**	Telegram; Telegram
12 Nov W46-049	Germany: Russia's embassy in Berlin relayed in German a statement by the press bureau of the SVR, Russia's foreign intelligence service, claiming that Brussels regards more than a million Ukrainian men living in the EU as suitable "consumables" for the war and plans to push them home by restricting their access to financial services, jobs and rented housing. **disarm** not labeled · overt state action	The SVR, relayed by the Russian embassy in Berlin, overt statements **[official]**	Telegram
10-12 Nov W46-050	Germany: after France on 9 November attributed the October hacks of supermarket cooling systems to the Shahid Kaveh unit, which it ties to Iran's Revolutionary Guards, Mimikama noted that the French attribution does not cover the German cases, which need findings of their own. German security authorities have still not determined who is behind the attacks on supermarkets in Germany, dpa reports, while Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt called the attacks a hybrid attack "next level" that needs an "answer next level" and said Germany is creating the legal basis "to strike back in cyberspace". **disarm** not labeled · context	The IRGC's Shahid Kaveh unit for the French cases, per France; unknown for Germany, per German security authorities as reported by dpa **[official]**	Mimikama; Tagesspiegel

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
9-12 Nov W46-051	Austria: Russia's delegation to the Vienna negotiations on military security and arms control held a round table in Vienna on 9 November titled "Militarisation of Europe: what next?", opened by deputy foreign minister Sergei Ryabkov by video, Unser Mitteleuropa reports, with delegation head Yulia Zhdanova saying Europe is "only one step from the edge of the abyss". Russia's embassy in Berlin then posted excerpts of Ryabkov's speech in German, including his claims that NATO and EU states effectively steer the war, take part in preparing sabotage on Russian territory, and that Ukraine is "only a puppet of the West". One of the four Russian diplomats Austria expelled in October was a member of that delegation, ORF notes.	The Russian foreign ministry and its Vienna delegation, overt statements **[official]**	unser-mitteleuropa.com; Telegram; Telegram; orf.at
	disarm not labeled · overt state action		
11 Nov W46-052	Austria: the government agreed a tougher espionage law and sent the draft to consultation, to apply from mid-February: spying against Austria will carry up to ten years, spying against EU bodies and international organisations based in Austria up to five, and both recruiting agents and letting oneself be recruited become offences, aimed at what state secretary Jörg Leichtfried called "throwaway agents" hired for one-off jobs such as photographing a facility. Foreign Minister Beate Meinl-Reisinger said 63 entry visas have been refused and eight Russian diplomats expelled since the coalition took office, the FPÖ warned of risks to free speech and journalism, and the Greens said a cross-government strategy against disinformation campaigns and hybrid threats is still missing.	No actor named, a policy step **[official]**	orf.at
	disarm not labeled · response		
11 Nov W46-053	Germany: CORRECTIV found that a nursery notice renaming this year's St Martin's procession a "festival of lights" so that all children feel included, shared on X in early November with about 200,000 views to stir hostility toward migrants, comes from an AI video whose maker, an Instagram account that labels its posts as AI, told CORRECTIV he had made it and marked it as AI, and Volksverpetzer found no real case of a procession renamed or cancelled for religious reasons.	None named. One spreading account showed an AfD logo, per CORRECTIV **[unattributed]**	CORRECTIV; volksverpetzer.de
	disarm TA02 T0140.003 · TA06 T0084.003 T0086.002 T0087.001 · TA07 T0151.008 · TA11 ~T0129.009 (actor unknown)		

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
10 Nov W46-054	Germany: following up on the "torture chamber" story that AfD leader Alice Weidel and BSW founder Sahra Wagenknecht shared, tagesschau's faktenfinder found no evidence of a torture site and reports that one post was viewed more than 14 million times, that Russia's foreign ministry shared the teenager's images on X, and that they also appeared on fake front pages styled as Euronews, La Croix and Libération, which experts including antibot4navalny attribute to the Russian campaign Matryoshka. The woman who posed as an emergency doctor, a cosmetic surgeon per slidstvo.info, has been remanded for 60 days.	Matryoshka for the fake front pages, per antibot4navalny as cited by tagesschau; Ukrainian authorities suspect the protests were organised, but there is so far no evidence of Russian involvement in organising them, per tagesschau **[researcher]**	tagesschau.de
disarm TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0023 T0086.003 · TA16 T0097.102 T0097.202 T0097.206 T0143.001 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.008			
10 Nov W46-055	Germany: at least ten current and former AfD politicians gave interviews published on Doppelganger outlets, the largest share of any party, OCCRP and Delfi Estonia found, among them Berlin deputy Gunnar Lindemann, who said he talks to all journalists, and former MEP Gunnar Beck, who said he never knowingly spoke to these organisations. BSW local politician Frederick Brossart, quoted in at least four articles on the Doppelganger site Militärblatt, gave another interview to the Doppelganger outlet RRN on 9 October although journalists had asked him about Militärblatt in July; he admitted his checks were not thorough enough and said he never knowingly cooperated with a Russian disinformation network.	Doppelganger, which OCCRP, citing researchers and US and European authorities, places with the Social Design Agency **[media]**	occrp.org
disarm TA02 T0136.006 · TA15 T0091.002 · TA16 T0097.102 T0098.001 T0098.002 T0100.001 T0143.002 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0152.004 T0153.007 · TA11 T0128.005 T0130.001			
10 Nov W46-056	Germany: Myth Detector found that Russian-language Facebook accounts posted on 1 November a speech by AfD MP René Springer with a fabricated Russian voiceover in which he calls Ursula von der Leyen a "traitor" and Zelensky the "destroyer of Ukraine", when his 15 October speech was about taxes, pensions and social and immigration policy.	Russian-language Facebook accounts, per Myth Detector. No state named **[researcher]**	mythdetector.com
disarm TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA06 T0087.002 T0088.001 · TA16 T0143.004 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0151.001 T0152.006 (actor unknown)			

[-] Background: Austria declared four Russian diplomats persona non grata on 23 October, three from the embassy and one from Russia's OSCE delegation, ORF reported; the fourth belonged to the delegation for military security and arms control, ORF added on 11 November.

Ukraine

The SBU said Russia had sharply stepped up information and psychological operations against the service itself, partly built on NABU's corruption investigations, the CCD said official Russian state and diplomatic institutions openly back #RussiaIsNotMyEnemy, and the CCD and HUR listed Rossotrudnichestvo officials, after which the CCD reported Telegram networks whitewashing the agency. The main exposures were InfoLight.UA's map of the wave around an interview with a man presented as the "Mexican" from NABU's "Carthage" tapes, whose Russian segment it calls coordinated, and SPRAVDI's count that hostile FIMI resources produced 16,014 of 20,388 world media mentions of Ukraine on 6-8 November, ahead of the Abu Dhabi talks, about 90% of them on the Pravda network.

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
14-15 Nov W46-057	An interview with a man presented as Yehor Burkin, the "Mexican" from NABU's "Carthage" tapes, went out on blogger Vasyl Tymoshenko's YouTube channel late on 13 November, and InfoLight.UA counted 1,498 publications from 957 sources in 21 hours, republished by Detector Media. It found the Ukrainian 90% of the wave behaved like a live reaction, but the Russian segment, 118 publications from 77 sources, came in volleys: ten Telegram channels with about 131,000 subscribers posted the same text within one minute, the Pravda network's automatic translations followed within three to six minutes, and after Diana Panchenko's post the line "paid the security services" became "Zelensky is in on it" in Ukraina.ru's headline, with RT and the Pravda network following within minutes, although the speaker says he had no link to the president. InfoLight stresses that the speaker's identity is unconfirmed, and journalists Denys Kazanskyi and Danylo Mokryk said they had turned down the same interview, offered from an unknown account, Mokryk by email on 9 November.	Unknown for the interview; a coordinated Russian Telegram and Pravda network segment, per InfoLight.UA **[researcher]**	infolight.ua; detector.media; detector.media

disarm TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0023 T0084.001 T0085 · TA16 T0097.102 T0098.002 T0143.001 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0111 T0151.007 T0152.004

9-15 Nov W46-058	CCD media literacy head Ivan Slychko said that after Ukraine's strikes on Russian data centres, technical failures halved the output of the Pravda, InfoDefense and Nod of Time networks, with activity recovering after about 12 hours through manual control or backup capacity. Olesia Horiainova of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center, writing in CEPA's Europe's Edge, found less: researchers saw temporary disruption to some automated Russian networks, "there is little evidence that the strikes degraded its broader influence operations", which run on many servers, cloud platforms and residential connections. SPRAVDI's own analysis says six of the twelve large data centres of Yandex, VK and Sberbank were hit in October and that physical destruction blocks bots.	The Pravda, InfoDefense and Nod of Time networks, per the CCD **[official]**	CCD Telegram; cepa.org; SPRAVDI

disarm not labeled · context

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
9-15 Nov W46-059	The CCD rebutted posts claiming that on 17 November a cyberattack would "zero" bank accounts and switch off the internet worldwide for three months, urging people to stock food, water and cash: they cite real government advice on emergency supplies and tie the rumour to a 17 November test of the US alert system, which is only a radio and TV message. SPRAVDI added that the posts cite "darknet" sources and urge stocking weapons too, and the CCD said on 15 November that Russian resources had picked up the conspiracy theory and added claims about problems in Ukraine's banking and energy systems. **disarm** TA02 T0135.003 · TA14 T0022.001 · TA06 T0085 · TA08 ~T0042	Origin not named; amplified by Russian resources, per the CCD **[official]**	CCD Telegram; Telegram; CCD Telegram
12-14 Nov W46-060	The SBU and police have detained 13 participants in the 2 November clash at the National Guard post in Petropavlivska Borshchahivka, among them an 18-year-old who spent four and a half years in occupied territory and hit a police car and a National Guard bus with a sledgehammer, and found that one organiser posed as a private clinic's surgeon with a forged ID; seven are in custody on suspicion of obstructing the armed forces and disclosing troop locations. The military ombudsman's office told Hromadske that several servicemen who were at the post were "probably" subjected to violence and sent their statements to the State Bureau of Investigation and the Prosecutor General's Office, and Zelensky said the incident was planned, based on materials he had seen. **disarm** not labeled · context	Unnamed organisers, per the SBU; planned, per Zelensky, who names no one **[official]**	Telegram; hromadske.ua; Telegram
11-14 Nov W46-061	ISW said Russian officials used the Abu Dhabi talks to push "Russia's carefully crafted fictional version of the frontline", after Zelensky said Russian military and intelligence officials falsely claimed control of half the part of Donbas Ukraine still holds, and that US negotiators confirmed Ukraine's assessment, and that Putin repeated his false claim to hold Kostyantynivka in proposing a "humanitarian mission" there, a false parallel with Oleshky Peskov pressed on 13 November. The CCD called false Russian claims to have taken Voskresenka in Zaporizhzhia region, more than 20 km behind the line. **disarm** not labeled · overt state action	The Kremlin and Russian officials, per ISW, and Russian forces, per the CCD **[researcher]**	ISW; ISW; ISW; CCD Telegram

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
9-14 Nov W46-062	The CCD described a push to bind children and youth in occupied areas to the war: a meeting of "front-line writers" with Denis Pushilin in occupied Donetsk told to produce militarised books, comics, animation and films for young people, in exchange for grants; a 16.5 hectare "Patriot" park built there with Moscow's city budget for "military-patriotic education"; and, for adults, occupation heads urging residents to apply to a new intake of the "Time of Heroes" programme, which the Kremlin sells as a "social lift" for veterans of the war. The SBU detained a former head of an out-of-school education centre in Yevpatoria, lured out of Crimea, on suspicion of collaboration for drawing pupils aged 5 to 18 into militarised propaganda events with training by Russian servicemen, and SPRAVDI, citing Agentstvo, reported a drone operators' contest for schoolchildren advertised through Russia's Gosuslugi portal, which Sergei Kiriyenko said would help "contribute to defence capability". **disarm** not labeled · overt state action	Russia and its occupation authorities, per the CCD and the SBU **[official]**	CCD Telegram; CCD Telegram; CCD Telegram; Telegram; Telegram
13 Nov W46-063	The CCD said YouTube had blocked in Ukraine 16 Russian channels spreading propaganda and pro-war content, among them those of war correspondent Alexander Sladkov and Z-blogger Sergei Kolyasnikov (Zergulio), pro-war performers, "Russkiye skleyki SVO", "Sevastopolsky korrespondent" and foreign-language channels of the cartoon "Masha and the Bear". **disarm** not labeled · response	Russian propagandists, Z-bloggers and pro-war artists, per the CCD, reporting YouTube's action **[official]**	CCD Telegram
13 Nov W46-064	SPRAVDI rebutted Russian military expert Yuri Knutov's claim that Ukraine tested a nuclear weapon and that tremors felt in several regions came from a secret explosion, saying he relied on eyewitness reports of vibrations and that claims of French or British nuclear technology for Kyiv rest on statements by Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service; Detector Media relayed the rebuttal. **disarm** TA02 T0136.002 · TA06 T0085	Yuri Knutov and Russian propaganda, per SPRAVDI **[official]**	Telegram; Detector Media
13 Nov W46-065	SPRAVDI rebutted Viktor Medvedchuk's claim that Zelensky had made Ukraine a hub of international drug trafficking covered up by law enforcement, saying he offered no statistics, investigations or court rulings, repeated rumours of drug use attributed to the sanctioned Yulia Mendel, who admitted she had not seen anything herself, and leaned on Maria Zakharova's remarks about Zelensky's appearance. **disarm** TA02 T0135.001 · TA06 T0023 T0085	Viktor Medvedchuk, per SPRAVDI **[official]**	Telegram

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
12-13 Nov W46-066	The Insider found that the Russian state outlet Vesti quoted former Communist MP Spyrydon Kilinkarov claiming EU countries run a "corruption scheme" charging Ukrainian refugees 1,000 to 5,000 euros to sort out passports, when Ukrainian passports abroad are issued by Ukraine's consulates and the state enterprise Dokument, and no criminal case, victim account or investigation of such extortion exists; SPRAVDI rebutted the same claim and StopFake republished The Insider's check.	Vesti and Spyrydon Kilinkarov, per The Insider **[researcher]**	theins.ru; Telegram; StopFake
disarm TA02 T0079 · TA06 T0085 · TA16 T0100.001 · TA07 T0111 · TA08 T0042			
12-13 Nov W46-067	The Institute of Mass Information documented TikTok videos dressed as TV news, with the TSN logo and AI-generated presenters and voices, announcing a non-existent 15,000 hryvnia state payment, 5,000 hryvnia from mobile operators, "mobilisation of women" and a "third gender", and sending viewers through profile links to anonymous Telegram channels; it says the videos cannot show whether their authors are linked or who profits, and StopFake republished the study.	Unknown, described by IMI as fraudsters **[unattributed]**	IMI; StopFake
disarm TA02 ~T0137.002 · TA14 T0083 · TA06 T0087.001 T0088.001 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.002 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.008 · TA17 T0122 (actor unknown)			
10-13 Nov W46-068	SPRAVDI tracked old labels pinned on new pegs: 201 publications on "Nazism" and 80 on "total corruption" in Ukraine in a day, with 9 November as the peg, with Sputnik Live claiming "neo-Nazism became Ukraine's ideology" and items in the Pravda network's Polish and German segments; 155, 146 of them Pravda's, using an El País report on Spanish neo-Nazis of Núcleo Nacional said to have trained in Ukraine and a UN Third Committee vote on Russia's "glorification of Nazism" resolution (117 for, 53 against) to recast Ukraine and its allies as backers of Nazism; and 69, 68 of them Pravda's, calling Ukraine a "terrorist state" over the 12 November car bomb that killed a Russian serviceman in St Petersburg, before any official finding.	The Pravda network, Sputnik and RT, per SPRAVDI **[official]**	Telegram; Telegram; Telegram
disarm TA02 T0079 T0136.002 · TA14 T0068 T0083 · TA06 T0023 T0023.001 · TA16 T0098.002 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0111 T0152.004 · TA08 T0042			
10-13 Nov W46-069	The CCD said a RIA Novosti film, "Here a prayer sounds", presented in occupied Donetsk with the occupation leadership and the local Russian Orthodox Church eparchy, shifts the blame for churches destroyed in Donetsk region onto Ukraine and glorifies "military priests". Krym.Realii, republished by StopFake, reported that Metropolitan Tikhon (Shevkunov) of Simferopol and Crimea plans a Mendeleev pedagogical centre in Crimea with Russia's education ministry and that his metropolis sent camouflage nets to Russian troops.	RIA Novosti and the Russian Orthodox Church, per the CCD, and Metropolitan Tikhon, per Krym.Realii **[official]**	CCD Telegram; StopFake
disarm TA02 ~T0136.002 · TA14 T0004 · TA06 T0087 · TA07 T0111 · TA10 T0057			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
9-13 Nov W46-070	SPRAVDI found that hostile FIMI resources produced 16,014 of 20,388 world media mentions of Ukraine on 6-8 November, about 90% of them on the Pravda network, with 1,814 pushing the line that Ukraine would have "no voice" in Abu Dhabi; in a count published on 10 November, 1,354 publications in a day, 1,285 of them Pravda's, cast Europe as split, 313 of them built on a Politico report about Stubb and Store weighing a call to Putin, and after Putin met Witkoff and Kushner, 363 materials on 12 November presented the Kremlin as the "constructive side". EUvsDisinfo said Moscow's "FIMI machine" worked "overtime" before the talks to cast Europe as an obstacle, with Peskov calling Europe's stance "provocative", Maria Zakharova saying Europeans have "no business" at the table and Senator Alexei Pushkov accusing them of obstruction, and SPRAVDI tracked Pravda turning a Telegraph line on flexibility into "Kyiv ready for territorial concessions" (121 publications) and an AFP report into "Kyiv demands money for 10 years" (177, 160 of them Pravda's).	The Pravda network and RT, per SPRAVDI, and Russian officials, per EUvsDisinfo **[official]**	Telegram; Telegram; Telegram; EUvsDisinfo; Telegram; Telegram
disarm TA02 T0079 T0136.004 · TA14 T0004 T0068 · TA06 T0023 T0023.001 · TA16 T0097.111 T0098.002 T0143.001 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0111 T0152.004			
9-13 Nov W46-071	SPRAVDI tracked the Pravda network and RT telling Ukrainians and Europeans that Ukraine cannot hold out: 734 publications on Kyiv's "winter collapse", pegged to a Klitschko interview, with one RT German text on six mirror sites and clones of "local news" such as capitoldaily.news and fldaily.news; 292 on "the end of Patriot", built from a Pistorius remark and a Bloomberg report on interceptor shortages, which Detector Media relayed; and 568 on 12 November, 538 of them Pravda's, mocking Zelensky over Starshield speed limits while promoting Bureau 1440's Russian satellite system as the alternative.	The Pravda network and RT, per SPRAVDI **[official]**	Telegram; Telegram; Detector Media; Telegram
disarm TA02 ~T0135.001 T0139.001 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0023 T0084.001 · TA16 T0098.002 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0111 T0152.004 · TA08 T0042			
9-13 Nov W46-072	SPRAVDI counted Pravda and RT campaigns against funding Ukraine: 463 publications on 10 November, 391 of them Pravda's, calling Merz's plan to tie the EU budget to a 70 billion euro loan "blackmail", and 536 presenting his letter to António Costa as an EU "rebellion", with the Slovak site hlavnespravy.sk relaying an unsupported claim by Russian foreign ministry representative Rodion Miroshnik that Merz expects "kickbacks"; 283 recasting the extension of the EU training mission EUMAM as a "provocation"; 125, 123 of them Pravda's, turning an FT report on a 15 billion dollar Democratic aid package into "Biden's war"; and 81, all on Pravda, calling Zelensky a touring "beggar" after his Copenhagen visit.	The Pravda network and RT, per SPRAVDI **[official]**	Telegram; Telegram; Telegram; Telegram; Telegram
disarm TA02 T0079 ~T0135.001 T0135.002 · TA06 T0023 T0023.001 · TA16 T0097.111 T0098.002 T0143.001 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0111 T0152.004			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
9-13 Nov W46-073	Texty found that the Petropavlivska Borshchahivka clash drew at least 156 videos with over 19.25 million views from the TikTok "talking heads" it tracks on 2-8 November, five times what the week's main topic usually draws, and that nearly 60% of the destructive YouTube comments it logged were about it, almost one in six from a bot, led by the "network of secret torture chambers" line (3,732 comments); it says the scale and synchronicity suggest Russian special services "likely" hoped to use the case to spark mass protests. In an earlier piece Texty showed the Telegram channel "Bila Varta", which calls itself an "extra-systemic nationalist" group, calling people to the site and, on 4 November, posting in sync with the blogger Anatolii Sharii, whom Texty calls pro-Russian, a video presenting a commercial, non-state award to the detained "medic" Valentyna Moloda as an honour, rhetoric Texty says matches Russian propaganda on mobilisation and the state.	Ukrainian TikTok bloggers, YouTube bots and Telegram channels, with Russian special services "likely" behind the push, per Texty **[researcher]**	Texty; Texty
disarm TA02 ~T0135.003 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0023.001 T0087 · TA07 T0151.007 T0151.008 T0151.014 · TA09 T0116.001 · TA10 T0126.001 · TA11 T0129.007			
9-13 Nov W46-074	The SBU and prosecutors described more recruitment through Telegram: an unemployed man in Cherkasy region found by the FSB while seeking "easy" earnings in Telegram channels, a man near Izium recruited through a fake "woman's" account in Telegram dating chats, a mobilised paratrooper in Mykolaiv, found in Telegram dating channels, who was preparing to guide a strike on his brigade commander, and a Kyiv man sentenced to 15 years for registering Starlink terminals for Russian forces, promised 120 dollars for his own and paid 50 for each of three more registered by acquaintances, per prosecutors. A Kramatorsk blogger working for the GRU got 15 years for using two Telegram channels to urge nearly 500 subscribers to reveal troop positions and to spread fakes, and the case over the February double bombing in Lviv, whose perpetrator the SBU says was found in Telegram chats, went to court.	The FSB, the GRU and Russian special services, per the SBU and the Prosecutor General's Office **[official]**	Telegram; Telegram; Telegram; Telegram; Telegram; Telegram; Telegram
disarm TA06 T0085 · TA15 T0091.001 · TA16 T0097.109 T0143.002 · TA07 T0151.006 T0151.007 T0153.007 · TA10 T0127.002			
12 Nov W46-075	The SBU said Russia had sharply stepped up information and psychological operations to discredit it, creating "hundreds" of fake news items, some exploiting NABU's recent investigations, to suggest a conflict between the SBU and the anti-corruption bodies. It cited a fake, spread with reference to RIA Novosti, that NABU had announced a "contract killing of a navy officer" ordered by the SBU, when NABU made no such statement, murder is outside its remit, and the September killing of a Ukrainian navy officer was carried out by a pensioner recruited by Russian services.	Russia, through media controlled by its special services, per the SBU **[official]**	Telegram
disarm TA02 T0135.003 · TA06 T0085.003 · TA07 T0111 · TA08 T0042			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
12 Nov W46-076	SPRAVDI rebutted claims spread by pro-Russian bot pages on Facebook that Melania Trump refused Ukraine's Order of Princess Olga: ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets presented it at the White House on 5 November, both sides confirmed it, and she thanked Zelensky. **disarm** TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0085 · TA07 T0151.003 · TA17 T0049.003	Pro-Russian bot pages on Facebook, per SPRAVDI **[official]**	Telegram
11-12 Nov W46-077	VoxCheck, which checks claims in partnership with Meta, debunked ten more fakes that recast local crime reports as crimes by soldiers of named units, from the 82nd air assault brigade to the 48th engineering brigade, each made by editing a real outlet's headline when neither the article nor the police, prosecutor's or court statement mentioned military service, and an AI-made photo of a Rihanna portrait in a Lviv music school, flagged by a SynthID watermark. **disarm** TA06 T0086.002 T0086.003 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.007 (actor unknown)	Unnamed; VoxCheck says "propagandists" probably edited the headlines and links the fake screenshots to the Telegram channel dillfrash **[unattributed]**	voxukraine.org; voxukraine.org; voxukraine.org
11-12 Nov W46-078	Hackers replaced the homepage of Ukraine's state news agency Ukrinform with the word "ZELENET", a crossed-out Ukrainian flag and a link to a Telegram channel, renamed its X account "ZELENET" and put a pro-Russian slogan in its biography, The Kyiv Independent reported, noting earlier breaches of its own site on 4 November and of Ukrainska Pravda's newsletter on 6 November. Ukrinform said it was working with the SBU and the State Special Communications Service and that "the adversary" keeps improving its methods, and its site came back on 12 November. **disarm** TA06 T0086 · TA15 T0150.005 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.008 T0152.004 · TA17 T0122 · TA18 T0123 (actor unknown)	Unnamed; "the adversary", per Ukrinform **[official]**	Kyiv Independent; Telegram; Telegram
11-12 Nov W46-079	The CCD and HUR added Rossotrudnichestvo officials to the "Mouthpieces of the Kremlin" section of the War&Sanctions portal, among them its head since April 2026 Igor Chaika, whom they tie to financing Russian influence operations in Moldova's 2021 elections, his predecessor Yevgeny Primakov, and Svetlana Nekrasova, acting head of the Russian House in Berlin until September 2026, and urged sanctions and expulsions from EU states. A day later the CCD reported a campaign through networks of anonymous Telegram channels "created by the enemy" to present the agency as a purely humanitarian, "soft power" body. **disarm** TA02 T0135.002 T0136.001 · TA14 T0004 T0068 · TA07 T0151.007	Rossotrudnichestvo, and anonymous Telegram networks run by Russia, per the CCD and HUR **[official]**	CCD Telegram; Telegram; CCD Telegram

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
11-12 Nov W46-080	The Russian prank duo Vovan and Lexus, posing as Rustem Umerov, head of Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service, held a 17-minute video call with three senior OpenAI national security staff about AI support for Ukraine and posted the recording, The Intercept reported; OpenAI confirmed it was a prank after an investigation with "the relevant authorities", and Vovan said they first reached a Ukrainian official in San Francisco posing as Umerov. MediaSapiens noted the pair had impersonated Umerov before.	Vovan and Lexus, whose pranks The Intercept says have often aligned with Russian foreign policy and who have been accused of working with the government, which they deny **[media]**	theintercept.com; ms.detector.media
	disarm TA06 T0087 · TA16 T0097.111 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.004 T0152.006		
10-12 Nov W46-081	The Institute of Mass Information found Russian state outlets such as TASS and Vesti renaming occupied Oleshky "Aleshki" throughout their evacuation coverage while blaming Ukraine for the town's blockade, mining and the destruction of the Kakhovka dam, and reporting 25 buses for 750 people without saying where they went; StopFake republished the study.	TASS, Vesti and pro-war Telegram channels, per IMI **[researcher]**	IMI; StopFake
	disarm TA02 T0136.002 ~T0136.004 · TA14 T0004 · TA06 T0023 T0023.001 T0085 · TA07 T0111 T0151.007		
9-12 Nov W46-082	Russian outlets kept building the "secret torture chambers" story: SPRAVDI counted 583 publications on 6-8 November on "torture chambers and forced mobilisation", pegged to Yulia Mendel's speech at an AfD event in the Bundestag and a video by Patrick Lancaster, whom SPRAVDI calls a pro-Russian blogger, spread by the Pravda network in English, German, Spanish and French and by RT Brasil; it rebutted Abzac's presentation of Diana Panchenko's claim that Ukrainians had flooded journalists with "a thousand letters" about secret torture chambers; and Mozhem Obyasnit noted Vesti Nedeli's claim of about 1,000 such "concentration camps" in Ukraine, for which, as for RIA Novosti's claim that every fifth prisoner dies there, Russian media give no evidence, names or addresses.	The Pravda network, RT Brasil, Abzac and Diana Panchenko, per SPRAVDI, and Vesti Nedeli and other Kremlin media, per Mozhem Obyasnit **[official]**	Telegram; Telegram; Telegram
	disarm TA02 T0135.002 T0135.003 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0023 T0084.001 T0085 T0087 · TA16 T0097.208 T0098.002 T0143.002 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0111 T0152.004		
11 Nov W46-083	StopFake debunked rumours, citing the Norwegian site Steigan, that Zelensky drags out trips abroad to avoid returning home, listing his returns between Berlin, Madrid and Copenhagen. It describes Steigan, run by communist activist Pal Steigan, as one of the main channels of pro-Russian content in Norway, citing Faktisk.no's finding that 87% of its articles from January 2021 to March 2022 cited sources "clearly subordinate to the Russian authorities".	The Norwegian site Steigan as the cited source, per StopFake **[researcher]**	StopFake
	disarm TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA06 T0085 · TA16 T0098.002 · TA07 T0152.004 (actor unknown)		

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
11 Nov W46-084	Myth Detector found that a video said to show recruitment officers leading a man on a rope in Kryvyi Rih, shared by Russian-speaking Facebook users from 20 October to 2 November and in Serbian on 2 November, carries a SynthID watermark, and that the earliest copy it found was posted on 19 October on the Telegram channel "Odesskoe obshchestvennoe televidenie Z". **disarm** TA06 T0087.001 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.007 (actor unknown)	Telegram channels and Facebook users, per Myth Detector. No state named **[researcher]**	mythdetector.com
9-11 Nov W46-085	The screenshot of Iranian state TV said to show Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa and Rzeszów as missile targets, covered last week, is manipulated: Georgia's Myth Detector found that the 3 November bulletins showed no such map, and Detector Media said both versions were AI-generated, carrying Google's SynthID watermark, after Myth Detector found the broadcast in Iran's TV archive with an IRGC emblem where the "threat map" was inserted. Both name the Russian outlets gazeta.ru, rg.ru, vz.ru and vesti.ru among those that carried it from 4 November. **disarm** TA02 T0135.003 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0086.002 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA07 T0111 T0151.001 T0151.003	Creator unknown; carried by Russian media, per Myth Detector and Detector Media **[researcher]**	mythdetector.com; Detector Media
10 Nov W46-086	CCD media literacy head Ivan Slychko told Slawa TV, a Ukrainian channel in Poland, that the #RussiaIsNotMyEnemy campaign, active in European social media this autumn, is openly backed by official Russian state and diplomatic institutions, ran through coordinated networks posting similar AI images and identical texts translated into several languages, and reached over 250,000 posts under the hashtag on X, but did not shift Europeans' views, since much of the content criticised Russia. **disarm** TA02 T0135.002 · TA06 T0015 T0084.001 T0086.002 · TA16 T0097.101 T0143.002 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0151.008 · TA17 T0049.001	Russia, backed by its state and diplomatic institutions, per the CCD **[official]**	CCD Telegram
10 Nov W46-087	StopFake found that a video Russian Telegram channels spread as a "rally" of Ukrainians in Slovakia demanding to "fight to the last" shows Ukrainian football fans marching in Trnava before the 5 October Nations League match against Hungary, with no such slogans. **disarm** TA02 T0066 · TA06 T0023.001 · TA07 T0151.007	Russian Telegram channels, per StopFake **[researcher]**	StopFake
10 Nov W46-088	Myth Detector found AI-generated footage and audio, with a SynthID watermark in the audio, in a news-style video posted by a Russian-speaking Facebook user on 27 October claiming Hasidic Jews are paid 200,000 hryvnias to move to Ukraine, which it says aims to fuel antisemitism and discredit Ukraine's authorities. **disarm** TA02 T0135.003 T0140.003 · TA06 T0087.001 T0088.001 · TA07 T0151.001 (actor unknown)	Unknown **[unattributed]**	mythdetector.com

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
9 Nov W46-089	HUR said Russia is building a media network in Africa, opening editorial centres, arranging broadcasts on local radio stations, launching digital platforms and enlisting local journalists and bloggers to push anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian narratives under talk of culture and "friendship of peoples", and to create a favourable setting for recruiters who send Africans to assault units in the war against Ukraine.	The Kremlin, per HUR **[official]**	Telegram
disarm TA02 T0136.002 · TA15 T0091.001 T0095 · TA16 T0097.106 T0100.003 T0143.002 · TA07 T0111.003			
9 Nov W46-090	StopFake debunked claims that South Korea is cutting military aid to Ukraine, which cited a 5 November article in The Diplomat on a Korean startup ending AI trials in Ukraine: the outlet retracted it, saying the interview with Newtype Industries' CEO was fabricated, the freelance author may not be who he claimed and his emails showed evidence of coming from Russia, suggesting it may have been part of a disinformation operation, as SPRAVDI also reported. Detector Media separately relayed StopFake's finding that a photo pro-Russian Telegram channels spread of "fascists" daubed on a Korean restaurant in Kyiv, tied to the same Seoul-Kyiv row, was AI-generated.	An author whose emails, The Diplomat found, showed evidence of coming from Russia, and posts such as one on the Telegram channel Ostashko News, per StopFake; pro-Russian Telegram channels, per Detector Media **[researcher]**	StopFake; Telegram; Detector Media
disarm TA02 ~T0079 · TA06 T0085.003 T0086.002 · TA16 T0097.102 T0100 T0143.002 · TA07 T0151.007 T0153.001 · TA11 T0130.001			
9 Nov W46-091	StopFake debunked Russian claims that the 2 November strike on an underground school in Komyshuvakha, Zaporizhzhia region, which had killed 55 by the State Emergency Service's count of 7 November, hit a military base: Iznanka called it a 128th brigade post, LostArmour a command post, Voennoye Obozreniye a drone operators' base, and Moskovsky Komsomolets said Kyiv had "confirmed" 54 drone operators killed, while documents, police bodycam footage, witnesses and the UN monitoring mission show an aid point and shelter full of civilians. CAT-UA found the "AFU bunker" version pushed even in Ukrainian-language channels such as PRAVDA UA, and a new pro-Russian message, "Ukraine fights dishonestly, commits war crimes", in a sample where pro-Russian views made up 10%.	Russian media and pro-war Telegram channels, per StopFake **[researcher]**	StopFake; cat-ua.org
disarm TA02 ~T0136.002 · TA14 T0004 T0068 · TA06 T0023 T0023.001 · TA07 T0111.002 T0151.007 T0152.004 · TA08 T0042			
9 Nov W46-092	Russian units and pro-war bloggers have posted at least 35 front-line videos likely made or altered with AI to claim towns still in Ukrainian hands, Novaya Gazeta Europe reports from the Financial Times, citing ISW: the Defence Ministry's footage of Dobropillia's capture shows a flag that reverses direction between shots, which the Conflict Intelligence Team said showed signs of AI manipulation. ISW's Daniel Mealie said the videos look like the work of opportunistic units and bloggers rather than a central effort, but part of a campaign to make Russian victory look inevitable.	Russian military units and pro-war bloggers, per ISW, and the Russian Defence Ministry's Dobropillia footage, per the Conflict Intelligence Team, both as reported by the FT **[researcher]**	novayagazeta.eu
disarm TA02 T0139.001 · TA06 T0087.001 · TA16 T0097.206 T0143.001 · TA07 ~T0151.007			

[-] Attribution note: The CCD, SPRAVDI, the SBU, HUR, the Prosecutor General's Office, the military ombudsman's office, the state news agency Ukrinform and President Zelensky are Ukrainian state bodies or officials and a party to the war. Their attributions are official, but not neutral.

Wider Europe and beyond

Estonia's KAPO said the GRU coordinated an attempted arson at drone maker Threod Systems, France attributed October's sabotage of supermarket refrigeration controllers to an IRGC unit whose hacktivist avatars claim some of its attacks, and the leaders backing Armenia said its June elections were a clear choice for Europe made "despite multi-faceted interference from Russia". The main exposure was the leak of the files of John Mark Dougan, whom NewsGuard counts as part of Storm-1516, alongside a Matryoshka campaign against Spain's 29 November election, the hacked archive of over 500 Doppelganger interviews that OCCRP reviewed, ads paid for from Russia in Gagauzia's campaign found by Promo-LEX, and a new wave of hoax bomb threats to schools in Italy, Ireland and the UK that no authority has attributed.

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
15 Nov W46-093	Estonia's Internal Security Service KAPO said counterintelligence had confirmed that Russia was behind an attempted arson at drone maker Threod Systems in Viimsi at 3.06 a.m. on 14 November, coordinated by the GRU, and eight residents of Latvia were detained; Director General Margo Palloson called it "yet another attempt by Russia to carry out an act of sabotage in Estonia" and said the GRU recruits EU residents from criminal circles and among people in difficult socioeconomic circumstances, while KAPO has said Russia aims to sow fear in society and among businesses. Prime Minister Kristen Michal said "we know that Russian intelligence services exploit border crossings to exert influence over people", and the foreign ministry says road border crossings with Russia close on 1 December.	The GRU, per KAPO **[official]**	news.err.ee; news.err.ee
disarm not labeled · context			
15 Nov W46-094	Factcheck.bg found no trace on the Kremlin's site, TASS or RIA Novosti of a supposed official address by Putin to Bulgaria's Prime Minister Rumen Radev after drone attacks on ships in the Black Sea, in which he says Russian forces strike only military targets and blames Ukraine and a "third party". The Facebook post has circulated since 15 October, drawing over 19,300 interactions, and some versions cite DailyStandart.com, a site Factcheck.bg says its checks have repeatedly found spreading disinformation.	DailyStandart.com, cited as the source by some posts, per Factcheck.bg. No state named **[researcher]**	factcheck.bg
disarm TA14 T0004 T0068 · TA06 T0023.001 T0085 · TA16 ~T0098.002 · TA07 T0151.001 ~T0152.004 · TA08 T0042 (actor unknown)			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
13 Nov W46-095	EUvsDisinfo said the Kremlin's "FIMI machine" worked "overtime" before the US-mediated talks in Abu Dhabi on 10-11 November: spokesman Dmitry Peskov called European governments' stance "provocative", Maria Zakharova said European countries have "no business" at the table, and Senator Alexei Pushkov and other commentators cast Europe as the obstacle to peace. It reads this as an attempt to push Europe out of the talks and drive a wedge between Washington and Europe, calling disinformation "part of its negotiating strategy". After the talks Russia's negotiator Vladimir Medinsky blamed European arms deliveries for civilian deaths and tied dialogue with Europe to their end, INFO OPS Polska found. **disarm** TA02 T0079 · TA14 T0004 T0068 · TA16 T0097.111 T0098.002 T0143.001 · TA07 T0152.004	Russian officials and pro-Kremlin commentators, per EUvsDisinfo, part of the EEAS **[official]**	EUvsDisinfo; disinfodigest.pl
13 Nov W46-096	The European Alliance of News Agencies expelled TASS, Russia's state news agency, at its general assembly in Larnaca, by 19 of the 20 agencies present with one abstention, TASR reported; TASS had been suspended since February 2022 and did not answer an offer to defend itself, said EANA secretary general Alexandru Giboi. Ukrinform, whose director general chairs the alliance's committee on countering disinformation, reported it too. **disarm** not labeled · response	No actor named, a measure against a Russian state agency **[media]**	teraz.sk; Ukrinform
12-13 Nov W46-097	Moldova's government spokesman Dumitru Ciorici called reports that Russia's conditions for a European security system include turning Moldova into a federation with Transnistria and Gagauzia, with independence referendums there if Moldova joins the EU, "scarecrows and provocations" from Moscow meant to hinder its EU path. The reports came from Echo on 12 November, citing sources in the negotiating groups, and from Bild on 13 November, per NewsMaker. **disarm** not labeled · context	Sources cited by Echo, and Bild; "provocations from Moscow", per Moldova's government **[official]**	newsmaker.md
9-13 Nov W46-098	The Gnida Project flagged a Storm-1516 campaign claiming the US consulting firm McKinsey backs French presidential candidate Édouard Philippe, carrying Washington Examiner branding and linking to a copycat site, thewashingtonexaminer.net. Lead Stories found the domain was registered on 3 November and ran the story on 9 November, and an X post of 10 November claimed McKinsey financed Philippe's campaign with 30 million euros, twice Macron's spending. **disarm** TA02 ~T0135.001 · TA06 T0085.003 T0087 · TA15 T0149.003 T0150.001 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.008 T0152.004 · TA08 T0042	Storm-1516, per The Gnida Project. Lead Stories names no actor **[researcher]**	bsky.app; leadstories.com

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
11-13 Nov W46-099	EU ambassadors provisionally agreed on 11 November to list 145 individuals and entities, including 30 individuals and one entity under the regime for Russia's hybrid activities, covering foreign information manipulation and interference, per Georgia Today citing Reuters. RFE/RL reported that the hybrid proposal mainly targets the Social Design Agency and several of its leading figures, which the EU says runs projects "funded, directed and supervised by the Russian Presidential Administration", and Kremlin-friendly journalists including Chay Bowes, an Irish national working for RT International, while the "pro-Russian hacker group" NoName057(16) goes on the cyber list; foreign ministers are due to adopt them on 16 November. **disarm** not labeled · response	The Social Design Agency and others, per EU documents reported by RFE/RL **[official]**	georgiatoday.ge; RFE/RL
12 Nov W46-100	Leaders and representatives of Estonia, France, Latvia, Lithuania and the UK and the EU's High Representative, joined by Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and the presidents of the European Council and Commission, said after meeting Armenia's Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Dublin that Armenia's June elections let its people make "a clear choice in favour of peace, democracy and closer ties with Europe, despite multi-faceted interference from Russia", whose pressure "has only been increasing" and which "is now threatening to use energy supplies as a means of intimidation". **disarm** not labeled · context	Russia, per the Core Group of Support to Armenia **[official]**	eeas.europa.eu
12 Nov W46-101	Promo-LEX's second observation report on Gagauzia's 15 November elections, covering 16 October to 10 November, found ads for the Socialists' candidate Fiodor Gagauz, "some financed from the Russian Federation" and others with no payer named, plus 34 TikTok accounts promoting him at over 400,000 views, which he says are not his and asked to have investigated, and at least six accounts pushing Cornel Dudnic's videos to over 1.2 million views. The new pages GagauzPoint and Gagauzia Now denigrated candidates Alexandr Stoianoglo, Serghei Anastasov and Oleg Garizan, and networks pushed narratives that the vote is illegitimate or controlled by the central authorities or external actors, some urging a boycott or spoiled ballots, per NewsMaker's summary and the report. **disarm** TA02 ~T0135.001 ~T0135.003 ~T0136.006 · TA15 T0150.001 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.003 T0151.008 · TA09 T0114.001 · TA17 T0049.001 · TA11 T0130.001 (actor unknown)	Unnamed page operators, some ads financed from Russia, per Promo-LEX **[researcher]**	promolex.md; newsmaker.md

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
12 Nov W46-102	Moldova's Intelligence and Security Service SIS said a person suspected of collecting information on Moldova's security institutions at the direction of Russian special services, partly through people in the "unconstitutional" security structures of the Transnistrian region, has been placed in pretrial detention, in a criminal case for unauthorised collection of information. **disarm** not labeled · context	Russian special services, per SIS **[official]**	newsmaker.md
12 Nov W46-103	Norway's Police Security Service PST raised its assessment of the sabotage threat, with Inger Haugland, head of its state actors department, saying there is "good reason to expect that Russian intelligence will carry out sabotage in Norway in the coming year". PST has uncovered no attempts against Norwegian targets but knows that actors linked to Russian intelligence have mapped infrastructure and targets in Norway, and says most operations in Europe were carried out by proxies who may not know that a state is behind them. **disarm** not labeled · response	Russian intelligence, per PST **[official]**	pst.no
12 Nov W46-104	At the European Political Community summit in Dublin, which followed "a week of unsettling hybrid attacks on media organisations, schools and airlines" in RTÉ's words, Taoiseach Micheál Martin named "closer cooperation in preventing and responding to hybrid attack activity" among its outcomes, per RTÉ. Cyprus's President Nikos Christodoulides said hybrid threats are "beginning to be treated as something normal" and called for "targeted sanctions against those responsible for such actions" and "collective European tools" against information manipulation. **disarm** not labeled · response	None named **[official]**	rte.ie; cyprus-mail.com
12 Nov W46-105	Veridica found that Ukraina.ru, which it calls a pro-Kremlin publication, turned a Zelensky bill on asset declarations, registered on 9 November, into a law shielding soldiers who steal defence funds, when the bill restores declaration duties for SBU and intelligence staff and changes no criminal liability for corruption. **disarm** TA02 T0135.001 T0135.002 T0135.003 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0023 · TA07 T0111 · TA08 T0042 · TA17 ~T0119.002	Ukraina.ru, per Veridica **[researcher]**	veridica.ro

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
12 Nov W46-106	Pro-China users spread a voice clip, which a detector NewsGuard used rated 99 percent likely AI-generated, of Lori Huang, wife of former Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, supposedly defending Alice Huang, whom US officials cited by the New York Times call a Chinese intelligence asset; NewsGuard counted 31 posts on X, TikTok and YouTube with 6.6 million views in a day, after Chinese government spokesperson Guo Jiakun called the spy allegations "entirely groundless". Pro-China users also recast a 2023 remark by Monica Crowley, now the State Department's chief of protocol, as a "confession" that the US made COVID-19 in Ukrainian biolabs, one post reaching 255,400 views.	Pro-China social media users, per NewsGuard **[researcher]**	newsguardriskbriefing.substack.com
disarm TA02 T0136.001 · TA14 T0004 T0022.001 T0068 · TA06 T0084.003 T0088.001 · TA07 T0151.008 T0152.006 (actor unknown)			
10-12 Nov W46-107	Hackers leaked files from the devices of John Mark Dougan, the former Florida deputy sheriff living in Moscow, and The Insider says they show many of his activities coordinated by Russian intelligence: Yuri Khoroshenky (also known as Khoroshevsky), a GRU Unit 29155 officer under cover at the Dugin-linked Center for Geopolitical Expertise (CGE), asked him to post biolab stories and used him as a "financial cutout" for payments, at least two FSB officers handled him, and The Insider says it gained access to the Storm-1516 control panel Dougan called "DarkPulsar". CORRECTIV found that the CGE financed him. NewsGuard, which counts Dougan as part of Storm-1516, found that he aimed to steer search engines and AI chatbots "towards Russia's favor", wrote "we are writing 43k articles a month" in a prompt to Anthropic's Claude, used Claude and Alibaba's Qwen to produce content, and had operating costs of roughly 2 million rubles a month, and Dougan confirmed the leak to NewsGuard.	John Mark Dougan, part of Storm-1516 per NewsGuard, tasked by a GRU officer under cover at the CGE and handled by FSB officers, per The Insider **[media]**	The Insider; CORRECTIV; newsguardrealitycheck.com
disarm TA01 T0073 · TA06 T0084.002 T0085.001 · TA15 T0091.001 · TA16 T0098.001 T0100.003 · TA07 T0151.007 T0152.004 T0154.001 · TA08 T0046 · TA11 T0129 T0130.001 T0130.005 · TA12 T0134.001			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
10-12 Nov W46-108	The European Commission called EU aviation security experts to a meeting on 11 November after the flight threats without attributing them to anyone, per 2EU. On 11 November threatening emails reached at least 6,300 schools in Italy and hundreds in Ireland and the UK, per CBS News, which says the one Italian media published was signed "Mikhail Andropov, leader of the Vilayat of Misoginistan", calls that "a Russian misogynistic extremist group that was banned by authorities in Moscow several years ago" and says a message in the same name went to Rome's airport authorities about two flights on 5 November; ANSA reported around 1,800 more schools threatened on 12 November from addresses with Philippine domains, and Rome's anti-terrorism prosecutors are investigating. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni said the messages "are not intended to cause harm, but to instil fear" and Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi that "it is premature to speak of a coordinated operation", per Il Sole 24 Ore, which says the first email reportedly came from a compromised account at a university in Taiwan and that the name appears to echo the "Fighters of the Male State".	Unknown. The emails use the name of a group CBS calls Russian and banned in Moscow; no authority has attributed them **[unattributed]**	2eu.brussels; cbsnews.com; ansa.it; en.ilsole24ore.com
disarm TA06 T0085 · TA15 T0150.005 · TA16 T0097.208 ~T0143.003 · TA07 T0153.001 (actor unknown)			
10-12 Nov W46-109	The European Commission opened a targeted consultation until 23 November on revised election guidelines under the Digital Services Act, saying platforms should detect coordinated inauthentic behaviour early and dismantle the networks behind it, and that deepfakes should be clearly labelled and keep their label when shared; EDMO says its network's expertise fed the draft.	None named, a policy step **[official]**	European Commission; edmo.eu
disarm not labeled · response			
11 Nov W46-110	Matryoshka launched a campaign at Spain's 29 November general election, per Antibot4Navalny, with fake videos branded as El País, El Mundo, AFP, Euronews, Reuters and The Economist claiming that elections will change nothing, that Spain should leave the EU and lift sanctions, and that Catalonia should claim independence, per Maldita.es, which calls Matryoshka a Russian propaganda and disinformation operation and says some of the accounts have been suspended. The Insider adds fake covers of Libération, La Croix and Le Nouvel Économiste and videos putting the claims in the mouths of economists Jordi Galí and Xavier Sala-i-Martin.	Matryoshka, a Russian operation per Maldita.es and The Insider, tracked by Antibot4Navalny **[researcher]**	bsky.app; maldita.es; The Insider
disarm TA02 ~T0135.002 ~T0135.003 · TA14 T0083 · TA06 T0086.003 T0087 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0151.008 · TA17 T0049.003			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
11 Nov W46-111	Factcheck.bg found no evidence for a claim, posted on 1 November by the profile Petko Yatsov and shared 1,400 times, that "over 80 vans of German police" arrived in Warsaw to back Donald Tusk during the 30 October protests at the Constitutional Tribunal; Polish police deny it, and Germany's federal police say its officers were in Poland for international exercises.	Unknown **[unattributed]**	factcheck.bg
disarm TA14 T0068 · TA06 ~T0084.003 T0085 · TA07 T0151.001 (actor unknown)			
10-11 Nov W46-112	A hack of Recent Reliable News turned it into an archive of over 500 interviews behind some 1,800 articles on Doppelganger-linked sites, OCCRP and Delfi Estonia found: people from more than 50 countries, among them former US, French and Spanish intelligence officers, Bulgarian MEP Petar Volgin and retired Bulgarian general Dimitar Shivikov. Five interviewees said Raphael Machado, leader of the Dugin-inspired New Resistance in Brazil, set up or conducted their interviews, and others were approached by a self-described journalist who gave his name as Nikolay Maslov and lists Moscow as his location. DisinfoWatch named 14 people with Canadian links in the archive, noting that inclusion does not show they knowingly took part.	Doppelganger, which OCCRP, citing researchers and US and European authorities, places with the Social Design Agency **[media]**	occrp.org; disinfowatch.org
disarm TA15 T0091.002 · TA16 T0097.102 T0098.001 T0098.002 T0100.001 T0143.002 · TA05 T0101 · TA07 T0152.004 T0153.007 · TA11 T0128.005 T0130.001			
10 Nov W46-113	Factcheck.bg found no source for a quote in which Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan supposedly says NATO would hold out 4 to 12 hours or 2 days in a war with Russia and that Turkey will not fight Russia, spread in groups it calls pro-Russian, such as "Friends of V.V. Putin in Bulgaria, Europe and the world" and "Society supporting Russia against NATO and the WHO", one post at over 3,600 likes and 540 shares.	Pro-Russian Facebook groups, per Factcheck.bg. No state named **[researcher]**	factcheck.bg
disarm TA06 T0085 · TA05 T0102.001 · TA07 T0151.001 T0151.002 (actor unknown)			
9 Nov W46-114	France attributed to Iran the 11-12 October attack on refrigeration controllers at some 700 supermarket sites, carried out by the Shahid Kaveh unit of the IRGC's electronic and cyber centre, will summon Iran's ambassador and will propose new EU sanctions. The C4's technical report says the unit is mainly known through hacktivist avatars, among them CyberAveng3rs, Soldiers of Solomon, Mr. Soul and Cyber Isnaad Front, which publicly claim some of its attacks, and that its "propaganda organ" CyberbanNews relayed this one from 13 October; it also attributes to the sister unit Shahid Shoostari (Emennet Pasargad) a July 2024 attempt to hijack video display terminals before the Paris Olympics to show photomontages denouncing Israeli athletes' participation, first posted on a Persian-language Instagram account.	The IRGC's Shahid Kaveh and Shahid Shoostari units, per France's foreign ministry and the C4 **[official]**	diplomatie.gouv.fr; cert.cyber.gouv.fr
disarm TA15 T0095 T0149.009 T0150.005 · TA16 T0097.104 T0143.002 · TA07 T0151.001 · TA11 T0130.001			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
9 Nov W46-115	Propastop's October media review found Russian media turning Estonia's defence steps into provocations: Ura.ru and others cast units moving east as a NATO "bridgehead", MK headlined war correspondent Aleksandr Kots's guess about a drone route over the Baltics as a "NATO corridor", which Re:Baltica found no evidence for, and Kommersant had Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna "threaten" to close the Baltic to Russia "within hours". It cites the Government Office's strategic communication newsletter for a 4 per cent rise in Russia-origin propaganda from September, and notes that Maria Zakharova called Prime Minister Kristen Michal a "destroyer" and a "scoundrel".	Russian media and officials, per Propastop **[researcher]**	Propastop
disarm TA02 ~T0079 ~T0135.001 · TA14 T0004 T0068 · TA06 T0023 T0023.001 · TA16 T0097.111 T0143.001 · TA05 T0016 · TA07 T0111 · TA08 T0042			
9 Nov W46-116	Russia's Security Council secretary Sergei Shoigu said at a meeting of CIS security council secretaries, as quoted by Interfax, that "the Georgian authorities in 2024 practically prevented a coup d'état initiated by the pro-Western Georgian opposition", remarks Civil.ge says match the Georgian ruling party's framing of the protests as coup attempts, and called for resuming the 3+3 regional platform, which Georgia has refused to join.	Sergei Shoigu, an overt statement **[official]**	civil.ge
disarm not labeled · overt state action			
9 Nov W46-117	Veridica debunked claims by MEP Diana Sosoaca, whom it calls pro-Russian, that a "Jewish occult" plans a "New Israel" in Eastern Europe on Romanian and Ukrainian territory because Israel's independence was declared for only 76 years, narratives it says aim to undermine trust in the authorities and promote antisemitic conspiracy theories.	Diana Sosoaca, per Veridica. No state named **[researcher]**	veridica.ro
disarm TA02 T0140.003 · TA14 T0022.001 · TA06 T0023.001 · TA16 T0097.110 T0143.001 · TA07 T0151.003 (domestic · excluded from FIMI analysis)			
9 Nov W46-118	Factcheck.bg found that a quote is fabricated in which Putin says he never wanted war and that Russia has always fought to save lives, not to bring "fascist democracy like the US", posted on 16 October by the profile Bobi Stoianov and shared 2,200 times with a 2012 photo of him in tears.	Unknown **[unattributed]**	factcheck.bg
disarm TA02 ~T0136.004 · TA06 T0085 · TA07 T0151.001 (actor unknown)			

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	ACTOR AND ATTRIBUTION	SOURCE
9 Nov W46-119	An internal EU assessment seen by Reuters found that Operation Overload, a covert Russian network, spread videos impersonating Western media to blame France's October riots on immigration and claim migrants raped protesters, seeking to "depict the French leadership as weak and increasingly authoritarian", with no evidence Moscow instigated the protests. A separate French foreign ministry assessment found the ten most-viewed X posts from "pro-Russian spheres" drew 2.8 million views on 16-18 October against over 49 million for MAGA-linked and over 35 million for Israeli accounts; Reuters could not verify either report.	Operation Overload, per the EU's diplomatic service as reported by Reuters **[official]**	irishexaminer.com

disarm TA02 T0135.003 · TA14 T0068 · TA06 T0087 · TA16 T0097.202 T0143.003 · TA07 T0151.001

[-] Background: The school threats follow the waves against flights on 3, 5 and 6 November, per Al Jazeera, and an email to European broadcasters on 6 November, per Reuters via CNBC, when Spain's foreign minister called them most likely "an attempt at hybrid aggression", per RFE/RL. Threod is the second Estonian defence firm targeted this year after Milrem Robotics, which Estonia's government, on KAPO's assessment, attributed to Russian special services.

Actors and techniques

Russian operations dominated again, but this week some were exposed from the inside: the Dougan files tie Storm-1516 to the Center for Geopolitical Expertise and, per The Insider, to GRU and FSB officers, and the Recent Reliable News hack laid out Doppelganger's interviews. China appeared through the Czech sites the leaked messages say it pays for and through its state broadcasters, and Iran through France's attribution of the supermarket sabotage.

OPERATION OR ACTOR	ORIGIN	WHAT IT DID THIS WEEK	WHERE SEEN
Storm-1516 (John Mark Dougan)	Russia per NewsGuard, CORRECTIV and The Insider	Leaked files showing payments routed through Dougan by a GRU officer, FSB handlers, output of "43k articles a month" and Czech sites run for two Czech communists; accounts linking the Krakow attacker to "Ukrainian Nazis" or blaming the Polish government and the EU, per DFRLab's Givi Gigitashvili as cited by Demagog; and a fake Washington Examiner report on McKinsey backing Édouard Philippe, per The Gnida Project.	Czechia, Germany, Poland, France and the US (websites, X)
Center for Geopolitical Expertise	Russia, held behind Storm-1516 by European and US authorities, per CORRECTIV	Financed Dougan, per CORRECTIV, and drew the Czech communist Roman Blaško into its team meetings, per The Gnida Project.	Czechia and Germany
Matryoshka (Operation Overload)	Russia per Maldita.es, The Insider and an internal EU assessment reported by Reuters, "Kremlin-aligned" per Antibot4Navalny	Fake Euronews, DW, WSJ, Time and CNN videos on the Krakow shooting, fakes under Spanish and international media brands against Spain's election, fake front pages around the "torture chamber" teenager, per tagesschau, and videos blaming France's riots on immigration, per the EU assessment.	Poland, Spain, Germany and France (X, Tumblr)

OPERATION OR ACTOR	ORIGIN	WHAT IT DID THIS WEEK	WHERE SEEN
Doppelganger (Social Design Agency)	Russia, per OCCRP citing researchers and US and European authorities	Over 500 interviews behind some 1,800 articles, with at least ten current and former AfD politicians among the interviewees; EU ambassadors provisionally agreed new hybrid-regime listings, per Georgia Today citing Reuters, which RFE/RL says are aimed mainly at the Social Design Agency.	Germany, Bulgaria, Canada and over 50 countries
Pravda network (Portal Kombat)	Russia per SPRAVDI, with "proven ties to Russia" per Demagog	About 90% of the 16,014 hostile publications on Ukraine SPRAVDI counted before the Abu Dhabi talks, the Polish site repeating the Krakow patch claim, per Demagog, and translations of the "Mexican" interview within minutes, per InfoLight.UA.	Ukraine, Poland and Germany
Russian foreign ministry and embassies	Russia, in the open	Zakharova on Europe having "no business" at the talks, on the Czech foreign minister, on Slovakia's refusal to fund Ukraine and on travel to Poland; Deputy Foreign Minister Lyubinsky on Nord Stream stories "deliberately planted" in Western media; embassies relaying Zakharova in Slovak and Polish, a "staged" Bucha in Slovak, and the ambassador's Nord Stream "litmus test" and an SVR claim in German; the ambassador's wreath for Ludvík Svoboda in Czechia.	Czechia, Slovakia, Poland, Germany and Austria (Telegram)
Russian state media	Russia, in the open	Vesti on refugee passport "extortion" and Blaha's deportation claims, RIA Novosti's film shifting blame for destroyed churches, TASS and Vesti renaming Oleshky, and RT carrying the false Forward Observations Group link to the Krakow attacker, per Detector Media.	Ukraine, Slovakia and Poland
Shot (News Media Holding)	Russia per Demagog	Posted the false Forward Observations Group link to the Krakow attacker after 8:30 pm on 7 November, after X accounts had pushed it, per Demagog; Ukraina.ru and EADaily cited it, per Detector Media and INFO OPS Polska.	Poland (Telegram)
FSB	Russia, in the open and per The Insider	Announced a "Polish spy network" in Kaliningrad that Polish services call disinformation, and handled Dougan, per The Insider.	Poland
Russian special services and the GRU	Russia per the ABW, Poland's National Prosecutor's Office, KAPO, the SBU and Moldova's SIS	Suspected saboteurs who put plates resembling the Ukrainian army's on cars they burned, a rail sabotage helper, the Threod arson attempt, a suspected spy in Moldova and recruitment through Telegram in Ukraine.	Poland, Estonia, Ukraine and Moldova
Chinese state media and the Chinese embassy in Prague	China	CGTN and CRI published an MEP's answers under a China critic's name, in the open, and per the leaked messages the embassy bought banner ads on gnews.cz.	Czechia

OPERATION OR ACTOR	ORIGIN	WHAT IT DID THIS WEEK	WHERE SEEN
IRGC Shahid Kaveh unit	Iran per France	Sabotage of supermarket refrigeration controllers, relayed by CyberbanNews, which France's report calls the unit's propaganda organ, with hacktivist avatars that claim some of its attacks.	France
Rossotrudnichestvo	Russia per the CCD and HUR	Officials listed on War&Sanctions, then whitewashed by anonymous Telegram networks, per the CCD; the head of its Russian House in Prague joined the ambassador in Hroznatín.	Ukraine and Czechia
Belarus	Per Demagog and BELPOL	International Radio Belarus repeated the Krakow patch claim, and BELPOL says Belarusian or Russian services could be behind the "Slava UPA" graffiti offers.	Poland (Telegram)
Pro-China accounts	Per NewsGuard	A likely AI-made voice of Lori Huang and a COVID "Ukrainian biolabs" claim.	The US (X, TikTok, YouTube)

New research and reports

The Dougan leak drove the week's research, read by The Insider, CORRECTIV and NewsGuard as an inside view of Storm-1516 and by Czech outlets as the hand behind a Czech site network, while OCCRP mapped the interviews behind Doppelganger and several studies traced the Krakow narratives. No platform published a takedown report.

DATE	PUBLISHER	TITLE OR TOPIC	WHY IT MATTERS
15 Nov	The Gnida Project	"Inside CGE: Czech tovarisch"	Opens a series on the Center for Geopolitical Expertise, which it calls Dougan's main employer, with its Czech communist contacts and the General News sites.
14 Nov	InfoLight.UA	"The 'Mexican' interview: the information wave of the first day"	Separates a live domestic reaction from a coordinated Russian segment, minute by minute.
13 Nov	EUvsDisinfo	"Peace on Moscow's terms: disinformation ahead of the Abu Dhabi talks"	Reads Russia's messaging as part of its negotiating strategy.
13 Nov	Texty	"'In Kyiv, Nazis in the basement'. Monitoring of Russian disinformation for 2-8 November 2026"	Measures the TikTok and YouTube push around Petropavlivska Borshchahivka against the usual weekly baseline.
13 Nov	Detector Media	"From Detection to Silence: Takeaways from the FIMI Research Cluster's Joint Final Conference"	Reports DE-CONSPIRATOR's open dataset of 3,029 publicly attributed FIMI incidents and its finding that local actors took up foreign narratives in about 93% of "successful" ones.
12 Nov	NewsGuard	"Dougan Leak Exposes Concerted Effort to Infect AI"	Documents the scale of Dougan's AI-written output and his use of commercial chatbots.
12 Nov	Voxpot	"Money from Beijing, an administrator from Moscow: leaked messages show how a Czech disinformation network works"	The first account of the Czech trail in the Dougan leak.
12 Nov	Voxpot	"SPD supposedly wants objective media. Its MEP's website spreads Russian propaganda"	Counts, source by source, what a governing party MEP's website takes from EU-sanctioned Russian outlets.

DATE	PUBLISHER	TITLE OR TOPIC	WHY IT MATTERS
12 Nov	Detector Media	"How Russian propaganda went looking for a 'Ukrainian trail' in the Krakow attack"	A dataset of 145 Telegram posts showing how fast the Ukraine link spread.
12 Nov	EDMO	"The greatest threat to European information integrity is coming from the U.S. and the European far right"	Argues that Russia's operations had "limited" impact on France's unrest, against the reach of US and European far-right voices.
12 Nov	Promo-LEX	"Report no. 2: Promo-LEX observation mission for the regional elections in ATU Gagauzia"	Counts paid ads, some financed from Russia, and coordinated TikTok accounts promoting candidates before Gagauzia's vote.
12 Nov	PST	"The sabotage threat in Norway"	Raises Norway's sabotage assessment, naming Russian intelligence and its use of proxies.
11 Nov	CORRECTIV	"Hack Exposes Inner Workings of Russian Influence Operation 'Storm-1516'"	Ties Dougan's pay to the Center for Geopolitical Expertise and traces an AI program that filled over 40 sites.
11 Nov	Metamorphosis Foundation	"DISINFO RADAR: Watch and Warn, November 2026 edition"	A Western Balkans forecast of manipulation risks, from Serbia's new government to Republika Srpska.
10 Nov	The Insider	"Johnny on the spot: A hack of ex-Marine-turned-defector John Dougan's messages reveals the rise and fall of a Russian disinformation asset"	The first account of the leak, naming the GRU and FSB officers it says stood behind Dougan.
10 Nov	OCCRP	"From Politicians to Academics, Hundreds Around the Globe Interviewed and Featured in Notorious Russian Disinformation Campaign"	Shows how Doppelganger sourced the voices that lend its sites credibility.
10 Nov	Demagog	"How did Russia use the attack in Krakow?"	Puts Storm-1516, Matryoshka, the Pravda network, Shot and Belarusian radio on one map of the Krakow campaign.
9 Nov	CERT-FR	"Offensive cyber activities by Iranian actors linked to the IRGC"	The technical basis of France's attribution, naming the hacktivist avatars and propaganda outlet that front for the unit.
9 Nov	CEPA	"Data Center Attacks Matter But Not in the Way We Thought"	A sceptical counterweight to claims that strikes on Russian data centres switched off its propaganda.
9 Nov	Propastop	"October media review: in propaganda's hands, a defence measure becomes an attack plan"	Shows Russian media casting Estonia's defence steps as aggression.

What to watch next week

EU sanctions on the Social Design Agency, Gagauzia's result and the 17 November anniversaries open the week, with Spain's 29 November election a week after it.

[+] 16 Nov: EU foreign ministers are due to adopt the hybrid-regime listings aimed at the Social Design Agency and others, per RFE/RL.

[+] 16 Nov: Results of Gagauzia's 15 November vote, where Promo-LEX found ads for one candidate, some of them "financed from the Russian Federation".

[+] 17 Nov: The anniversary of 17 November 1989, with commemorations across Prague and an opposition rally in Bratislava.

[+] 17 Nov: The US alert system test that a rumour of "zeroed" bank accounts and a worldwide internet shutdown is pegged to, per the CCD.

[+] 19 Nov: The "coalition of the willing" meets in Berlin, with Slovakia as an observer, per TASR.

[+] 23 Nov: Deadline of the European Commission's consultation on revised election guidelines under the Digital Services Act.

[+] 29 Nov: Spain's general election, already a Matryoshka target, per Maldita.es.

[+] 1 Dec: Estonia's road border crossings with Russia are due to close, per its foreign ministry as ERR reports; the government discusses the step next week.

[+] No date: The High Court in Prague on the appeal against Jang I-ming's acquittal, which Deník N notes still awaits him.

[+] No date: The Polish Senate's vote on the restrictive measures bill, with information manipulation as a ground for listing, which the Sejm passed on 6 November and whose Sejm record shows no Senate position yet.

[+] No date: Russia's promised retaliation for Austria's expulsion of four diplomats, per ORF.

[+] No date: The next part of The Gnida Project's "Inside CGE" series.

[-] Coverage gap: This issue does not draw on Manipulátoři.cz, the European Values Center, GLOBSEC's own report, PAP Fake Hunter, Demagog.org.pl's full list of fact-checks, Slovakia's SIS, VIGINUM's own publications, AFP's fact-checks, or Hungarian, Serbian, Bosnian and Nordic sources other than Norway's PST. Finding nothing there is not proof that nothing happened.

TTP patterns this week

Russia is the state behind 47 of the 50 records with a state actor this week, attributed or suspected, with two records for China and one for Iran, and 27 manipulation records have no known actor. What set the week apart was a look inside: the leak of John Mark Dougan's files put planning, payments and AI tooling into the Russian records, which fact-checks of single fakes rarely show, while one event, the Krakow shooting, again drew much of the content. This is the sixth set of records, so the per-week figures can be read as a short trend, but the numbers below are n/N records and several rest on a handful of cases.

[x] Tactic presence by actor: records using each DISARM tactic at least once

TACTIC (KILL-CHAIN ORDER)	RUSSIA (N=47)	UNATTRIBUTED (N=27)	CHINA (N=2)	IRAN (N=1)
TA01 Plan Strategy	2/47	0/27	[ ]	[ ]
TA02 Plan Objectives	38/47	11/27	[x]	[ ]
TA14 Develop Narratives	28/47	12/27	[ ]	[ ]
TA06 Develop Content	39/47	26/27	[x]	[ ]
TA15 Establish Assets	10/47	3/27	[x]	[x]
TA16 Establish Legitimacy	30/47	12/27	[x]	[x]
TA05 Microtarget	16/47	3/27	[x]	[ ]
TA07 Select Channels and Affordances	43/47	24/27	[x]	[x]
TA08 Conduct Pump Priming	12/47	2/27	[ ]	[ ]
TA09 Deliver Content	1/47	1/27	[ ]	[ ]
TA17 Maximise Exposure	5/47	4/27	[x]	[ ]

TACTIC (KILL-CHAIN ORDER)	RUSSIA (N=47)	UNATTRIBUTED (N=27)	CHINA (N=2)	IRAN (N=1)
TA18 Drive Online Harms	0/47	1/27	[ ]	[ ]
TA10 Drive Offline Activity	5/47	1/27	[ ]	[ ]
TA11 Persist in the Information Environment	9/47	3/27	[x]	[x]
TA12 Assess Effectiveness	2/47	0/27	[x]	[ ]

Not seen this week: TA13 Target Audience Analysis. Planning-phase tactics are rarely visible in open sources, so their absence says more about evidence than behaviour. TA02 includes inferred aims. Counting only aims a source states, Russia is 26/47 and unattributed is 5/27.

[1] **The Dougan leak shows the back office.** Planning (TA01) and assessment of effectiveness (TA12) are in 2/47 Russian records each, both the leak (W46-044 and its duplicate W46-107), and the same two records carry the only AI platform and AI-written text labels among Russian records (T0154.001 and T0085.001). Concealed sponsorship (T0130.001) is in 5/47: the leak (W46-044, -107), the Doppelganger interview archive (W46-055 and its duplicate W46-112) and the fabricated interview in The Diplomat (W46-090). The leak's Czech side, sites that the leaked messages say China pays for, is filed under China (W46-001), not Russia.

[2] **Breaking news carried more Russian content than last week.** Responding to a breaking event (T0068) is in 20/47 Russian records, after 15/36: five on the Krakow shooting (W46-030, -034, -035, -037, -042, two of them duplicates of W46-030), two on the Abu Dhabi talks (W46-070 and its duplicate -095) and three on the "torture chamber" story (W46-054, -073, -082). It is in 11/27 unattributed records too. Six of the 20 Russian records (W46-068, -070, -071, -076, -079, -082) rest first on Ukrainian state bodies.

[3] **Telegram carries Russian records, Facebook the unattributed, and the gap widened.** Telegram channels (T0151.007) are in 17/47 Russian records against 2/27 unattributed ones, after 10/36 and 2/15 last week, and Facebook and unspecified social networks (T0151.001) in 15/27 unattributed records against 3/47 Russian ones, after 7/15 and 6/36. Only two of the 17 Russian Telegram records (W46-074, -079) rest first on Ukrainian state bodies. Part of the gap is likely a selection effect: Telegram channels can be traced to known Russian networks, which is often what makes attribution possible, while anonymous Facebook posts usually cannot.

[4] **AI-made media turned up mostly where no actor is named.** AI-generated content is in 11/27 unattributed records, after 3/15 and 4/13 in the two issues before, against 7/47 Russian records, after 3/36 and 9/35. All 11 unattributed records rest on fact-checks of single fakes, such as the face swap of the Krakow attacker with Poland's interior minister (W46-016) and the AI videos of Ukrainian recruitment officers and Hasidic settlers (W46-084, -088), and two of the seven Russian ones are the leak's AI-written text rather than an AI artefact (W46-044, -107).

[5] **Borrowed brands stayed with Matryoshka.** A news-outlet persona (T0097.202) is in 6/47 Russian records, four of them the week's four Matryoshka records (W46-034, -054, -110, -119), and impersonation (T0143.003 or T0149.003) in 7/47, after 9/36. A lookalike domain (T0149.003) is back in one record, Storm-1516's copycat Washington Examiner site (W46-098), after none last week.

[6] **Legitimacy eased in share after two rises, and open voices grew.** TA16 Establish Legitimacy is in 30/47 Russian records, after 10/23, 18/31, 20/39, 24/35 and 26/36, so 64% against 72% last week. Officials and outlets speaking as themselves (T0143.001) are in 11/47, after 5/36, among them the FSB's spy claim (W46-025) and Russian officials on the Abu Dhabi talks (W46-070, -095). Eight of the 30 legitimacy records rest first on Ukrainian state bodies.

russian spoof-to-spread chain · records documenting each stage (n = 47)

disguise →	content →	seed →	spread
persona, spoofed brand, fake front	AI-made or manipulated real media	Telegram, X, Facebook, own or spoofed sites	localization, cross-posting, flooding
TA16	TA06	TA07	TA05 · TA17
30 / 47	**24 / 47**	**34 / 47**	**17 / 47**

All four stages are documented in 10 records: W46-034 (Matryoshka/Overload), W46-044 (Storm-1516), W46-057 (Pravda/Portal Kombat), W46-068 (Pravda/Portal Kombat), W46-070 (Pravda/Portal Kombat), W46-071 (Pravda/Portal Kombat), W46-072 (Pravda/Portal Kombat), W46-082, W46-086, W46-110 (Matryoshka/Overload). Stages count techniques, not whole tactics. Disguise is any TA16 label. Content is AI-made or edited media (T0023, T0023.001, T0084.003, T0085.001, T0086.002, T0086.003, T0087.001, T0087.002, T0088.001, T0088.002). Seed is T0151.001, T0151.007, T0151.008 or T0152.004. Spread is any TA17 label or T0101. That is why content and seed can count fewer records than TA06 and TA07.

[-] Read with care: these are six consecutive issues, and the 26 October and 1 November issues fall in one ISO week, so the per-week rows are issues rather than calendar weeks. 15 of the 84 labelled records rest first on Ukrainian state bodies, which are official sources but a party to the war, and they carry 7.2 labels on average against 7.0 for fact-checks (n=40) and 8.6 for media reports (n=17), so label density follows the source. China (W46-001, -005) and Iran (W46-114) rest on two records and one, too few for any pattern, and the two false-flag records (T0129.010, W46-023 and -036) are too few as well. 11 Russian records are attributed only as suspected, among them W46-023, -073 and -105. Seven records are duplicates and count twice: W46-016 of -007, W46-043 of -016, W46-037 and -042 of -030, W46-095 of -070, W46-107 of -044 and W46-112 of -055; W46-043 is filed as domestic where its originals are unattributed, because its sources name the Polish posters. The jump in AI-made media among unattributed records follows the fact-checks published this week, several of which found SynthID watermarks, so it may reflect detection as much as production. Labels come from secondary reporting, so they show what was documented, not everything the operators did.

[x] What to track as weeks accumulate

- [+] AI-made media in unattributed records (now 11/27, after 3/15 and 4/13) against Russian ones (7/47).
- [+] The Telegram and Facebook split between Russian and unattributed records (T0151.007 17/47 against 2/27, T0151.001 15/27 against 3/47).
- [+] Back-office tactics (TA01, TA12, TA15) beyond the Dougan leak, as further parts of The Gnida Project's series and NewsGuard's reading come out.
- [+] False flags meant to cast suspicion on Ukraine (T0129.010, 2/47 this week).
- [+] Legitimacy in Russian records (TA16, now 30/47 after 26/36), split between open voices (T0143.001, 11/47) and disguise.

Appendix: DISARM techniques used this week

121 techniques, ordered by tactic along the kill chain. Counts are records, not labels. RU = Russia, UNK = unattributed, CN = China, IR = Iran, DOM = domestic (excluded from the analysis). Each ID links to its definition in the DISARM framework, published by the DISARM Foundation under CC BY-SA 4.0.

TACTIC	ID	TECHNIQUE	RU	UNK	CN	IR	DOM
TA01	T0073	Determine Target Audiences	2	·	·	·	·
TA02	T0066	Degrade Adversary	1	·	·	·	·
TA02	T0075.001	Discredit Credible Sources	·	·	1	·	1
TA02	T0079	Divide	13	·	·	·	·
TA02	T0135.001	Smear	7	4	·	·	2
TA02	T0135.002	Thwart	8	·	·	·	·
TA02	T0135.003	Subvert	10	3	·	·	·
TA02	T0135.004	Polarise	1	1	·	·	·
TA02	T0136.001	Defend Reputaton	2	1	·	·	1
TA02	T0136.002	Justify Action	6	·	·	·	·
TA02	T0136.004	Boost Reputation	2	1	1	·	·
TA02	T0136.006	Cultivate Support for Ally	2	1	·	·	·
TA02	T0137.002	Scam	·	1	·	·	·
TA02	T0139.001	Discourage	3	·	·	·	·
TA02	T0139.003	Deter	·	1	·	·	·
TA02	T0140.003	Spread Hate	·	2	·	·	1
TA14	T0004	Develop Competing Narratives	11	4	·	·	2
TA14	T0022.001	Amplify Existing Conspiracy Theory Narratives	2	2	·	·	3
TA14	T0068	Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis	20	11	·	·	3
TA14	T0083	Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative	5	1	·	·	·
TA06	T0015	Create Hashtags and Search Artefacts	1	·	·	·	·
TA06	T0023	Distort Facts	12	2	·	·	·
TA06	T0023.001	Reframe Context	8	3	1	·	2
TA06	T0084.001	Use Copypasta	5	·	·	·	·
TA06	T0084.002	Plagiarise Content	2	·	·	·	·
TA06	T0084.003	Deceptively Labelled or Translated	1	7	·	·	2
TA06	T0084.004	Appropriate Content	1	·	1	·	·
TA06	T0085	Develop Text-Based Content	13	9	·	·	1
TA06	T0085.001	Develop AI-Generated Text	2	·	·	·	·
TA06	T0085.003	Develop Inauthentic News Articles	3	·	·	·	·
TA06	T0085.004	Develop Document	·	1	·	·	·
TA06	T0085.008	Machine Translated Text	1	·	1	·	·
TA06	T0086	Develop Image-Based Content	·	2	·	·	·
TA06	T0086.002	Develop AI-Generated Images (Deepfakes)	4	6	·	·	2
TA06	T0086.003	Deceptively Edit Images (Cheap Fakes)	2	2	·	·	·
TA06	T0087	Develop Video-Based Content	9	·	·	·	·
TA06	T0087.001	Develop AI-Generated Videos (Deepfakes)	1	5	·	·	·

TACTIC	ID	TECHNIQUE	RU	UNK	CN	IR	DOM
TA06	T0087.002	Deceptively Edit Video (Cheap Fakes)	1	1	·	·	·
TA06	T0088.001	Develop AI-Generated Audio (Deepfakes)	·	4	·	·	·
TA15	T0091.001	Recruit Contractors	6	·	1	·	·
TA15	T0091.002	Recruit Partisans	2	·	·	·	·
TA15	T0093.001	Fund Proxies	·	·	1	·	·
TA15	T0095	Develop Owned Media Assets	1	·	·	1	·
TA15	T0147	Software Asset	·	·	1	·	·
TA15	T0149.003	Lookalike Domain	1	·	·	·	·
TA15	T0149.009	Internet Connected Physical Asset	·	·	·	1	·
TA15	T0150.001	Newly Created Asset	1	1	·	·	·
TA15	T0150.005	Compromised Asset	·	2	·	1	·
TA15	T0150.008	Bulk Created Asset	1	·	·	·	·
TA16	T0097.101	Local Persona	1	·	·	·	·
TA16	T0097.102	Journalist Persona	7	·	·	·	·
TA16	T0097.104	Hacktivist Persona	·	·	·	1	·
TA16	T0097.106	Recruiter Persona	1	·	·	·	·
TA16	T0097.109	Romantic Suitor Persona	1	·	·	·	·
TA16	T0097.110	Party Official Persona	1	3	·	·	6
TA16	T0097.111	Government Official Persona	5	·	·	·	·
TA16	T0097.201	Local Institution Persona	·	1	·	·	·
TA16	T0097.202	News Outlet Persona	6	4	·	·	·
TA16	T0097.203	Fact Checking Organisation Persona	1	·	·	·	·
TA16	T0097.206	Government Institution Persona	4	·	·	·	·
TA16	T0097.207	NGO Persona	1	·	·	·	·
TA16	T0097.208	Social Cause Persona	1	2	·	·	·
TA16	T0098	Establish Inauthentic News Sites	·	·	1	·	·
TA16	T0098.001	Create Inauthentic News Sites	4	·	·	·	·
TA16	T0098.002	Leverage Existing Inauthentic News Sites	11	2	·	·	1
TA16	T0100	Co-Opt Trusted Sources	1	·	·	·	·
TA16	T0100.001	Co-Opt Trusted Individuals	4	·	·	·	·
TA16	T0100.003	Co-Opt Influencers	2	·	·	·	·
TA16	T0143.001	Authentic Persona	11	3	·	·	6
TA16	T0143.002	Fabricated Persona	9	2	·	1	·
TA16	T0143.003	Impersonated Persona	7	5	·	·	·
TA16	T0143.004	Parody Persona	·	1	·	·	·
TA05	T0016	Create Clickbait	2	·	·	·	·
TA05	T0101	Create Localised Content	14	2	2	·	·
TA05	T0102.001	Use Existing Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles	·	1	·	·	·
TA07	T0111	Traditional Media	19	·	2	·	·
TA07	T0111.001	TV	1	·	·	·	·
TA07	T0111.002	Newspaper	1	·	·	·	·
TA07	T0111.003	Radio	1	·	·	·	·
TA07	T0151.001	Social Media Platform	3	15	1	1	2
TA07	T0151.002	Online Community Group	·	1	·	·	1

TACTIC	ID	TECHNIQUE	RU	UNK	CN	IR	DOM
TA07	T0151.003	Online Community Page	2	2	·	·	3
TA07	T0151.004	Chat Platform	1	·	·	·	·
TA07	T0151.006	Chat Room	2	·	·	·	·
TA07	T0151.007	Chat Broadcast Group	17	2	1	·	1
TA07	T0151.008	Microblogging Platform	9	9	·	·	2
TA07	T0151.014	Comments Section	1	·	·	·	·
TA07	T0152.001	Blogging Platform	1	·	·	·	·
TA07	T0152.004	Website Asset	15	3	2	·	1
TA07	T0152.006	Video Platform	1	2	·	·	·
TA07	T0153.001	Email Platform	1	1	·	·	·
TA07	T0153.004	QR Code Asset	1	1	·	·	·
TA07	T0153.007	Direct Messaging	4	·	·	·	·
TA07	T0154.001	AI LLM Platform	2	·	·	·	·
TA08	T0042	Seed Kernel of Truth	10	2	·	·	1
TA08	T0044	Seed Distortions	1	·	·	·	·
TA08	T0046	Use Search Engine Optimisation	1	·	·	·	·
TA09	T0114.001	Social Media	·	1	·	·	·
TA09	T0116.001	Post Inauthentic Social Media Comment	1	·	·	·	·
TA17	T0039	Bait Influencer	1	·	1	·	·
TA17	T0049.001	Trolls Amplify and Manipulate	1	1	·	·	·
TA17	T0049.003	Bots Amplify via Automated Forwarding and Reposting	2	1	·	·	·
TA17	T0119.002	Post across Platform	2	·	·	·	·
TA17	T0122	Direct Users to Alternative Platforms	·	2	·	·	·
TA18	T0123	Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations	·	1	·	·	·
TA10	T0057	Organise Events	1	·	·	·	·
TA10	T0057.002	Conduct Symbolic Action	1	1	·	·	·
TA10	T0126.001	Call to Action to Attend	1	·	·	·	·
TA10	T0127.002	Encourage Physical Violence	2	·	·	·	·
TA11	T0060	Continue to Amplify	1	1	·	·	·
TA11	T0128.005	Change Names of Information Assets	2	·	·	·	·
TA11	T0129	Conceal Operational Activity	1	·	·	·	·
TA11	T0129.006	Deny Involvement	1	·	·	·	·
TA11	T0129.007	Delete Accounts/Account Activity	1	·	·	·	·
TA11	T0129.009	Remove Post Origins	·	1	·	·	1
TA11	T0129.010	Misattribute Activity	2	·	·	·	·
TA11	T0130.001	Conceal Sponsorship	5	1	1	1	·
TA11	T0130.004	Use Cryptocurrency	2	·	·	·	·
TA11	T0130.005	Obfuscate Payment	1	·	·	·	·
TA12	T0132	Measure Performance	1	·	·	·	·
TA12	T0134.001	Message Reach	1	·	1	·	·